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Essays in the Economics of Health Care and
the Regulation of Medical Technology
Abstract
The ﬁrst chapter of this dissertation explores how the regulatory approval process affects
innovation incentives in medical technologies. While prior studies of medical innovation
under regulation have found an early mover regulatory advantage for drugs, I ﬁnd the
opposite to be true for medical devices. Using detailed data on over three decades of
high-risk medical device approval times in the United States, I show pioneer entrants spend
approximately 34 percent (7.2 months) longer in the approval process than the ﬁrst follow-on
innovator. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the opportunity cost of capital
of a delay of this length is upwards of 7 percent of the total cost of bringing a new device
to market. I consider how different types of regulatory uncertainty affect approval times
and ﬁnd that a product’s technological novelty is largely unrelated to time spent under
review. In contrast, uncertainty about application content and format appears to play a
large role: when objective guidelines for evaluation are published, approval times quicken
for subsequent entrants. Finally, I consider how the regulatory process affects ﬁrms’ market
entry strategies and ﬁnd that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms are less likely to enter new device
markets as pioneers.
The second chapter considers the voting behaviors of individuals on expert advisory
committees at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Individuals on these com-
mittees sometimes have ﬁnancial conﬂicts of interest, which may result in a principal-agent
dilemma. Committee members also have institutional afﬁliations, a history of co-authoring
relationships, and different areas of expertise, which may inﬂuence voting behavior. Using
iiidata on over 1500 uniquely identiﬁed individuals at 110 new product meetings over a
seven-year period, I ﬁnd that in a simple analysis, ﬁnancially conﬂicted individuals are
18 percent more likely to vote favorably for new medical devices, but no more likely to
vote favorably for new drugs. This pattern is driven by individuals voting favorably for
competitors’ products and is consistent with a regulatory setting in which conﬂicted indi-
viduals help “pave the way” for subsequent entrants to move swiftly through the regulatory
approval process. I then describe a preliminary model of individuals’ voting behaviors
which incorporates both direct conﬂicts of interest and peer effects. Using this framework, I
ﬁnd reduced form evidence that the composition of an advisory committee adds additional
predictive power to a model of how individuals vote. Peer effects models suggest that at
high (low) levels of in favor voting within a meeting, the simple analysis is likely to to
understate (overstate) bias related to conﬂict of interest.
The ﬁnal chapter considers drivers of regional variations in healthcare spending in the
United States and is based on joint work with David Cutler, Jonathan Skinner, and David
Wennberg. There is considerable controversy about the causes of regional variations in
healthcare expenditures. We use a set of detailed vignettes from patient and physician
surveys linked to Medicare expenditures at the level of the Hospital Referral Region to test
whether patient demand-side factors or physician supply-side factors better explain regional
variations in Medicare spending. We ﬁnd patient demand is relatively unimportant in
explaining variations. Physician organizational factors (such as peer effects) matter, but the
single most important factor is physician beliefs about treatment: 36 percent of end-of-life
spending, and 17 percent of U.S. health care spending, are associated with physician beliefs
unsupported by clinical evidence.
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Uncertainty: Evidence from Medical
Technology
1.1 Introduction
When does regulation help or hinder pioneer innovators? On the one hand, ﬁrst mover
advantages in commercializing new technologies arise when ﬁrms can capture substantial
market share, for example through exclusive patenting. On the other hand, early innovators
may pay large ﬁxed costs in order to establish regulatory precedents and in doing so,
allow subsequent entrants to free ride. Thus, the effect of novelty on pioneer innovators is
ambiguous.
Industry regulation, in turn, is often associated with delayed or reduced ﬁrm entry; all
else equal, extended time between a new invention and its commercialization will reduce
incentives to innovate. For example Roin et. al. (2013) ﬁnd evidence of this phenomenon in
cancer research and development (R&D). Reductions in ﬁrms’ innovation incentives will,
in turn, have a downstream effect on their strategies for entering new markets. This paper
explores one determinant of these market entry choices by considering the costs of being a
1ﬁrst mover innovator in the context of new medical product regulation in the United States.
In the United States, all medical technologies are regulated by a single agency, the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The FDA regulates two trillion dollars worth
of products every year, including 80 percent of the U.S. food supply, cosmetics, animal
products, and, importantly for this study, all ethical drugs and medical devices (Babiarz
and Pisano, 2008). The FDA also regulates several emerging classes of medical products
such as biologic drugs (“biologics”), nanomedicines, tissue engineered products, and the
use and applications of cellular and gene therapies.
Previous studies of medical innovation under FDA regulation have focused almost
entirely on the pharmaceutical drug industry (Goldman and Lakdawalla, 2012), where early
mover regulatory advantages have been documented. For example, Carpenter et. al. (2010)
ﬁnd a small but statistically signiﬁcant relationship between entry order into a drug market
and approval times for new drugs: going from being ﬁrst to second to enter a given market is
associated with a regulatory approval process that is just over a week longer (approximately
a 1.2 percent increase in the length of the approval process). Relatedly, Dranove and
Meltzer (1994) show that more important chemical drugs are developed and approved more
rapidly. However, newer classes of medical technology – in particular, medical devices –
are characterized by a larger degree of product heterogeneity and signiﬁcant regulatory
uncertainty, changing the context of new product regulation.
I begin by comparing the dynamics of the well-established regulatory approval process
for new chemical drugs to the less studied and more uncertain regulatory approval process
for new medical devices, a category including products as wide-ranging as pacemakers,
coronary stents, and silicone breast implants. I ﬁnd that, in contrast to the early entrant
advantages observed in drug regulation, ﬁrst entrants in medical device markets experience
a strong disadvantage in the regulatory approval process. Using data spanning three
decades of regulatory approvals (1977-2007), I show that pioneer entrants in new device
product categories spend 34 percent (7.2 months) longer in the approval process than the
ﬁrst follow-on innovator in that category. This represents 16 to 21 percent of the total period
2of de facto market exclusivity a pioneer device innovator can expect to experience. Given the
concentration of earnings in the earliest years a device is on the market, back-of-the-envelope
calculations suggest that a delay of this length could mean a loss of approximately 8 percent
of expected lifetime product revenues.
I then ask how different types of regulatory uncertainty are related to approval times
in the medical device setting. I ﬁrst consider technological uncertainty – uncertainty on the
part of the regulator that involves a lack of technological or scientiﬁc understanding of a
speciﬁc type of product which is used for a given function in the human body. Technological
uncertainty arises most frequently in the evaluation of very novel medical devices, where
the regulator needs to understand the scientiﬁc mechanisms through which a device works
in the human body. Consider for example the ﬁrst time that the FDA was asked to evaluate
an implantable cardioverter deﬁbrillator (ICD1) for approval. The ﬁrst ICD was approved
by the FDA in 1984 and at that time, the technological uncertainty faced by regulators was
centered around understanding precisely how the device interacts with the heart and the
surrounding tissues with which it is in contact.
Research and development on ICDs continued over subsequent years and to date, over
two dozen later-generation ICDs have been approved by the FDA. Some of these ICDs were
classiﬁed under the same product code as the originally approved device, but starting in
1997, some approved ICDs were given a new product code due to modiﬁcations in the
design of the device (for example, one group of ICDs that has emerged since 1997 involves
two electrodes inserted into the heart, rather than just one). While these later products
were somewhat different than earlier models, the FDA had already established a good
understanding of how ICDs function as well as an understanding of how to assess the
technology involved in these devices by the time that later-generation ICDs began applying
for regulatory approval.
1An ICD is a small device that is surgically placed in the chest or abdomen, which is used
to treat irregular heartbeats called arrhythmias. An ICD uses electrical pulses to help control life-
threatening arrhythmias – in particular, those that can cause sudden cardiac arrest and subsequent death
(http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-topics/topics/icd)
3Exploiting the fact that some products with the same technical function are given a
new nominal classiﬁcation as a result of design changes, I ask how much of the longer
regulatory approval times for ﬁrst entrants can be explained by technological novelty vs.
(nominal) categorical novelty. I ﬁnd that once I control for the designation of being in a
“new product code,” knowing whether or not a device was technologically novel does not
provide any additional explanatory power in understanding regulatory approval times. This
suggests that the regulator’s familiarity or lack of familiarity with the primary technology
used in a new medical device is not the primary determinant of the length of the regulatory
approval process. For example, the ﬁrst ICDs in later-established ICD product codes still
experienced a regulatory delay associated with being the “ﬁrst entrant,” despite the fact
that the regulator was already familiar with the technology used in these devices.
If technological novelty is not the primary driver of longer regulatory approval times for
ﬁrst mover innovators, than what else might be at play? The results suggest that there is
something particular about the administrative designation of being in a new product code
that is of importance – that for some reason the categorical change associated with a new
product code itself is predictive of longer regulatory approval times. With this in mind,
I next consider the role of a different type of uncertainty: uncertainty about content and
format of a new product application.
Content and format uncertainty occurs in the absence of clear guidelines for the protocol
for evaluating a new product, leading to uncertainty on the part of the regulator as to how
to assess the results of clinical studies and other (e.g. biocompatibility and engineering) tests.
This type of uncertainty almost certainly co-occurs with technological uncertainty for new
products, and without the establishment of clear evaluation standards, it will persist long
into a product’s development lifecycle. Content and format uncertainty is easiest to think
of in a scenario in which a product and its functionality are known to the regulator, but
evaluation criteria are not formally articulated or established. This can be seen in the case of
drug eluting stents2 (DESs), which were ﬁrst submitted to the FDA for approval in 2002.
2Catheter-based procedures are frequently used to treat blockages in the arteries of the heart (coronary
4It was not until 2008, however – after ﬁve different DESs had submitted applications for
regulatory approval and four had already been cleared – that the FDA published a formal
guidance document, detailing what criteria it would use to evaluate DESs moving forward.
I consider the release of FDA guidance on DESs and eight other unique medical devices.
In each case, objective regulatory guidance was introduced for a group of already-established
products (i.e. multiple approvals had already occurred). I ﬁnd that on average, approval
times for subsequent entrants fall by approximately 40 percent (6.1 months) after application
content and evaluation procedures are made explicit through formal guidance. In contrast to
technological uncertainty, uncertainty about content and format of new product applications
appears to play a large role in explaining regulatory approval times for ﬁrst movers, and
overall.
This ﬁnding has implications for other emerging categories of medical technology
including biologics, tissue engineered products, and the applications of cellular and gene
therapies – all settings in which there is a large degree of uncertainty about the content and
format of new product applications and as a corollary, around how to evaluate new products.
This is the result of both a short regulatory history and dearth of established regulatory
criteria. For these new product categories, regulatory approval times are similarly likely to
be substantially protracted (relative to what is administratively required) until a time when
objective product evaluation criteria are formalized and made available to innovators.
After showing the impact of uncertainty on review times, I consider how the implicit
costs of the regulatory approval process affect ﬁrms’ strategies for entry into new medical
device product categories. I consider ﬁrm behavior under regulatory uncertainty, given
likely additional costs of gaining regulatory approval in new product codes. I evaluate the
behavior of all cardiovascular device ﬁrms in the data and ﬁnd that ﬁnancially constrained
ﬁrms are less likely to enter new device markets as pioneers: the fraction of ﬁnancially
arteries). Often a stent is used to prevent restentosis (renarrowing) of the diseased artery. Stents are small metal
tubes that are inserted and expanded into the artery wall and used to keep the previously narrowed artery
segment open. Drug eluting stents (DESs) are medication-coated stents that reduce the chance of renarrowing
of the blood vessel (Maisel and Lasky, 2007)
5constrained ﬁrms among pioneer entrants into device markets is between 25 and 52 percent
lower3 than among follow-on entrants.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: the next section describes the markets for
drugs and medical devices and the institutions that regulate their entry. Section 3 lays out
a model of regulatory delay and subsequent ﬁrm choice given large anticipated costs for
pioneer innovators. Section 4 describes the data on new drug and device approvals used in
the empirical analyses in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 concludes.
1.2 Background: Markets and Regulatory Frameworks
1.2.1 Medical Products: Deﬁnitions and Markets
This paper considers two large categories of medical products: chemical drugs and medical
devices. Chemical drugs are deﬁned by the FDA4 as “articles intended for use in the
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease” and “articles (other than
food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body.” Examples of drugs
include familiar ingestible or injectable products such as antibiotics and oral contraceptives.
A medical device is deﬁned by the FDA5 as an “instrument, apparatus, implement, machine,
contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article...intended for
use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment,
or prevention of disease” and “which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the
achievement of any of its principal intended purposes.” Examples of medical devices range
from stethoscopes to breast implants, to prosthetic limbs and pacemakers.
U.S. drug and device markets are large: at an annual $320b and $140b respectively,
these markets make up a meaningful share of the $2.7 trillion that is spent annually on
3depending on the deﬁnition used; see Section 1.6 and Table 1.10 for detailed descriptions.
4FD&C Act, sec. 201(g)(1)
5http://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/overview/classifyyourdevice
6health care in the United States6. Drug spending is greater – however, devices and other
emerging medical technologies make up a growing share of national health expenditures:
while spending on prescription drugs grew at an annual rate of approximately 3.3% over
the ﬁve years ending in 2011, spending on medical devices grew at a rate of 6.0% (versus
4.5% overall health expenditure growth over the same period). In addition to representing
large medical product markets in the United States, drugs and devices offer substantial
research opportunities: detailed data are available across product classes and over the entire
history of the FDA’s regulation of these products.
Other emerging categories of medical technology also comprise an increasing share of
health spending. One prominent example is that of biologics, a group of large, complex
and heterogeneous proteins derived from living organisms, which are often the primary
component of vaccines and cancer therapies. Because they are more complex and derived
from living cells, biologic drugs are regulated separately from chemical drugs. Although
biologics do not appear in the analysis below, they resemble devices in their heterogeneity
and shorter regulatory history and are poised to increase in both economic importance and
regulatory submissions over the coming years. In 2010, seven of the top 20 drugs in the US
were biologics (Lancet, 2012).7
Drugs are a relatively homogeneous category of products with a century-long history of
regulation. By comparison, medical devices and other non-drug medical products have a
shorter regulatory history and are far more heterogeneous. As such, for devices and other
newer categories of medical technology, it is more difﬁcult to deﬁne detailed regulatory
standards for new products ex ante. Given the greater degree of regulatory uncertainty for
innovators in the medical device industry, I explore what types of incentives have been
6Source: National Health Expenditures, 2012
7Another example of an emerging medical technology is that of nanomedicine – a term used to deﬁne the
application of nanotechnology in medicine. Nanomedicine involves the use of particles in the size range of
100 nanometres (nm) or less and includes liposomes, polymer conjugates, protein/antibody conjugates, block
polymer micelles, cross-linked (nano)gels, bioactive synthetic polymers/vesicles, nanoparticles and nano-sized
drug crystals. Nanomedicines are mainly anticancer, anti-infective or immunomodulator drugs. The global
nanomedicines market was valued at $72.8 billion in 2011 and is expected to reach $130.9 billion in 2016
(Generics and Biosimilars Initiative, 2013).
7created by the regulatory system in place.
1.2.2 Medical Product Regulation in the United States: The FDA
In the United States, all medical technologies are regulated by a single agency, the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The FDA is an agency of the Department of Health
and Human Services and is responsible for the oversight of two trillion dollars worth of
products every year, including all over-the-counter and prescription drugs and medical
devices (Babiarz and Pisano, 2008; Hamburg and Sharfstien, 2009). The FDA also regulates
all other new and emerging classes of medical products. The precursor to the modern
FDA was established through the Pure Food and Drug Act, which was signed by President
Theodore Roosevelt in 1906. It was not until seven decades later, however, that the FDA’s
regulatory scope grew to include medical devices, which came under FDA regulation in
1976.
The FDA is organized into centers, each of which is tasked with the oversight of a
different type of product. The two centers most relevant to the analysis below are the Center
for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) and the Center for Devices and Radiological
Health (CDRH), which regulate chemical drugs and medical devices, respectively8. Within
the CDER, the Ofﬁce of Drug Evaluation is responsible for the approval of new drugs and
within the CDRH, the Ofﬁce of Device Evaluation is responsible for the review and approval
of medical devices. Other categories of products are also reviewed by specialty centers
within the FDA (e.g. biologics and human cells, tissues, and cellular- and tissue-based
products are reviewed by the FDA’s Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, CBER).
1.2.3 The FDA and the Regulation of Drugs
The foundation of the FDA’s modern statutory authority to regulate medical products
is the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA), which requires that new
drugs be tested for safety and that those tests be submitted to the government for marking
8The CDRH also regulates radiation-emitting products such as X-ray and ultrasound machines
8approval (Babiarz and Pisano, 2008; FDA, 2013). The FDCA “endowed the FDA with
sole authority to reject the ex ante marketability of any new pharmaceutical product”
(Carpenter, 2010) and resulted in the establishment of the new drug application process
(NDA), the “vehicle through which drug sponsors formally propose that the FDA approve
a new pharmaceutical for sale and marketing in the U.S.”9 The goals of the NDA are
to provide sufﬁcient information on drug safety and effectiveness for proposed uses, to
determine whether the contents of proposed labeling are appropriate, and to evaluate
whether manufacturing methods used are adequate.
The NDA is organized into technical sections,10 which are evaluated by specialized
review teams of experts (Monahan and Babiarz, 2008). The components of the NDA are
speciﬁc and well-deﬁned for all types of drugs. For example, for the information required
about the drug’s manufacturing scheme, the applicant ﬁrm must describe the synthesis of the
active ingredient, including details on all starting materials, solvents, reagents, intermediate
substances and their compilations and analytical controls (Monahan and Babiarz, 2008). The
results of randomized, typically placebo-controlled clinical trials11 are also an important
component of any NDA. During the FDA’s in-depth review of the NDA, the sponsor may
also be required to submit additional information supporting the drug application (Babiarz
and Pisano, 2008). The average approval time for a new drug in this study is 23.5 months,
although the average for a drug that is ﬁrst in its disease group is shorter, at 19.3 months.
Figures 1.2 and 1.2 provide additional information on the chronology and requirements of
9http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved
/ApprovalApplications/NewDrugApplicationNDA
10Requirements are outlined in FDCA and Title 21 of the US Code of Federal Regulations part 314
11Typically three phases of clinical trials are required in order for the FDA to be assured of a drug’s safety
and effectiveness (although sometimes approval decisions are made early based on demonstrated need for a
drug and very promising results in phase II trials). Phase I trials are typically very small (N=20 to 80) and
are primarily for determining drug safety and establishing side effects. Assuming that Phase I trials don’t
reveal unacceptable levels of harm, Phase II trials are conducted in a greater number of healthy subjects (as
many as a few hundred, with the exception of drugs for diseases like cancer) and the focus is on establishing a
product’s effectiveness. Phase III trials begin following evidence of effectiveness in Phase II and are usually
very large studies (N= hundreds to 3000). Phase III studies are designed to have sufﬁcient statistical power
to conﬁrm a product’s safety and effectiveness in different populations and different dosages (FDA, 2012;
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143534.htm)
9the NDA process.
1.2.4 The FDA and the Regulation of Medical Devices
The FDCA of 1938 did not impose any pre-approval requirements on medical devices, which
instead were regulated at the state level at the discretion of each state’s legislature for nearly
four subsequent decades. It wasn’t until 1976, after a series of well-publicized medical
device failures, that Congress passed the Medical Device Amendments Act (MDA), which
gave the FDA primary authority to regulate devices sold in the United States (Sall, 2008;
Kramer et. al., 2012; Munsey 1995).
Devices are diverse in their cost, invasiveness, function, and risk: they include products
ranging from tongue depressors and stethoscopes (which the FDA classiﬁes as “low-risk”
devices) to hearing aids (“moderate-risk” devices) to pacemakers and prosthetic heart valves
(“high-risk” devices). The MDA delineates these three risk groups and lays out the rules for
regulating each differently. This paper focuses only on approval regulation of “high-risk”
(Class III) devices which “support or sustain human life” and are of the highest risk (FDA,
2002).12 Unlike moderate and low risk devices, high-risk devices are are subject to a rigorous
regulatory process that is similar to that imposed on new drugs (Zuckerman et. al. 2011;
Goldman and Lakdawalla, 2012), requiring detailed product information and evidence of
safety and effectiveness from clinical trials. While high risk devices represent only about one
percent of the devices that the FDA regulates each year (Redberg and Dhruva, 2011), they
represent an out-sized fraction of medical device spending: In 2008, spending on the six
highest-cost implanted devices alone was about $13 billion (Meier, 2009), or approximately
10 percent of total U.S. medical device spending.
The regulatory approval process for high-risk devices is called “premarket approval”
(PMA) and is necessary when a medical device developer wants to market a new high-risk
device. Importantly, once the ﬁrst device in a product code is approved through the PMA
12http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/Premarket
Submissions/PremarketApprovalPMA/ucm2007514.htm
10process, all subsequent devices in that product code go through the PMA process.13 The
average approval time for a new device is 18.1 months, although the average for a device
that is ﬁrst within a product code is longer, at 22.5 months. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 provide
additional information on the chronology and requirements of the PMA process and Figure
1.2 highlights similarities and differences between the requirements for the NDA and PMA.
Much like the NDA, the PMA is a complex document ﬁled by the manufacturer that contains
information about the product and results of clinical trials. As is the case for drugs, Section
515 of the FDCA requires that a PMA provide scientiﬁc evidence of safety and effectiveness,
typically in the form of data from a pivotal study.14 However, as the next section explains,
the types of trials that can constitute a pivotal study for a new high-risk medical device are
highly heterogeneous and to a large extent, open to interpretation – an important difference
between the regulatory approval processes for drugs vs. devices.
1.2.5 Drugs vs. Medical Devices: Regulatory Differences
Importantly – and unlike drug trials – clinical trials for medical devices may take many
different and often more ﬂexible forms. In new drug studies, three phases of randomized
controlled trials are the norm. In device trials, however, clinical evidence can come from
a variety of sources: trials may take the form of well controlled investigations, partially
controlled investigations, objective trials without matched controls, and other types of
studies “from which it can fairly and responsibly be concluded by qualiﬁed experts that
there is reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness of a device under its conditions of
13The 510(k) process, which allows devices to be cleared for marketing on the basis of being “sufﬁciently
similar” to other already-cleared devices was originally intended for use with medium-risk devices only. In
recent years, some high-risk devices have also managed to gain clearance through this process, but these are not
devices that have a history or precedent of PMA approval within the product code. The 510(k) process has been
criticized for being used too freely and the Institute of Medicine has convened a committee to look at its use
(Garber, 2010). This is certainly an important area for further research, however this paper focuses only on those
device product codes that are explicitly designated for the PMA-track approval process.
14The clinical study report includes the study design and protocol, patient enrollment and exclusion data,
primary and secondary endpoints of the study, data from all patients entered into the trial, and detailed
statistical analysis of the results. Technical data on biocompatibility, stress and fatigue, shelf life, and other
relevant non-clinical tests are also submitted (Zenios et. al., 2010)
11Figure 1.1: Regulatory Approval Processes: Drugs & Devices
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13use” (21 CFR 860.7(c)(2)).
This lack of speciﬁcity about the type and execution of clinical trials is largely the result
of product and delivery-method heterogeneity across medical devices. Given these sources
of heterogeneity, regulators have been unable to articulate general rules or guidelines for
medical device clinical trials and subsequent regulatory evaluation that are both sufﬁciently
broad so as to be relevant to devices ranging from pacemakers to silicone breast implants,
while still being sufﬁciently speciﬁc to guide the clinical trials and the regulatory evaluation
of all types of devices.
While drugs are almost always delivered in one of just a few conventional ways (admin-
istered orally, injected intravenously or intramuscularly, inhaled, or administered topically),
the insertion and delivery method of a new high-risk medical device is often a novel process
with few (if any) related prior clinical trials to use as a precedent or guide. Thus, both the
planning and execution of device trials are substantially more heterogenous than those for
new chemical drugs. Devices can be used, implanted, or otherwise administered in hun-
dreds of ways. Furthermore, how a device is used or the method by which an implantable
device is put into the human body is often not only unique, but also critical to the success
or failure of a trial (Sall, 2008).
The large degree of heterogeneity across medical devices and in the processes required
for their evaluation combined with non-speciﬁc regulatory language about how clinical
trials should proceed results in a much greater degree of uncertainty around content and
format requirements for device regulation (vs. drug regulation) because the regulator’s
expectations are typically not clearly known or deﬁned ex ante. Chatterji (2009) relays the
anecdote of one extreme case of regulatory uncertainty: the company Acorn Cardiovascular
“believed they were close to FDA approval in 2002 for their device that helps to shrink
enlarged hearts, but the FDA instead recommended a much larger clinical trial that ended
up taking three more years and costing the company $30 million.”
While this represents an extreme example of delay due to regulatory uncertainty, it is also
true that in general, FDA decisions are rarely made immediately after a PMA submission.
14Indeed there are typically at least two cycles of requests and responses between the FDA
and the applicant ﬁrm before a decision is made (Zenios et. al., 2010). This is because for
most devices, the evaluation criteria that the FDA will use to assess a new product are not
made explicit before the regulatory process begins. An important exception to this are cases
where the FDA publishes regulatory guidance, a list of objective product evaluation criteria
addressing application content and format that will be used to assess all devices of a certain
type moving forward. The publication of such guidance is considered in detail in Section
5.3 of this paper.
Appendix A.1 presents additional case studies of ﬁrms’ experiences with regulatory
uncertainty and delay. Case 1 in Appendix A.1 presents the story of a heart failure
monitoring system that has been under consideration at the FDA for three years. At the
time of writing, the device has already been through one large-scale controlled clinical trial
and one follow-up study, but the FDA has yet to come to an approval decision. Case 2
presents a typical occurrence for a new high-risk device: following the completion of a
randomized, double-blind, sham-controlled pivotal clinical trial that yielded statistically
signiﬁcant results supporting the device’s safety and efﬁcacy, the FDA returned to the
manufacturer with follow-up questions related to device testing and clinical data.
In sum, although device manufacturers need to present clinical trial evidence to the
FDA, the lack of regulatory speciﬁcity about what types of data to collect and present
to regulators as well as the content and format of a new product application makes the
regulatory process for devices far more uncertain than that of drugs. In the sections that
follow, I will explore how this uncertainty plays out in product approval times and ﬁrms’
strategies for entering new markets.
1.2.6 A Note on Safety vs. Speed of Regulation
A long debate has engaged with the tradeoffs between regulatory speed and consumer safety.
In a 2009 piece in the New England Journal of Medicine, FDA Commissioner Margaret
Hamburg and Principal Deputy Commissioner Joshua Sharfstein discuss the balance that
15the FDA must strike between risks to consumers and speed of regulation: “as a public
health agency, the FDA should always ask whether delays in approval or safety problems
can be prevented” (Hamburg and Sharfstien, 2009).
This paper does not assess or weigh in on the balance between regulatory speed and
consumer safety in current policies. Rather, I consider factors that may affect delays in
new product regulation on the intensive margin – that is, given the regulatory system as
experienced by medical product innovators in the United States – and as such, the length of
development times experienced by ﬁrms. My conclusions concern only the context of the
regulatory system in place, given a regulatory agency that aims to protect both consumer
safety and its own reputation. These dual goals are reﬂected in the model discussed in the
next section and described in detail in Appendix A.2.
1.3 A Model of Approval Regulation and Firm Strategy
In many industries, government approval or licensing is a prerequisite for market entry.
Examples include nearly all parts of the energy, health care and transportation industries.
This paper considers the experiences of medical technology ﬁrms in their interactions with
the FDA.
1.3.1 Framework and Regulator Decision-Making
The ﬁrst part of my empirical work builds on Carpenter et. al.’s (2010), model15 of the FDA
drug approval process. In this model, a farsighted regulator discounts the future pipeline of
device approvals and decides how rapidly to approve a new device in light of this. In such
a setting, the regulator gets greater utility from quickly approving an earlier entrant into a
given market than a later entrant. Appendix B presents details of this model of approval by
a farsighted regulator.
15This framework is also related to Carpetner (2004). In this model, “early entrants” into an exclusive market
niche (disease) receive shorter expected approval times than later entrants, even when later entrants offer known
quality improvements over earlier products.
16In the model, the regulator can also respond to political factors, which is consistent
with existing evidence on the political economy of the FDA’s regulatory behavior. For
example, studies show that the FDA responds to the demands of lobby groups representing
(potential) drug consumers, such as cancer or AIDS organizations (Olson, 1995; Carpenter
2002; Carpenter et. al., 2010).
Individual ﬁrms may also exert pressure on the FDA16, although recent work on phar-
maceutical drug approvals has found limited evidence of their inﬂuence on regulatory
approval times (Carpenter et. al., 2010). In the model and analyses that follow, I account for
ﬁrm and disease-speciﬁc factors that may inﬂuence the duration of the regulatory approval
process without focusing on their relative importance (for example, Acemoglu and Linn
(2004) ﬁnd that potential market size has a strong inﬂuence on the entry of non-generic
drugs and new molecular entities while Carpenter (2004) ﬁnds that ﬁrms submitting more
new product applications may expect quicker and more likely approvals). In doing so, I
deviate from Carpenter et. al. (2010) in deﬁning a more general model of approval priorities
for an uncertain regulator.
I begin with a simple, ﬂexible model of regulatory approval times that includes known
covariates, such as those factors identiﬁed above. Both ﬁrms and the regulator observe the
relationship between regulatory approval times and application characteristics. Approval
time (T) of product p, of entry order f produced by ﬁrm f, in year t is observed as:
Tpf ft = f(bX) (1.1)
where Xs include:
• Entry order within a product code (devices) or disease group (drugs)
• Advisory panel (organized by medical specialty), product group, and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects
• Year of review
• Applicant ﬁrm’s cumulative regulatory experience
16Other work – e.g. Thomas (1990) has found that FDA regulations have heterogeneous effects on ﬁrm
productivity by ﬁrm size.
17• Eligibility for expedited review (e.g. product is for a rare/orphan/terminal disease)
Because the regulator discounts the future pipeline of products, it would prefer to
approve earlier products more quickly (see Appendix B). Thus, review times should be
increasing in entry order ceteris paribus. In other words, all else equal, earlier entrants should
beneﬁt from a shorter regulatory process (and later products should experience increasingly
longer approval times) leading to early mover advantages in the approval process.
However, when there is regulatory uncertainty about how to evaluate a product, it will
increase the time that a regulator spends on the approval decision. Further, because that
uncertainty is likely to be inversely related to entry order (i.e. uncertainty is greater among
the ﬁrst products to seek regulatory approval), the presence of regulatory uncertainty could
affect approval times in the opposite direction of the early mover regulatory advantages
described above. Indeed, if regulatory uncertainty is great enough, it could lead to longer
regulatory approval times for earlier entrants, even given the regulator’s preference for
getting more novel products to market quickly.
To account for entry-order speciﬁc uncertainty, I modify Equation 1. I relate review
times to the set of determinants above as well as an uncertainty term:






D + # if f < f⇤
0, otherwise
(1.3)
For simplicity, regulatory uncertainty, Upf, can be thought of as generating a ﬁxed delay
during the regulatory approval process, on average D, although a more general framework
would model Upf = g(f)+e where g0(f) < 0. That is, among some set of the earliest
entrants for whom the regulator is uncertain as to how to regulate the new product in
question, approval times are D longer, on average. When D is large, expected approval
times will increase. Thus, even when the regulator prefers faster approval for earlier entrants,
a large value of D implies that approval times for the earliest entrants could be longer than
18those of subsequent entrants.
In the empirical section of this paper, I ask when there is evidence that D > 0 and for
which values of f this is the case. By knowing the values of f (entry order), for which
there are additional costs of regulatory approval, one can evaluate which set of entrants are
disadvantaged (in the form of extended approval times) in the approval process. In Section
5, I ﬁrst focus on estimating the additional regulatory approval times associated with early
entrants – i.e. the cost of pioneer entry that is directly observable in this data. However,
there are other additional costs likely to accrue to early innovators such as additional legal
fees and shortened periods of market exclusivity; these are discussed later in the paper.
In addition, the empirical section of the paper addresses the fact that Upf likely has
several components. I am unable to identify all of them, but note that a factor that increases
Upf should also lead to longer approval times. I consider two such factors – technological
uncertainty and uncertainty about application content and format – which I am able to
analyze separately by taking advantage of two unique sources of variation in the regulatory
approval data. I test the model above and the role of different types of regulatory uncertainty
in Section 5.
1.3.2 Firm Strategy
Finally, I present a testable hypothesis about ﬁrm strategy that emerges from the model
described above. Both ﬁrms and the regulator observe to-date regulatory approvals, approval
times, and the entry order of all prior products. Firms know that greater uncertainty
increases time spent on regulatory approval and decide which markets to enter, given
anticipated costs and beneﬁts. The ﬁrst dimension on which a ﬁrm makes a decision is
whether to enter a novel or existing market. All else equal, this decision will be inﬂuenced
by the relative cost of novel vs. established product regulation.
Assume that each ﬁrm, F, has capital KF. Firms expect an uncertainty-driven delay of
length D (as above) for innovating in a new market. For a ﬁrm, the implied cost of being
a ﬁrst mover is an increasing function of the length of the anticipated regulatory delay
19and a decreasing function of ﬁrm capital (as ﬁnancially-constrained ﬁrms will have less
capital allocated for R&D and/or higher costs of borrowing) such that CF = c(D,KF). Now
consider two ﬁrms: Firm A has a large stock of available capital (e.g. Firm A as a large,
publicly listed company with a large R&D budget), while Firm B is ﬁnancially constrained
(e.g. Firm B is small and has a ﬁnite amount of venture capital to deploy and faces high
costs of borrowing or additional fundraising) such that KA > KB. Then in a given product
area, the relative cost of innovating in a new market is greater for Firm B than for Firm A
(i.e., CB > CA) because the expected value of D is the same for both ﬁrms.
Assume a distribution of the value of pioneer entry into new markets, such that there
is a range of potential proﬁts, p, that can be captured by the ﬁrst entrant. Then each ﬁrm
decides whether the expected marginal value of being the ﬁrst entrant is greater than the
marginal cost of being the ﬁrst mover: p > c(D,KF). Since relative costs are greater for
Firm B than for Firm A, Firm B will be willing to enter fewer new markets than Firm A.
More generally, ﬁnancially-constrained ﬁrms should be less inclined to enter new markets
as pioneers when there are large delays associated with doing so.
Market Entry Hypothesis: In the presence of delays under regulatory uncertainty, ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrms should be less likely to act as pioneer entrants
1.4 Data
The ﬁrst two sources of data I use are FDA databases: the New Drug Approval (NDA)
database and the Premarket Approval (PMA) database. Later in my analyses, I also use
information from a detailed ﬁrm-level dataset, which was collected by hand from ﬁnancial
databases and ﬁrm websites and includes ﬁnancial, ownership, and acquisition data for all
cardiovascular device ﬁrms represented in the PMA data.
The FDA’s NDA database includes a comprehensive list of all new drug approvals in
the FDA’s regulatory history.17 For comparability in my empirical analyses and in order
17I am grateful to Daniel Carpenter for sharing the cleaned data from Carpenter, et. al. (2010) for this project.
The raw data are available at http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/InformationOnDrugs/ucm135821.htm
20to focus on contemporaneous regulatory periods for both drugs and devices, I limit the
years of drug application data used to only those applications that were submitted after
1976 (when the FDA ﬁrst began regulating medical devices) and through 2007. While later
data are available, I truncate the approval data to avoid any bias that would be created by
using a sample in which only the fastest approvals in more recent years would be observed.
I consider a ﬁnal sample of 693 unique drug approvals that are indicated for 187 disease
groups. “Disease groups” are speciﬁc product categories based on the function and target
of a drug that are likely to be very good to excellent clinical substitutes for one another – for
example, anti-inﬂammatory agents, contraceptives, or statins. The data also include detailed
information about the date of NDA submission, date of FDA decision, the submitting
ﬁrm’s identity, and an indicator for whether a product received “priority” or expedited
review (e.g. a drug could be eligible for expedited review because it is used for a rare or
late-stage/terminal disease). I observe approval times as elapsed days or months from the
date of the NDA submission to FDA decision.18 Summary statistics are presented in Table
1.1.
The data on high-risk device approvals come from the FDA’s PMA database,19 which
includes an exhaustive record of all PMA approvals since the 1976 Medical Device Amend-
ments to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. As with the NDA data, I include all
submissions starting in calendar year 1977 and truncate the data to include submissions
through the year 2007.20 The medical device approval data summarized in Table 1.1 include
847 unique device approvals in 249 product codes. Product codes are speciﬁc deﬁnitions
18One reader noted that it may be harder to recruit patients for clinical trials for non-ﬁrst-in-class drugs, and
that this could make the clinical trials last longer and extend commercialization lags for non-pioneers. While this
may be true, it would represent an effect above and beyond what I observe in the FDA’s data on approval times,
which measure time between submission and an approval decision and not pre-NDA-submission phenomena
such as the duration of clinical trials.
19The raw data are available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpma/pma.cfm
20For example: a device application that was submitted in 2007 and approved in 2010 would be included in
the dataset. A device application submitted in 2011 and approved in 2012 would not because its submission
occurred after the end of calendar year 2007.
21Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
New Drug Applications (NDAs) - Drugs: N=693
Premarket Applications (PMAs) - Devices: N=847
Premarket Applications (Cardiovascular Devices): N=241
Drugs Devices CV Devices
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Approval Time (Months) 23.54 17.67 18.12 15.84 17.31 12.96
Approval Time (1st Product) 19.31 14.40 21.48 16.77 23.07 18.16
Entry Order 13.64 17.81 6.37 8.79 5.06 4.32
Priority Review 0.44 0.50 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.29
New Applications (Current) 7.68 7.78 15.32 20.63 27.57 25.92
Submission Year 1991 7.42 1994 8.46 1995 7.98
Firm 57 FEs – 32 FEs – 15 FEs –
Disease Group / Product Code 187 FEs – 249 FEs – 55 FEs –
Summary statistics for the 693 drugs and 847 medical devices used in the empirical
analyses, as well as separate descriptive statistics for the subset of (241) cardiovascular
devices alone. Approval Time measures months from PMA/NDA submission until FDA
approval. Entry Order is based on the chronological ordering of PMA or NDA sub-
missions. Priority Review is an indicator for whether a product was eligible for expe-
dited FDA review. New Applications (Current) is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc, time-varying count of
successful new product applications that the applicant ﬁrm has completed at the time
of a given submission. Submission year is the calendar year in which an application
was sent to the FDA. Firm contains a set of dummy variables for each ﬁrm in the data
set or a dummy indicator for being a “small” ﬁrm – i.e. one with fewer than ﬁve new
applications over the entire period of observation.
22based on design and function that “delineate [a device’s] technology and indication,”21 such
as drug-eluding stents or silicone breast implants. As an analog to drug disease groups,
device product codes are likely to be very good to excellent clinical substitutes for one
another. A list of example device product code names as well as an example of a device
product code deﬁnition from the FDA can be found in Appendix C. The PMA database
also includes detailed information about the date of each application’s submission, date of
FDA decision, the submitting ﬁrm’s identity, and an indicator for whether a product ever
received “priority” or expedited review.
Table 1.1 highlights several similarities and important differences between the drug and
device approval data. While average approval times in the sample are longer for drugs (22.5
months) than devices (18.1 months), the average approval times for the ﬁrst product in a
given category are shorter for drugs (19.3 months) than for devices (21.5 months). Drugs
tend to have more entry per product category (13.6 products on average) than devices
(6.4 products on average) and drugs are also far more likely to be eligible for “priority”
(expedited) review (44 percent of drugs vs. 10 percent of devices).
I focus many analyses on understanding medical device approval times and for a subset
of the exercises that follow, I focus only on high-risk cardiovascular devices, which are
those reviewed by the Circulatory System Devices Panel. Table 1.2 shows the distribution of
medical device approvals by specialty. Cardiovascular (circulatory system) devices make up
by far the largest speciality area, comprising 241 out of the 847 applications in the data, or
approximately 28.5 percent of the total device sample.
Finally, for the set of ﬁrms that produce the high-risk cardiovascular devices in the PMA
database, I collect detailed ﬁrm-level ﬁnancial and ownership data. These include data
on ﬁrm size (as measured by annual revenues), ﬁrm ownership (public vs. private), and
whether and when a ﬁrm was acquired by another company – as well as the identity of that
company and the year of acquisition, if relevant. Financial data were collected from Google
Finance, NASDAQ, NYSE Euronext, and from ﬁrm websites.
21http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments
23Table 1.2: New Devices by Advisory Committee (Specialty)
Advisory Committee New Devices Percent
Circulatory System 241 28.45
Opthalmic 160 18.89
Microbiology 74 8.74
General and Plastic Surgery 60 7.08
Gastroenterology-Urology 53 6.26
Orthopedic and Rehabilitation 53 6.26
Immunology 38 4.49
Obstetrics and Gynecology 33 3.90
Radiology 28 3.31
General Hospital and Personal use 23 2.72
Clinical Chemistry and Toxicology 17 2.01
Dental 15 1.77
Ear, nose and throat 13 1.53
Neurology 13 1.53
Anesthesiology 12 1.42
Physical Medicine 8 0.94
Hematology and pathology 6 0.71
(Total) 847 100.00
This table shows the distribution of all 847 new devices analyzed
in this study by FDA (specialty-speciﬁc) Advisory Committee.
24Throughout the paper, I observe data on new product approvals, not on innovation and
other decisions prior to the regulatory approval process. This means that I do not observe
those products that are abandoned before or during the Premarket Approval process, based
on unpromising clinical results. As such, the approval time phenomena I observe and the
effects that I calculate represent the effects of regulation on the regulated, and not the effect of
regulation on those products that do not make it into (or through) the approval process.22
1.5 Empirical Estimation
I proceed with a series of estimates from the models above. I ﬁrst compare drugs and
devices using the model of regulatory approval times presented in Section 1.3. I then test
the hypothesis about ﬁrm market entry strategies in detailed ﬁrm-level data.
1.5.1 Approval Times and Entry Order
The ﬁrst part of this analysis is grounded in the literature on the determinants of FDA
approval times for new drugs, notably Carpenter et. al. (2010) and others. I account for
potential political and institutional factors that may affect approval times while estimating
the relationship between product entry order and approval times for both drugs and devices.
Carpenter et. al. (2010) deﬁne “entry order” as the order in which a drug within a given
disease group submits an application for FDA approval. I extend this deﬁnition to its closest
analog for medical devices: the order in which a medical device within a given product
code submits an application for FDA approval.
22While the fraction of PMAs that are rejected following the PMA process is negligible (zero in recent years),
the fraction of devices that are granted investigational device exemptions and then never apply for approval
through the PMA process is likely higher. This data is not currently available to the public. I have requested it
through the FDA’s Division of Freedom of Information and hope that future versions of this paper will be able
to shed additional light on the existence and nature of selection that may be involved in understanding which
devices (and which type of ﬁrms’ devices) are most likely to make it to the stage of regulatory approval.
25Table 1.3: Entry order and Approval Times
Outcome = Ln Time to Approval
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Log-Linear) (Log-Linear) (Cox Hazard) (Cox Hazard)
Drugs Devices Drugs Devices
Entry Order 0.0200** -0.0098* -0.0207*** 0.0265***
(0.0074) (0.0047) (0.0057) (0.0063)
Controls X X XX
N 693 847 693 847
R2 0.3587 0.1048
F-test P[(b1)=( b2)] = 0.000 P[(b3)=( b4)] = 0.000
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
This table shows the average relationships between product entry order
and approval times for drugs and devices.
Columns 1 and 2 represent the results from a (parametric) log-normal model.
Columns 3 and 4 present the results form a (semi-parametric) Cox hazard
model. Columns 1 and 3 consider new drug approvals and columns 2 and 4
consider new device approvals. The dependent variable in all models is the
natural log of approval time from submission.
All models include ﬁrm and product type ﬁxed effects and a time trend (year)
Results presented are robust to the exclusion/inclusion of ﬁrm ﬁxed effects
and to the use of year ﬁxed effects rather than a time trend. All models also
include controls for whether a product was granted “priority” (expedited)
review as well as a count of the applicant ﬁrm’s total approved applications
at the time of submission. Standard errors are clustered at the product level.
26I begin my analysis by replicating Carpenter et. al.’s (2010) results on the set of 693 new
chemical drugs described above. Columns 1 and 3 of Table 1.3 show the results of both a
parametric (log-normal) model and a semi-parametric (Cox proportional hazard) model.23
As previously observed, I ﬁnd evidence of a positive, statistically signiﬁcant entry order
gradient in approval times for new drugs that is persistent, robust to multiple statistical
speciﬁcations, and tantamount to early mover advantage in the drug regulatory approval
process. On average, a one unit increase in entry order is associated with approximately
a 2 percent increase in regulatory approval times for new drugs within a disease group
(e.g. among statins, oral contraceptives, etc.). The results are statistically signiﬁcant at
conventional levels and robust to the inclusion of ﬁrm and year ﬁxed effects or a time trend,
disease group ﬁxed or random effects, and a time-varying indicator of a ﬁrm’s “expertise”
in navigating the regulatory process (for which I use a ﬁrm-speciﬁc, time-varying count of
successfully approved NDAs at the time of a given new application as a proxy).
I then conduct a parallel analysis for the approval times of new medical devices. In
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 1.3, I repeat both the parametric (log-normal) and semi-parametric
(Cox proportional hazard) analyses on the dataset of 847 new medical devices. In the medical
device sample, I document a statistically signiﬁcant relationship, which is oppositely signed
compared to that estimated for drugs: on average, a one unit increase in entry order is
associated with approximately a 1 percent decrease in regulatory approval times for new
medical devices. That is, the later a product enters a given market, the shorter the average
time to regulatory approval. These medical device approval models also present results that
are statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels and robust to the inclusion of ﬁrm and
year ﬁxed effects or a time trend, product code ﬁxed or random effects, and a time-varying
indicator of a ﬁrm’s “expertise” in navigating the regulatory process (for which I use a
ﬁrm-speciﬁc, time-varying count of successfully approved PMAs at the time of a given
new application as a proxy). F-tests comparing the drug versus device coefﬁcients reject
23The log-normal model can be interpreted as the percentage change in approval time associated with a one
unit increase in entry order. The Cox proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972) reports the effect of a unit increase
in entry order with respect to the hazard rate of exiting the approval process.
27the equivalence of the relationships between entry order and approval times for these two
categories of products at the 0.001 percent level in both sets of models.
Having found evidence of early mover regulatory advantages (on average) in drug
approval times and early mover regulatory disadvantages (on average) for device approval
times, I turn to understanding the drivers of these patterns. If the relationship seen in device
approvals is a result of early entrant regulatory disadvantage, there are three phenomena
that should be observable in the data. First, if observed patterns are being driven by early
entrants, one should expect to see stronger relationships in samples that include these
entrants and should not expect to see the same patterns in samples that do not include
early entrants. Second, it should be possible to identify those entrants for whom there are
additional delays associated with entry order and third, to quantify their magnitude.
Table 1.4 tests the ﬁrst implication above. Column 0 replicates the two sets of log-linear
results in Table 1.3: on average, approval times are decreasing in entry order for devices and
increasing in entry order for drugs. Subsequent columns of Table 1.4 then ask the question:
“what is the relationship between entry order and approval times when considering only
entrants beyond the Zth product?” While the positive entry order gradient documented in the
regulatory approval of new drugs is relatively stable over the product development lifecycle
of a category of drugs, this is not the case for devices: the negative entry order gradient
disappears as soon as the ﬁrst entrants are excluded from the sample. The device results in
Table 1.4 thus suggest that delays accrue mostly to the ﬁrst entrant in a device product code
and that the inclusion of these early entrants drives overall averages in the data.
To explain the ﬁrst entrant effects further, the ﬁrst column of Table 1.5 uses dummy
variable indicators for a product being ﬁrst, second, third, fourth, or greater than ﬁfth in a
product code, rather than a linear indicator of entry order. Column 2 estimates the same
model as Column 1, but uses months as the independent variable. Column 3 compares only
the ﬁrst entrant to the ﬁrst unambiguous follow-on entrant (i.e. the ﬁrst PMA submitted in
a product code vs. the ﬁrst PMA submitted after the ﬁrst PMA had been approved) and
ﬁnds that relative to the ﬁrst follow-on entrant, a pioneer entrant spends approximately
28Table 1.4: Truncated Samples and Approval Times
Outcome = Ln Time to Approval for Products of Entry Order >Z
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Z=1 Z=2 Z=4 Z=6
Drugs
Product Entry Order 0.0200** 0.0195* 0.0236** 0.0295*** 0.0303**
(0.0074) (0.0076) (0.0072) (0.0084) (0.0092)
Controls X XX X X
N 693 581 497 394 337
R2 0.3587 0.3824 0.4365 0.4938 0.4927
Devices
Product Entry Order -0.0098** -0.0054 0.0014 -0.0050 -0.0069
(0.0047) (0.0062) (0.0069) (0.0090) (0.0148)
Controls X XX X X
N 847 608 479 330 234
R2 0.1048 0.1253 0.1400 0.1478 0.1682
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Column 1 replicates the log-linear results in column 3 of Table 1.3. Subsequent
columns answer the question: “what is the relationship between entry order
and approval times when considering only entrants beyond the Zth product?”
Columns 2 - 5 show results for an increasingly later group of entrants into
a product code as one reads from left to right.
All models include ﬁrm and advisory committee ﬁxed effects and a time trend
(year). Results presented are robust to the exclusion/inclusion of ﬁrm ﬁxed
effects and to the use of year ﬁxed effects rather than a time trend. All models
also include controls for whethera product was granted “priority” (expedited)
review as well as a count of the applicant ﬁrm’s total approved applications at
the time of submission. Standard errors are clustered at the product level.
29Table 1.5: Quantifying Early Mover Disadvantage
Outcome = Device Approval Time (Months)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln Approval Approval Ln Approval Approval
Time Time Time Time
(Months) (Months)
First in Product Code 0.2157** 5.7158*** 0.3376*** 7.1993***
(0.0890) (1.5015) (0.0914) (1.3238)
Second in Product Code -0.0705 0.1781
(0.0887) (1.3966)
Third in Product Code 0.1208 4.7995
(0.1235) (3.4273)
Fourth in Product Code 0.0039 1.6371
(0.0694) (1.7781)
Greater than 5th in Product Code -0.0536 0.9762
(0.0732) (1.0754)
Full Sample X X
Restricted Sample X X
(1st + 1st Follow-on Only)
N 847 847 342 342
R2 0.0934 0.1073 0.1105 0.0986
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Column 1 shows the relationship between the listed entry order dummies and the
log of approval time. Column 2 converts these results into months. Column 3
considers only the difference in approval times between the ﬁrst applicant (the
pioneer) and the ﬁrst unambiguous follow-on innovator in the same product code.
Column 4 converts these results into months.
All models include ﬁrm and advisory committee ﬁxed effects and a time trend (year)
and are robust to the exclusion/inclusion of year ﬁxed effects rather than a time
trend. All models also include controls for whether a product was granted “priority”
(expedited) review as well as a count of the applicant ﬁrm’s total approved appli-
cations at the time of submission. Standard errors are clustered at the product level.
3034 percent longer in the regulatory approval process. Column 4 converts this result into
months, indicating that a pioneer spends an average of 7.2 months (approximately 219 days)
longer in the regulatory approval process than the ﬁrst unambiguous follow-on entrant
into the same product code. The results from Tables 1.4 and 1.5 also allow me to put an
upper bound on the value of f⇤: approval delays are only statistically signiﬁcant for the
ﬁrst entrant into a product code, suggesting that the value of f⇤ is close to 1.
With the brunt of the costs of delay borne by the ﬁrst entrant, one might wonder about
the ﬁnancial implications of pioneer innovation. Consider the estimated value of D, the
7.2 month longer approval times estimated for pioneer entrants: how large is this? One
benchmark is the length of delay relative to the length of the period of de facto market
exclusivity that a pioneer can expect to have. In the full medical device sample, the ﬁrst
entrant into a product code has an average of 3.8 years as the sole product with regulatory
approval before the second product is approved for market entry – that is, the pioneer can
expect an average of 3.8 years of de facto market exclusivity. For high-risk cardiovascular
devices, this period is just 2.8 years. Thus as a ratio, the additional time a pioneer medical
device can expect to spend in regulation is between 15.8 and 21.4 percent of the total period
of time it can expect to spend alone on the market.
For medical devices, earnings are often concentrated in the ﬁrst few years in which a
product is marketed, making the role of approval times especially important in determining
a device’s proﬁtability. According to the 2013 Annual Report from Medtronic (the world’s
largest medical device company) 38 percent of 2013 revenues were from products introduced
in the last three years (Medtronic, 2013). While it is only a rough estimation of lost revenue,
it is illustrative to think about what a 7.2-month regulatory delay means in this context:
7.2 months represents 20 percent of three years. If, on average, a medical device makes 38
percent of its total proﬁts over its ﬁrst three years on the market (as the Medtronic average
would indicate), then a 7.2 month delay in getting to market would translate into a decrease
of approximately 8 percent of lifetime revenues per new device.
31A ﬁnal way to think about the observed delay is in the context of the implied opportunity
cost of capital. In medical product industries, the opportunity costs of capital are large.
Assuming a typical discount rate used for the biotechnology industry of 11.5% (DiMasi and
Grabowski, 2007), one can calculate the opportunity cost of a 7.2 month delay. Makower
et. al. (2010) survey roughly 20% of ﬁrms in the medical device industry and ﬁnd that the
average cost of bringing a high-risk medical device to market is about $94 million. Assuming
a discount rate of 11.5%, the results suggest that the opportunity cost of capital of the delay
associated with being the ﬁrst entrant in a product code is probably at least $6.7 million, or
more generally, over 7 percent of the total cost of device development.
1.5.2 Sources of Uncertainty Part 1: Is Technological Novelty Associated with
Longer Approval Times?
Given evidence of longer regulatory approval times for the earliest innovators in a medical
device product code, I next explore some potential explanations. Regulatory delay has
many potential components. One of the most obvious is technological uncertainty about the
workings of a new product. Technological uncertainty broadly encompasses uncertainty on
the part of the regulator due to a lack of scientiﬁc familiarity with or understanding of a
speciﬁc type of product used for a given function.
When a product is very novel – i.e. the regulator has never seen anything that performs
its function before – technological uncertainty is high. An example can be seen in the
historical approvals of implantable cardioverter deﬁbrillators (ICDs) described in Section
1.1. However, when the technological uncertainty around a certain type of device has been
largely resolved – for example through multiple assessments and approvals of that type
of technology – one would expect to see a decrease in that component of approval delay
associated with technological uncertainty for subsequent product approvals.
I use the information embedded in FDA-deﬁned, detailed device product names24 to
24The FDA has 16 independent panels for device classiﬁcation. These panels are found in 21 CFR 862-892.
For each of the devices classiﬁed by the FDA the CFR gives a general description including the intended use,
the class to which the device belongs (i.e., Class I, II, or III), and information about marketing requirements.
32measure product “novelty” in a subsample of high-risk cardiovascular devices. I look
within cardiovascular devices because this is by far the largest specialty area in the data,
representing over 28% of all new device approvals and because this speciality includes the
greatest number of unique product codes.
I identify eight “functional categories” of devices, each of which contains multiple
unique device product codes, but all of which share a common cardiovascular function,
making each category a natural setting for comparing highly related products. Examples
include functional categories for stents, implantable cardioverter deﬁbrillators (ICDs), and
replacement heart valves. Each of these functional categories includes multiple products
that have the same general function in the human body, but some variation in the materials
from which they are made, their method of delivery, and/or the product design, resulting
in administrative classiﬁcations of multiple product codes within each functional category.
Figure 1.3 provides a guide to functional category construction for the subsample. The eight
functional categories analyzed and the number of products and product codes in each are
listed in Table 1.6.
To evaluate how technological uncertainty affects approval delays, I consider whether
a prior device approval within the same functional category is associated with reduced
approval times for subsequent new devices in that functional category. Devices in a
functional category will, by deﬁnition, be highly similar to one another. Moreover, the prior
approval of the ﬁrst of a particular device (e.g. catheter) should lead to a technological
understanding of that type of product among reviewers for subsequent products of that
type. Thus I ask: when a device is ﬁrst in its product code, but its primary technological function
and components are already known to the regulator, are regulatory times shorter? In other words, I
control for the designation of being ﬁrst within a product code and then ask empirically
how much additional explanatory power (if any) can be gleaned from knowing that a device
was scientiﬁcally novel.
I identify the earliest entrant in each functional category of products and then look for
(http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDevice)
33Figure 1.3: Functional Category Construction
High Risk (Class III) Devices!
Regulated by Advisory Committees (N=17; organized at specialty level)!
Cardiovascular! Radiology! Ear, Nose & Throat! etc… !
Multiple Categories !
(organized by function & technology)!
Pacemakers (N=29 !
in 4 product codes)!
ICDs (N=23!
in 4 product codes)!
Stents (N=45!
in 5 product codes)!
Electrodes (N=3!
in 3 product codes) !!
Heart Valves (N=25 
in 4 product codes)!
Lasers (N=6 !
in 3 product codes)!
Catheters (N=47 !
in 9 product codes)!
Occluders (N=7 !
in 4 product codes)!
Table 1.6: Functional Category Composition
(Cardiovascular Devices)
Device Function Number of Unique Number of Unique
(Category) Product Codes Devices (Total)
1. Pacemaker 4 29
2. Catheter 9 47
3. ICD 4 23
4. Electrodes 3 3
5. Stents 5 45
6. Valves 4 25
7. Laser for Angioplasty 3 6
8. Occluder 4 7
This table presents the eight functional categories evaluated in
Section 1.5.4. Each of the categories contains multiple unique product
codes, making each a useful setting for comparing technologically
similar products.
34subsequent entrants into that category. These subsequent entrants are the clear beneﬁciaries
of reduced technological uncertainty because the ﬁrst product of that kind had necessarily
already being approved. This is true regardless of entry order within the relevant device
product code – which may or may not be different from entry order within the functional
category.
Because this analysis is limited to a smaller sample of only cardiovascular devices, I ﬁrst
repeat the product-code-level analyses of Table 1.5 for the subset of cardiovascular devices
alone. The results of this analysis are presented in Panel A of Table 1.7 and yield coefﬁcients
of a very similar magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance to those seen in Table 1.5: being ﬁrst
within a product code is associated with a regulatory approval process that is 5.1 to 6.8
months longer. I next proceed with the analysis at the functional category level. I ﬁnd little
evidence of the importance of reduced technological uncertainty in explaining subsequent
approval times (Panel B). The results suggest that on average, being ﬁrst within a functional
category is associated with a regulatory approval process that longer, but these results are
not statistically signiﬁcant at any conventional levels.25
In Panel C, I ask how much – if any – of the delay seen for a new entrant in a product code
is reduced when a highly related product has already completed the regulatory approval
process. Speciﬁcally, I control for the resolution of a large degree of technological uncertainty
(at the functional category level) and then look at the residual relationship between product
code entry order and approval delay. The statistically and economically non-signiﬁcant
coefﬁcients on “First in Category” suggest a very limited role for technological uncertainty
in explaining regulatory delays. However, in this speciﬁcation, being ﬁrst within a product
code is associated with a regulatory approval process that is 5.3 to 7.2 months longer and
these coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. Indeed, it seems that the
delineation of a new product code itself, rather than the novelty of the technology involved
25In models not presented, I also perform a “placebo test” in which I randomly assign each of the devices to
one of eight arbitrary dummy categories and then run the same set of regressions. As would be expected, a
prior approval of another randomly selected and unrelated cardiovascular device does not help in predicting
approval times for subsequent cardiovascular devices.
35Table 1.7: Technological Novelty in Cardiovascular Devices
(A) (B) (C)
Ln Approval Approval Approval
Time Time Time
(Months) (Months)
Panel A: Cardiovascular Subsample Only (by Prod. Code)
First in Product Code 0.2334* 5.1143** 6.8224**
(0.1292) (2.4862) (2.6205)
N 183 183 163
R2 0.5009 0.4372 0.4118
Panel B: Devices in 8 Functional Categories
First in Category 0.1624 2.7185 9.0857
(0.2767) (5.3434) (5.8699)
N 183 183 179
R2 0.4899 0.4206 0.4218
Panel C: Controlling for Technological Uncertainty
First in Product Code 0.2327* 5.2872** 7.1890**
(0.1376) (2.6466) (2.8121)
First in Category 0.0041 -1.1056 -2.1300
(0.2934) (5.6446) (5.7774)
N 183 183 163
R2 0.5009 0.4374 0.4125
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
This table looks at ﬁrst entrants and their respective approval
delays in a) product codes b) functional categories and c) both
in the same model.
All models include ﬁrm and year ﬁxed effects. Models also
include controls for whether a product was granted “priority”
(expedited) review and a count of the applicant ﬁrm’s approved
applications at the time of submission.
Column 1 presents a log-linear model, while Column 2 translates
the result into months. Column 3 restricts the sample to only the
ﬁrst entrant plus those subsequent entrants who submitted appli-
cations after the ﬁrst entrant’s approval decision was ﬁnalized.
36in that product’s primary function is the strongest predictor of longer regulatory approval
times.
1.5.3 Sources of Uncertainty Part 2: Reduced Uncertainty about Application
Content and Format through Publication of Objective Regulatory Criteria
This section addresses cases in which procedural uncertainty about new product application
content and format is resolved through the publication of formal guidance documents.
This type of uncertainty occurs in the absence of clear guidelines about the protocol for
evaluating a new product, leading to uncertainty on the part of the regulator as to how to
evaluate the results of clinical studies and other (e.g. biocompatibility and engineering) tests
and uncertainty on the part of ﬁrms as to what information to submit to the regulator and
in what format. An example of the resolution of procedural uncertainty can be seen in the
publication of FDA guidance documents related to the regulation of drug eluting stents,
which is described in Section 1.1.
The publication of formal FDA guidance about a speciﬁc product or class of products26
is the primary way in which protocols for evaluating a new medical device are formally
established. In 1997, the FDA announced that it would formalize its Good Guidance Practices
in order “to provide transparency and consistency in policy development” moving forward
(FDA, 2007).27 Examples include documents that describe the:
• design, production, ...manufacturing, and testing of regulated products
• processing, content, and evaluation or approval of submissions
26The history of FDA guidance dates back to the 1970s, when the FDA began to issue “guidelines” for
clinical trials, a regulatory norm (less stringent than formal rule-making) that would lead to an important
role of “guidance documents” in communicating structures of clinical experiment and drug development to
the pharmaceutical industry moving forward (Carpenter, 2010). Guidance documents continue to shape the
FDA’s regulation of medical products to this day and their scope has expanded with that of the FDA to include
medical devices and other products.
27Guidance documents are issued by the FDA, however their standardization in the 21st century has been
governed by a formal congressional regulation: on September 19th, 2000, Congress approved regulation (21
CFR 10.115), which outlined the FDA’s policies and procedures for developing, issuing, and using guidance
documents. While the FDA had released various medical device guidance documents prior to 2000, they were
not standardized and so their interpretability and signiﬁcance were more limited.
37Table 1.8: Case Studies, Publication of Objective Regulatory Guidance
Product Type Date Product Pre-Guidance Post-Guidance N (obs)
Published Code(s) Approval Approval
Affected Time (Months) Time (Months)
Drug-Eluting Stents (3/1/2008) 1 15.38 8.75 9
Intravascular Stents (4/18/2010) 4 13.50 8.02 42
Heart Valves (1/20/2010) 3 11.83 9.00 6
Catheter Ablation Devices (8/5/2008) 1 14.29 9.36 7
(N=49) (N=15) (N=64)
This table summarizes four recent cases in which objective regulatory guidelines were published
by the FDA for major categories of cardiovascular devices. In each of the cases, regulatory delays
fall substantially in the period after guidance is published. The data are raw and un-adjusted for
potentially relevant covariates.
• inspection and enforcement policies
In recent years, the FDA has released several pieces of guidance related to medical
devices, which are available from the Ofﬁce of Device Evaluation (ODE). Of the 162 pieces
of guidance released since the approval of GGPs, the vast majority deal with Class II
(moderate-risk) devices and several others relate to general evaluation practices, rather than
focusing on speciﬁc technologies. I consider a set of high-risk device policy changes around
the publication of four pieces of formal guidance. These pieces of guidance directly outline
objective evaluation criteria relating to the PMA process for nine speciﬁc product codes of
high-risk (Class III) cardiovascular devices. These guidance documents and the dates of
their publication are listed in Table 1.8.
In each of these cases, uncertainty around application content and format was largely
resolved through the release of formal content and evaluation guidelines for new product
applications and in each of these cases, average approval times subsequently decreased. In
the analysis that follows, I deﬁne “post-guidance” applications as those that were submitted
one month or more after the release of guidance for a given product code or set of products.
This ensures that all post-guidance applications were able to incorporate information from
the FDA guidance into their application prior to submission.
Table 1.8 shows that (without any controls), following the publication of regulatory
guidance, an average decrease in regulatory approval times of 2.8 to 6.6 months was observed
38Table 1.9: Publication of Objective Regulatory Guidance
Outcome = Approval Time







Controls X X X X
Excluding ﬁrst 2 Entrants X
Pre-Post Analysis X X
Matched Analysis X X
N 64 51 192 192
R2 0.3401 0.3944
†p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Controls = submission year, priority review eligibility, applicant
ﬁrm, applicant ﬁrm’s to-date total approvals, product code, entry
order. Column 3: nearest neighbor matching on observables
to identify two similar “untreated”/control applications.
in affected groups. Table 1.9 includes statistically appropriate control variables and estimates
the covariate-adjusted average decrease in approval time associated with the publication
of guidance. All models in Table 1.9 include product code ﬁxed effects and controls for
whether a product was granted “priority” (expedited) review, year of submission, and a
count of the applicant ﬁrm’s total approved PMAs at the time of submission. The ﬁrst
column of Table 1.9 presents a covariate-adjusted pre-post analysis of approval times with
respect to the publication of regulatory guidance for all applications in affected categories.
Column 2 excludes the ﬁrst two entrants in each group so as not to bias the results by
including applications in the pre-guidance average that are known to have longer approval
times.
Although these results are consistent with the conclusion that uncertainty about ap-
plication content and format is an important driver of ﬁrst mover disadvantage in the
medical device regulatory process, one might be concerned about likely endogeneity in
39the FDA’s decision to publish guidance for these particular devices. For example, it may
be the case that more “popular” categories of medical devices were more likely to get
regulatory guidance. To address potential selection, Column 3 presents results from a
nearest neighbor matching analysis in which each device in a “treated” product code (i.e.
one in which guidance was at some point published) is matched to two other “untreated”
devices (other high-risk cardiovascular devices in product codes in which guidance was
not published) based on ex ante observables about the application and relevant product
code including entry order, submission year, total PMA submissions in the product code
at the time of a given application, and average approval times in the product code. Both
the average treatment effect (ATE) and average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of the
introduction of regulatory guidance are presented. Even the most conservative estimate
(the ATE presented in Column 3), suggests that the resolution of procedural uncertainty
through the publication of formal guidance is associated with a 6.1 month (approximately
185 day) reduction in regulatory approval times. In this subsample, that represents a 41
percent reduction in regulatory approval times.
The results above complement existing research on the determinants of entrepreneurial
success in the device industry: Chatterji (2009) ﬁnds evidence that for venture capital
funded companies, familiarity with protocols is more important then technical knowledge
for predicting ﬁrm successes. My results in turn, suggest that uncertainty about the content
and format of a new product application is more important then technological uncertainty
about a product for predicting regulatory approval times.
1.6 Entrant Type and Strategy
The ﬁnal empirical section of this paper considers the relationship between ﬁrm type and
market entry strategies. The market entry hypothesis in Section 1.3.2, suggests that in the
presence of delays under regulatory uncertainty, ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms should be
less likely to enter new device markets as pioneers. Looking within the ownership and
ﬁnancial data assembled for all cardiovascular device ﬁrms in the data, I identify those ﬁrms
40that are most likely to be ﬁnancially constrained. For this exercise, I deﬁne a ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrm as one that a) is not publicly listed, b) does not have revenues of more than
$500 million per year, and c) is not a subsidiary of ﬁrms of type a or b. This leaves a set of
small, privately held ﬁrms, none of which are subsidiaries of larger companies.
Using the criteria above, Table 1.10 considers how the proportion of ﬁnancially con-
strained ﬁrms varies with the application of the above deﬁnition. The most conservative
deﬁnition (“Deﬁnition 1”) looks only at those ﬁrms that were deﬁned as “ﬁnancially
constrained” at least one year before an application was submitted. The next deﬁnition
(“Deﬁnition 2”) excludes those ﬁrms that were or became subsidiaries of established ﬁrms
within a ﬁve year window of a given PMA submission (for example, Irvine biomedical’s
percutaneous cardiac ablation catheter was submitted to the FDA for approval in 2004,
acquired by St. Jude in the same year, and received approval in 2005. This product would
count as "ﬁnancially constrained" under Deﬁnition 1, but not under Deﬁnition 2, which is
broader). The third deﬁnition (“Deﬁnition 3”) broadly classiﬁed “ﬁnancially constrained”
ﬁrms as those that never met criteria a, b, or c above – that is, they were never part of a
more established (less ﬁnancially constrained) company.
I ﬁnd that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms make up 6.9 to 17.2 percent of the sample
among pioneer entrants but 14.3 to 23.0 percent of the sample among follow-on entrants.
The difference between these two samples is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level for
Deﬁnitions 2 and 3 in two-sample t-tests of means with unequal variance. The difference
between the two samples is not statistically signiﬁcant based on Deﬁnition 1, likely a result
of the small sample sizes used to calculate the averages, however the average differences
between proportions of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms among pioneers and follow-on entrants
are consistent with the hypothesis’s predictions in all cases.
1.7 Discussion and Conclusion
I have considered how regulatory uncertainty is related to ﬁrst mover advantages and
disadvantages in the regulatory approval process for new chemical drugs and high-risk
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(1) (2) (3)
Pioneer Entrants Follow-On Entrants P[(1) = (2)]†
Deﬁnition 1 17.2% 23.0% 0.3169
Deﬁnition 2 10.3% 19.4% 0.0657
Deﬁnition 3 6.9% 14.3% 0.0751
† P-values are from a 2-sided t-test with unequal variances.
A ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm as one that is not a) publicly listed, b)
does not have revenues of more than $500 million per year, and c)
is not a subsidiary of ﬁrms of type a or b.
Deﬁnition 1: only those ﬁrms that were deﬁned as “ﬁnancially
constrained” at least one year before an application was submitted.
Deﬁnition 2: excludes those ﬁrms that were or became subsidiaries
of established ﬁrms within ﬁve years of a given PMA submission.
Deﬁnition 3: ﬁrms that never met criteria a, b, or c above.
medical devices. The data on FDA drug approvals show that earlier entrants into drug
markets experience a slight advantage over later entrants in the regulatory approval process.
However, the data on FDA medical device approvals reveal large ﬁxed costs of early entry
into new device markets: pioneer entrants in new device product codes spend 34 percent
longer in the approval process than the ﬁrst follow-on innovator in that product code. I
estimate that the magnitude of the additional approval time faced by pioneer innovators is
approximately 7.2 months, a large delay relative to the 2.8 to 3.8 years of de facto market
exclusivity that a pioneer innovator can expect. Back of the envelope calculations suggest
that a delay of this length could translate to a loss of approximately 8 percent of expected
lifetime product revenues and that the opportunity cost of capital of a delay of this length is
upwards of 7 percent of the total cost of bringing a high-risk medical device to market. I
ﬁnd that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms are less likely to act as pioneer innovators. This result
is consistent with the prediction that ﬁrms with more capital should be better able and/or
more willing to bear the additional regulatory costs of pioneer entry.
I analyze regulatory approval times under two sources of uncertainty by looking at
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ﬁnd that large delays for the ﬁrst entrant in a product code persist even when a great
degree of technological uncertainty has been resolved. In contrast, I ﬁnd that the resolution
of uncertainty about application content and format through the publication of formal
regulatory guidance to clarify product evaluation criteria is associated with substantially
reduced approval times thereafter. These results complement other research into the
importance of understanding regulatory protocols in the medical device industry; for
example, Chatterji (2009) ﬁnds that regulatory and procedural knowledge is more important
then technical knowledge for predicting ﬁrm success.
This paper contributes to a broad literature about the relationship between regulatory
uncertainty and innovation incentives – in particular, with respect to medical devices and
other emerging categories of medical products, where methods for effectively incentivizing
innovation remains poorly understood (Xu et. al., 2013). Generally speaking, incentives
for engaging in R&D activity are negatively inﬂuenced by increases in the costs and risks
of developing new products (Grabowski et. all, 1976). This study is therefore related to
research on how R&D incentives affect the pipeline of innovation. Budish et. al. (2013)
ﬁnd evidence that private ﬁrms’ incentives to innovate have meaningful impact on the
level and composition of R&D investments. Moreover, they ﬁnd that increases in R&D – in
particular in cases where there may be underinvestment – have the potential to generate
large improvements in patient health. This paper suggests that under regulatory uncertainty,
the nature of the approval process for new medical products can create disincentives for
pioneer entry by meaningfully increasing the length of the product development period for
novel products. This, in turn, affects ﬁrms’ strategies for entering new markets and could
lead to under-development of new medical technologies, although a deﬁnitive statement
about the extent to which this occurs in medical device innovation is beyond the scope of
this paper.
The results also suggest that the regulation of medical technologies could be made more
efﬁcient through the earlier resolution of uncertainty about new product application content
43and format whenever possible. This could be done, for example, through the earlier release
of guidance documents and/or by encouraging ﬁrms to work with the FDA very early in the
new product development process in order to help the FDA develop evaluation standards
or formal guidelines for a new medical technology before a regulatory approval application
is ofﬁcially submitted.28
This study could be expanded in a number of ways. First, it would be interesting to
know more about regulatory delays themselves: what happens over the period between
PMA submission and the FDA’s ultimate approval decision? Relatedly, how much of an
observed delay is due to the FDA requesting additional information from device companies
and what types of information are requested? And ﬁnally, are certain types of information
requests (e.g. additional product manufacturing speciﬁcations) faster to execute and/or
evaluate than others (e.g. additional biocompatibility tests)? The data that I use in this
study do not allow me to satisfactorily answer these questions. In my conversations and
interviews with medical device companies, it has frequently been expressed that the FDA’s
requesting of additional clinical or technical information is a major source of uncertainty
for device ﬁrms entering a regulatory process in which the regulator’s expectations are
unknown ex ante. Unfortunately, no quantitative data that I know of are able to shed light
on the relative frequency or size of these types of delays. As such, this would be a very
fruitful area for future data collection and aggregation – both within and beyond the context
of medical device regulation.
The results do not address the onerous process of regulatory reform. While it seems
likely that earlier engagement and articulation of regulatory requirements on the part of
the FDA could decrease regulatory approval times and minimize delays, the process for
implementing any large changes to the formal FDA regulatory policy is complex, time-
consuming and institutionally entrenched. Yet, my ﬁndings suggest that there may be room
for regulatory process efﬁciency improvements in the regulation of medical devices and
other categories of products with a high degree of regulatory uncertainty, as delays are
28Interviews with regulatory consultants revealed that this is a strategy that they often recommend.
44most prominent in cases where evaluation procedures are poorly deﬁned and delays can
be substantially reduced through clear articulation of the regulator’s expectations. FDA
Commissioner Margaret Hamburg has noted that “these challenges are not the FDA’s alone.”
Indeed, she argues that in order “to truly leverage advances in science and technology, there
must be a collaboration of all relevant stakeholders, including government, academia, and
industry. The FDA must work with its partners to promote innovation and creativity at
various points throughout the development process” (Hamburg, 2010).
New medical technologies are poised to continue to grow in importance over the coming
years and earlier engagement and clear communication between regulators and innovators
may be able to accelerate their regulatory approval. The goal of such communication should
be to mitigate uncertainty about regulatory protocols as early as possible in the regulatory
approval process. By minimizing content and format-related regulatory delays for entrants
into new product markets, the FDA can also increase its overall efﬁciency and free up
reviewer resources, potentially improving the process of regulatory approval not only for
early entrants, but also for later ones as well.
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Conﬂicts of Interest and the
Economics of FDA Advisory
Committee Voting
2.1 Introduction
The inﬂuence and importance of expert recommendations is clear in many health care
settings, where the recommendations of skilled medical professionals guide economic
activity and shape patient and societal welfare. Yet in the health care industry and beyond,
the structure of expert advising relationships may result in principal-agent issues.
At its most general, an agency dilemma can arise when the expert (agent) has incentives
that are different from those of the individual or society (principal) on whose behalf they are
making a recommendation. This principal-agent problem could take many forms ranging
from “physician induced demand” for health care services (McGuire, 2000) to the acceptance
of industry funding for academic research (Brennan et. al., 2006). In the health care setting,
when we talk about a “conﬂict of interest,” we are almost always talking about a setting in
which a principal-agent problem could potentially arise, due to competing incentives on the
part of an agent. This paper focuses on a speciﬁc set of conﬂicts of interest that may arise in
46one important expert advising setting: committee voting on new medical product approvals
at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
In the United States, the FDA is tasked with regulating all medical products, including
drugs and medical devices. The FDA also acts as a gatekeeper to all medical product
markets: without the agency’s marketing approval, it is illegal to market a medical product
in the United States. In making its decisions about whether or not to grant marketing
approval for new drugs, devices, and other products, the FDA relies heavily on the use
of expert “advisory committees,” that come together to make approval recommendations
for new high-risk products. These committees are staffed by scientiﬁc experts and their
recommendations are highly predictive of agency approval decisions: in a recent study,
the FDA went on to approve 88 percent of original new drug applications (NDAs) and
biologics license applications (BLAs) that were endorsed by advisory committees and of
those applications that were not endorsed by FDA committees, 86 percent were subsequently
denied marketing approval (Smith et. al., 2012).
Individuals on FDA advisory committees are typically experts in their ﬁelds (e.g. cardi-
ology, anesthesiology, or the evaluation of biostatistics). When committee members have
existing or recent ﬁnancial conﬂicts of interest, these conﬂicts of interest must be disclosed
to the FDA and publicly declared at the start of a meeting in which a conﬂicted member
participates. Financial relationships present one obvious set of potential biases that may
affect experts’ recommendations, and are analyzed here.
Committee members often also have longstanding academic careers: individuals who
serve on advisory committees have both past and current institutional afﬁliations, a career-
long history of co-authoring relationships, and varying degrees of expertise. These diverse
professional characteristics also present additional sources of potential voting bias and will
be discussed below and addressed empirically in future work.
Of course, ﬁnancial and professional relationships may also add valuable information
to committee members’ decision-making: individuals may better understand industry-
sponsored research if they have been involved in similar studies in the past, may be
47better able to assess the value of a co-advisory committee member’s opinions given prior
professional experiences with that individual, or may be able to make better assessments
of a new type of technology’s potential, given their expertise in that area of research. For
example, Li (2013) ﬁnds that reviewers of NIH grants are biased in favor of projects in their
own area of expertise, but also better informed about those projects.
In this preliminary analysis, I consider the voting behavior of 1545 uniquely identiﬁed
individuals at 110 new product meetings over a seven-year period. The results presented fo-
cus on individuals’ voting propensities vis-à-vis their own and their co-committee members’
ﬁnancial conﬂicts of interest, however future research will consider other potential sources
of bias, such as institutional afﬁliations, academic expertise, and co-authoring relationships.
I ﬁnd that ﬁnancially conﬂicted individuals – broadly deﬁned to include anyone who
has had a ﬁnancial relationship with industry in the past 12 months – are far more likely
(about 18 percent) to vote favorably for new medical devices, but not any more likely than
ﬁnancially unconﬂicted individuals to vote favorably for new drugs. I present a basic
conceptual framework for assessing how this may affect panel-based recommendations and
outcomes and what kinds of ﬁnancial conﬂicts of interest are predictive of voting patterns.
I ﬁnd that the average propensity of ﬁnancially conﬂicted individuals to vote more
favorably for new medical devices is not driven by individuals with a direct ﬁnancial conﬂict
of interest with the ﬁrm whose product is under consideration. Rather, I ﬁnd that the
pattern is driven by individuals with another ﬁnancial relationship with industry voting
favorably for a competitor’s product – that is, an individual who has a ﬁnancial relationship
with device Firm A is more likely to vote favorably for a new medical device produced by
Firm B.
This result initially seems counterintuitive: it would appear that individuals who work
for Firm A are voting against their own ﬁnancial interests when voting to endorse their
competitor’s product. However, voting incentives in the medical device setting are dynamic:
as I have shown in other work (Stern, 2014), there are signiﬁcant costs associated with
being a “ﬁrst mover” in a new medical device product market. One corollary of this ﬁrst
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committee members could help “pave the way” for subsequent entry by competitors
(including the ﬁrms in which conﬂicted individuals have an interest).
I look for evidence of “paving the way” behavior by asking whether or not favorable
voting patterns among ﬁnancially conﬂicted individuals are related to product entry order.1
Speciﬁcally, I look for evidence of an interaction effect that would suggest that favorable
voting propensity among those with a ﬁnancial conﬂict of interest is even stronger when the
product in question is an early entrant within a device category. I ﬁnd preliminary evidence
in support of this type of behavior, although the statistical power of these models is limited
by sample size.
An important aim of this paper is to move beyond a framework in which it is assumed or
implied that conﬂict of interest biases individuals identically regardless of the composition
of their peers on a panel. I introduce a conceptual model that includes basic peer effects:
how an individual votes is modeled as a function of characteristics of that individual
(ﬁnancial conﬂict of interest, academic expertise, gender, institutional afﬁliation) as well
as characteristics of their fellow panel members, interacted with the reference individual’s
characteristics and voting behavior. This allows me, for example, to ask if a ﬁnancially
conﬂicted person’s propensity to vote in favor changes with the fraction of other in favor
voters or the fraction of other conﬂicted voters on the panel.
Similarly to Li (2013), the identiﬁcation strategy for this exercise will rely on the fact
that the relative composition of panels (e.g. in terms of fraction of conﬂicted members,
members’ academic expertise, gender, and institutional afﬁliations) changes over time in a
way that is arguably independent of the relationship between panelist characteristics and
voting behavior. This is due to the rotating terms of permanent panel members: committee
members are staggered in a set of 4-year rotating terms, such that the same individuals will
1A second explanation for the observed voting patterns could be that there is an important unobserved
variable that could be thought of broadly as something like “optimism about medical technology.” This
particular type of optimism could drive the results seen if it makes certain individuals both more likely to take
money from industry as well as more likely to take a favorable view of new medical technology. This could also
certainly occur in the presence of other phenomena.
49appear multiple times in the data with different peer groups.
In a model in which individuals’ voting behaviors are inﬂuenced not only by their
ﬁnancial conﬂicts of interest, but also their panel peers, I ﬁnd that there is a positive
association between the fraction of other panel members’ in favor votes and an individual’s
probability of voting in favor of a new product, regardless of whether or not that individual
is conﬂicted.2 Further, I estimate a positive interaction effect between other panel members’
in favor votes and a conﬂicted individual’s probability of voting in favor, suggesting that
at very high rates of within-meeting in favor voting, the difference between conﬂicted and
unconﬂicted individuals’ in favor voting propensities will be the largest (the difference is
nearly 25 percentage points at 3 standard deviations above the sample average).
More generally, allowing for peer effects, I estimate that the bias associated with a
ﬁnancial conﬂict of interest will vary positively with the fraction of other panelists (or
other conﬂicted panelists) voting favorably for a new product. Future work will focus on
simulating meeting outcomes if the same individuals were to sit on panels with different
compositions of colleagues. Future work will also expand the set of characteristics of
individuals and peers used in predictive models of voting behavior.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Medical Product Regulation in the United States: The FDA
In the United States, the FDA regulates all medical technologies. An agency of the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, the FDA is responsible for the oversight of two trillion
dollars worth of products every year, including all over-the-counter and prescription drugs
and medical devices (Babiarz and Pisano, 2008; Hamburg and Sharfstien, 2009).3
The FDA is organized into centers, each of which is tasked with the oversight of a
different type of product. The two centers most relevant to the analysis here are the Center
2This result is consistent with herding behavior discussed by other authors (e.g. Smith, 2012).
3The FDA also regulates all other existing and emerging classes of medical products.
50for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) and the Center for Devices and Radiological
Health (CDRH4), which regulate chemical drugs and medical devices, respectively.5 Within
the CDER, the Ofﬁce of Drug Evaluation is responsible for the approval of new drugs, and
within the CDRH, the Ofﬁce of Device Evaluation is responsible for the review and approval
of medical devices.
These centers are often tasked with assembling committees of “experts with recognized
expertise and judgment in a speciﬁc ﬁeld” for the purpose of assessing the safety and efﬁcacy
of new products (FDA, 2008). In general, FDA review begins with regulators completing an
initial review of a marketing approval application for a new product and identifying those
questions that require external input. As necessary, the relevant center at the FDA then
convenes an advisory committee meeting to obtain input from experts through presented
information, discussion, questioning, and voting by committee members (Smith et. al., 2012).
Committee members are not employees of the FDA itself, but rather “special government
employees for the days they participate as members of a panel.” As in other areas, these
committees make recommendations only, and all ﬁnal regulatory decisions regarding the
approval of medical products are made by FDA ofﬁcials.
Which products are ultimately reviewed by an expert advisory committee? Reviewing
publicly available materials, Smith et. al. (2012) analyze FDA drug advisory committee
meetings over the decade ending in 2010 and ﬁnd that “new biologics, priority status
applications and orphan drugs were the subject of more meetings, on a percentage basis,
than new chemical entities, standard applications and non-orphan drugs.” That is special
categories of products were more likely to be sent to advisory committees for expert opinions
than more standard types of products.
Smith et. al. (2012) note that 87 percent of meetings resulted in a clear positive or
negative vote. The authors suggest that this may be a result of committee expertise and/or
4The CDRH also regulates radiation-emitting products such as X-ray and ultrasound machines.
5Other categories of products are also reviewed by specialty centers within the FDA (e.g. biologics and
human cells, tissues, and cellular- and tissue-based products are reviewed by the FDA’s Center for Biologics
Evaluation and Research, CBER).
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2.2.2 Conﬂicts of Interest in Medicine
It has been suggested that in recent decades, the drug industry “has gained unprecedented
control over the evaluation of its own products” (Angell, 2008). Brennan et. al. (2006)
write about the “extraordinary challenges to the principles of medical professionalism”
posed by physicians’ conﬂicts of interest and by their relationships with pharmaceutical
companies and medical device manufacturers. Indeed, in recent years, many academic
medical centers, which include medical schools and their afﬁliated hospitals have taken
steps to limit the inﬂuence of pharmaceutical companies on their physicians. Moreover,
many professional organizations, such as the American Medical Association, the American
College of Physicians, and the Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education have
issued or revamped their own guidelines for physicians’ interactions with pharmaceutical
companies (Studdert et. al., 2004). The practice of disclosure is a commonly prescribed
remedy for conﬂicts of interest and is used commonly in medicine and the health care
industry: the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission and the Accountable Care Act both
impose disclosure requirements as do most medical journals (Loewenstein et. al., 2012).
Others have pointed out that disclosure itself may lead to unintended behavioral con-
sequences on the part of the disclosing agent. One such consequence is “increased bias,”
which has two potential mechanisms: 1) strategic exaggeration – providing more biased
advice to compensate for the fact that the audience will discount that advice if it knows
about an agent’s conﬂict of interest – and 2) moral licensing – feeling justiﬁed in providing
biased advice because the principal (advisee) has been warned that the agent has a conﬂict
of interest (Loewenstein et. al., 2012).
Indeed, it has been demonstrated that physicians themselves believe that conﬂicts of
interest create biases and they adjust their assessments of their peers’ research when given
information about ﬁnancial conﬂicts of interest. Kesselheim et. al. (2012) look at how
disclosure of industry funding affects internists’ assessment of the rigor of clinical studies
52for hypothetical drugs. They ﬁnd that an industry funding disclosure results in physicians
downgrading their assessment of the rigor of a trial, decreases their conﬁdence in the
results, and lowers their willingness to prescribe the drug. In particular, they ﬁnd that
“physicians were half as willing to prescribe drugs studied in industry-funded trials as they
were to prescribe drugs studied in NIH-funded trials,” suggesting a meaningful behavioral
adjustment on the part of physicians in response to their perception of peers’ ﬁnancial
conﬂicts of interest.
However, there are also important reasons to believe that physician cooperation with
industry could facilitate better patient outcomes. Physicians can provide an essential
understanding of medicine and technology that can be incorporated into new medical
products. Further, physician involvement in industry activities that generate conﬂicts of
interest (e.g. clinical trials) has been cited as a way in which physicians can learn about
new technology (Chatterji et. al, 2008). For example, the diffusion of new cancer treatment
technologies has been linked to precisely those researchers who are involved in running
clinical trials for industry (Agha and Molitor, 2014).
Industry engagement may not only accelerate learning, but also facilitate product
innovation. Chatterji et. al. (2008) ﬁnd that those medical device patents ﬁled by physician-
innovators “had more inﬂuence on subsequent inventive activity than non-physician patents”
and argue for an open environment for physician-industry collaboration in the medical
device discovery and development process. Relatedly, Cockburn and Henderson (1998) ﬁnd
that pharmaceutical ﬁrms that are more “connected” to basic research perform better at
drug discovery. One component of this connectedness is co-authoring relationships between
industry researchers and researchers at public institutions: higher levels of co-authorship are
correlated with private sector research productivity, implying potential welfare beneﬁts of
industry-funded (or partially industry-funded) research initiatives. Relatedly, Zinner et. al.
(2009) ﬁnd that “life science faculty with industry research support were more productive
than faculty without such support on virtually every measure.”
This paper is thus related to an important set of policy questions about balancing the
53drawbacks and potential biases inherent in ﬁnancial conﬂict of interest against the potential
for additional expertise and innovative activity that comes with industry relationships.
2.2.3 FDA Advisory Committees and Financial Conﬂicts of Interest
While ﬁnancial conﬂicts of interest have been studied in the context of clinical trials and
the prescription of drugs, little research has considered the role of conﬂicts of interest in
expert committee decision making. An expert committee setting of particular interest is
that of FDA advisory committees, which are convened to make recommendations on the
safety, efﬁcacy, and subsequent approval of new medical products such as new chemical
and biologic drugs and new high-risk medical devices. Those who study conﬂicts of interest
in medicine have identiﬁed this setting as one where ﬁnancial conﬂicts of interest could also
affect important high-stakes decisions about new product approvals (Angell, 2008).
FDA committees must be composed of independent members without any ﬁnancial
conﬂicts of interest, except in cases where a conﬂict of interest waiver is granted by the FDA.
The FDA’s policy6 on participation of ﬁnancially conﬂicted individuals is as follows:
“When [the] FDA determines that an advisory committee member has a ﬁnancial conﬂict of
interest, the agency may grant a waiver that allows the member to participate in an advisory
committee meeting if certain criteria and policies are met. In general, FDA may grant a waiver if the
member’s expertise is considered essential to the committee’s discussions and recommendations. FDA
must also take into consideration a cap on the number of waivers that can be granted each year. FDA
searches for experts who have the necessary expertise without conﬂicts of interest; yet, in some cases,
many of the top authorities in specialized scientiﬁc ﬁelds may have a conﬂict of interest. When FDA
grants a waiver, the ﬁnancial interests associated with the waiver are posted on FDA’s website along
with the reasons for granting the waiver.”
In short, the FDA may grant a waiver when an expert’s knowledge is arguably required
for the committee’s understanding of the product in question. As indicated above, there is
a cap on the fraction of waivers that can be granted each year, although in aggregate, this




54Financial conﬂicts of interest themselves vary along several dimensions, such as the
total sum of money involved and the type of ﬁnancial relationship in question. Reasons for
conﬂicts include a host of proﬁt-generating activities such as direct employment, current
investments, patents, contracts, grants, cooperative research and development agreements
(CRADAs), consulting agreements, and honoraria for speaking and writing agreements
within past 12 months. These conﬂicts are divided into types: “index conﬂict” arises when
a committee member has ﬁnancial ties to the product’s sponsor (the ﬁrm working to bring
that product to market), while “competitor conﬂict” arises when a committee member has
ﬁnancial ties to a competitor of the sponsor. Both are broadly categorized as constituting
“any ﬁnancial conﬂict of interest” by the FDA and separately categorized into one or more
(non-mutually-exclusive) categories.7
The primary study that considers ﬁnancial conﬂicts of interest and voting at the FDA,
Lurie et. al. (2006), looks only at four years worth of committee voting data and only at
drug meetings. The authors ﬁnd that while disclosures of ﬁnancial conﬂicts of interest are
common, only a weak relationship can be detected between conﬂicts and favorable voting
behavior and a simulation exercise suggests that conﬂicts of interest are unlikely to inﬂuence
overall panel outcomes (majorities) in the meetings considered. It has separately been noted
that “there is much more to an advisory committee meeting than votes on product approval,”
including the ﬂow of information to the public and to the regulator (Mofﬁtt, 2012). This
could also include the inﬂuence of conﬂicted members on their colleagues, a scenario that
will be discussed below.
Mofﬁtt (2012) ﬁnds some evidence that the participation of conﬂicted individuals on
new drug advisory committees may be related to the probability of subsequent safety issues.
In comparing the outcomes of drugs recommended by committees both with and without
(a binary measure of) participation by ﬁnancially conﬂicted individuals, she ﬁnds that
“drugs reviewed by committees with no conﬂict of interest waivers were associated with
7The data used also include an indicator for “other” ﬁnancial conﬂicts of interest which are industry
relationships that are not directly associated with the reference product’s company or one of it’s competitors.
55signiﬁcantly fewer subsequent drug safety alerts.” Yet she also notes selection bias arising
from the use of observational data and a lack of consistent statistical signiﬁcance.
2.3 Conﬂict of Interest: Conceptual Framework
2.3.1 Voting Propensities and Bias
The behavior of individuals in voting situations is observed, as are the presence or absence
of ﬁnancial conﬂicts of interest. FDA committees make recommendations based on a simple
majority,8 so if the total proportion of in favor (“yes”) votes for a new product is greater than









where vn is observed voting behavior and vn = 1 if individual n votes in favor and
vn = 0 if individual n is not in favor (against). When p(y) > 0.5, the committee makes a
recommendation in favor of a new product.
However, the acknowledgement of the potential principal-agent problem that arises with
the participation of individuals with a ﬁnancial conﬂict of interest implies that individuals
with a conﬂict (c) may have different voting propensities ceteris paribus than individuals who














where A is the total number of conﬂicted individuals and B is the total number of uncon-
ﬂicted individuals.
More broadly, population estimates of P(y) could be thought of as weighted averages of
conﬂicted and unconﬂicted individuals propensities to vote favorably for a new product
8In the case of a tie, the committee chair will break the tie; this is discussed later.
56given the same observable data about that product, W:9
P(y|W)=aP(y|c,W)+( 1  a)P(y|u,W)
where a is equal to the ratio of conﬂicted individuals to total voters and W is the observable
information about a given product that all voting members can see (e.g. results from clinical
trials). In subsequent sections, I will change this simple framework to one that includes peer
effects, but this simple set-up is instructive for preliminary exercises.
2.3.2 Bias
The ﬁrst question of interest pertains to the existence of voting bias that is related to
ﬁnancial conﬂict of interest: when is P(y|c,W) 6= P(y|u,W) in a way that would suggest
bias associated with ﬁnancial conﬂict of interest? To simplify, we can start by asking: when
are voting patterns different among conﬂicted vs. non-conﬂicted individuals? In calculating
probabilities, there are ﬁve possible scenarios:
1. P(y|c,W)=P(y|u,W)=1: unanimous votes in favor, no evidence of bias
2. P(y|c,W)=P(y|u,W)=0: unanimous votes not in favor, no evidence of bias
3. 0 < P(y|c,W)=P(y|u,W) < 1: identical (average) voting behavior between conﬂicted
and unconﬂicted individuals, no evidence of bias
4. P(y|c,W) < P(y|u,W) 6= 0: unconﬂicted individuals are more likely to vote favorably
for new product than conﬂicted individuals. This is a) not consistent with empirical
evidence (presented in Section 5) and b) more generally not a scenario of interest
when we think about the speciﬁc principal-agent problem (and subsequent societal
risk) that could be generated by the presence of direct ﬁnancial conﬂict of interest.
9Future versions of this paper will relax the assumption that information is the same across all voting
individuals, but for the current analyses, I assume that all individuals have information W.
575. P(y|c,W) > P(y|u,W) 6= 0: what would be expected if an individual with a ﬁnancial
conﬂict of interest is an imperfect agent: this is bias that is aligned with the direct
ﬁnancial conﬂict of interest and has potential to lead to the approval of riskier products.
Thus, to learn about the existence of bias in voting behavior, we are interested in whether
the different components of the inequality in scenario 5 are statistically different from one
another, which I will test empirically in the data.
An obvious limitation of existing research on the voting behavior of conﬂicted individuals
is the ubiquitous implicit assumption that conﬂict (potentially) affects individuals in the
same way, regardless of who their peers are. That is, existing studies assume that the
composition of the panel on which an individual sits is irrelevant to her voting behavior.
This paper proposes a framework in which not only the presence or absence of a ﬁnancial
conﬂict of interest, but also the presence or absence of conﬂicted peers (or peers of varying
levels of expertise and varying academic relationships with other panelists) impacts each
individual’s voting behavior.
2.3.3 Peer Effects: Which Factors Predict Voting Behavior?
In order to move beyond a framework in which it is assumed or implied that conﬂict of
interest biases individuals identically regardless of their peers, I introduce a conceptual
model that includes basic peer effects. In this model, how an individual votes is a function
of her characteristics (ﬁnancial conﬂict of interest, academic expertise, gender, institutional
afﬁliation) as well as characteristics of her fellow panel members (the fraction of others with
a ﬁnancial conﬂict of interest, others’ academic expertise, whether or not an institutional
afﬁliation or professional relationship is shared with another panel member) interacted with
those individuals’ voting behavior.
The identiﬁcation strategy I will use relies on the fact that the relative compositions
of panels (e.g. in terms of fraction of conﬂicted members, members’ academic expertise,
gender, institutional afﬁliation) changes over time and does so in a way that is arguably
independent of the relationship between those variables and voting behavior. This is due to
58the rotating terms of permanent panel members:10 committee members are staggered in a
set of 4-year rotating terms, such that the same individuals will appear multiple times in
the data with different peer groups. Several temporary members also appear in the data in
multiple meetings, although there is more potential for endogeneity in their peer group –
for example because they are brought in because of a speciﬁc area of product expertise that
is missing among permanent members.11
Below I present one way of thinking about an empirical model for voting with peer
effects. At its most simple, the probability of an in favor vote by individual i on panel
z can be thought of as a function of both the individual i’s characteristics as well as the





bj6=i ⇤ (cj + ej + aij), z,t]
• ci = an indicator of an individual’s conﬂict of interest
• ei = academic expertise of individual i, measured, e.g., as a binary indicator of whether
or not an individual is an academic superstar or by publication count
• Xi = other observables about an individual – e.g. gender, whether or not they are
currently employed at a (top) research institution
• by|6=i = a binary indicator of an in favor vote by individual j (where j 6= i)
• cj = an indicator of a co-panel member’s conﬂict of interest
• En = Binary indicator of whether or not individual j is an academic superstar or
publication count
• aij = an indicator for whether individual j shares a past or current institutional
afﬁliation or co-author relationship with individual i
• z and t = panel and year ﬁxed effects, respectively
The expression after the summation sign in the expression above should relate to the
additional inﬂuence of another in favor vote when that individual a) has a ﬁnancial conﬂict
of interest, b) is a scientiﬁc expert or c) shares a professional relationship or institutional
10This identiﬁcations strategy is similar to Li (2013), who does a similar exercise using NIH study sections.
11future analyses will quantify the extent of this selection issue to the extent it exists
59afﬁliation with person i. Respectively, these terms should answer the questions: a) are
individuals more/less likely to vote favorably when another conﬂicted individual votes
favorably? b) are individuals more/less likely to vote favorably when a scientiﬁc expert votes
favorably? and c) are individuals more/less likely to vote favorably when an individual
with whom they have shared an institutional afﬁliation or a professional relationship votes
favorably?
Given the above framework, we can then ask ﬁrst how much additional explanatory
power is gained from the inclusion of peer effects. Second, we can analyze the relative
importance and magnitude of inﬂuence of different types of peer effects (e.g. ﬁnancial
conﬂicts of interest vs. professional relationships). Finally, we can consider how ﬁnancial
conﬂict of interest and professional relationships are likely to affect voting propensities and
subsequent panel outcomes in this modiﬁed framework.
2.4 Data
The database used in this analysis was assembled in two stages. The ﬁrst version of the
database was used for the empirical analysis in Lurie et. al. (2006), which is described above.
Following the publication of the Lurie et. al. (2006), the FDA commissioned the Eastern
Research Group (ERG) to assess “the relationship between ﬁnancial conﬂict-of-interest
disclosure and voting patterns at FDA advisory committee meetings” (ERG, 2009). ERG
was granted access to the data from Lurie et. al. (2006), which included data on all new
drug meetings held by CDER between January 2001 and December 2004. ERG researchers
then expanded the original database to include drug meetings through the ﬁrst quarter
of 2008 and to include meetings on new devices over the same period of time. While the
ﬁndings of this commissioned study are not statistically rigorous and were never published
in a peer-reviewed venue, the study ﬁnds that individual and meeting-level patterns were
similar to those published in Lurie et. al. (2006).
The primary data set for this project was provided to me by the FDA Ofﬁce of Planning
60in November of 2012.12 The data include both meeting and participant-level data for
meetings that took place between the beginning of 2001 and the end of the ﬁrst quarter
of 2008. The meeting data include information on the relevant FDA Center responsible
for the recommendation, the committee name, meeting date and meeting topic. The data
were limited to “particular matters involving speciﬁc parties” (PMISP), which are those
meetings that consider speciﬁc products. Other meetings (e.g. those about “matters of
general applicability” where no recommendations were made about speciﬁc products) were
not included.
Participant data include the participants’ names, participation type (e.g. permanent or
temporary committee member), disclosed ﬁnancial conﬂicts of interest, and individual votes.
Individuals whose conﬂicts were so signiﬁcant as to preclude their participation in meetings
were excluded. Participant data, which are publicly available from advisory committee
meetings, also include additional details about an individual such as their institutional
afﬁliation. An example of a publicly available panel roster is included as Appendix B.2 and
an example of a publicly available panel agenda is included as Appendix B.3.
For every meeting, each individual’s voting record (a binary indicator of voting in favor
or against a new product) is observed. Additionally, the meeting outcome – i.e. the majority
recommendation from the entire voting panel – is known. Other product-speciﬁc outcomes
(to the extent that they occur) are also observable; for example, whether or not a product
was recalled. The current version of this paper presents results exploring the association
between ﬁnancial conﬂicts of interest and voting patterns on the panels observed. Future
versions of the paper will present results that explore the overall relationships between
observable characteristics of individuals and their voting behaviors and the inﬂuence of
other professional relationships among panel participants on voting behavior.
Table 2.1 summarizes the total number of drug (CDER) and device (CDRH) meetings
observed in each year of the data from the FDA. Table 2.2 shows the distribution of panel
members and their observable characteristics across those meetings: of the 186 meetings in
12I am grateful to Clark Nardinella, Economics Staff Director, for helping me to secure access to the data.











Table 2.2: Meeting Sample Summary Statistics
All Drugs Devices
Total Product Meetings 186 96 90
Total Panels (Focal Areas) 26 13 13
Av. Voting Members on Panel 11.90 14.25 9.39
...of which, Permanent 5.42 5.33 5.52
...of which, Temporary 6.47 8.92 3.87
Meetings with Any Conﬂict 79.35% 71.60% 84.14%
Members with Any Conﬂict 28.69% 33.33% 21.18%
...of which, Index Conﬂict 5.20% 5.26% 5.09%
...of which, Competitor Conﬂict 17.44% 24.05% 6.75%
...of which, Other Conﬂict 2.80% 0.66% 6.27%
the data,13 just over half (96) consider drugs and the remainder (90) consider devices. These
meetings included 13 drug and 13 device panels (medical specialty areas).
Table 2.2 shows that the average number of voting members on drug panels (14.25) was
larger than the average number of voting members on device panels (9.39). The average
fraction of meetings with any conﬂicted member was higher among device panels (84.14%)
than among drug panels (71.60%), however, the percentage of individuals with “any conﬂict”
13Data were also collected on a small number of meetings about new biologics, but there were too few
meetings to be considered in this study for reasons of statistical power; future versions of this paper may try to
re-incorporate meetings about biologics
62was actually lower among among device panels (21.18%) than among drug panels (33.33%).
Device and drug panel members were similarly likely to have “index conﬂict” – a
ﬁnancial relationship with the sponsoring ﬁrm whose product is under consideration (5.09
and 5.26 percent respectively) – but drug panel members were far more likely to have
“competitor conﬂict” – a ﬁnancial relationship with a ﬁrm that is considered a competitor of
the sponsoring ﬁrm – with 24.05% of drug panel members reporting competitor conﬂict, but
only 6.75% of device panel members reporting competitor conﬂict. Device panel members
were more likely than drug panel member to have “other” forms of ﬁnancial conﬂicts of
interests (6.27% vs. 0.66%) – i.e. ﬁnancial relationships with industry, but not with the ﬁrm
sponsoring the product in question or one of its direct competitors.
2.5 Estimation
I begin by looking at meeting-level data in greater detail. One implication of the conceptual
framework section above is that meetings with unanimous voting behavior will not be
helpful in identifying bias. Summarizing within-meeting votes, I ﬁnd that 23.5% of all
meetings resulted in a unanimous vote in favor of approval while 8.9% of meetings resulted
in a unanimous vote against the approval of a new product. Thus nearly 1/3 of the total
meetings in the data do not provide directly usable information about expert bias and its
inﬂuence.
The fraction of in-favor meetings are similar for drugs and devices, but the incidence
of unanimous votes against a new product is over twice as likely in drug meetings vs.
device meetings (11.2% vs. 5.2%; p-value <0.01). Data on unanimous voting frequencies
is presented in Table 2.3. After excluding votes from unanimous meetings, data remains
on a set of 1495 votes from 110 non-unanimous meetings (48 drug meetings and 62 device
meetings). Figure 1.1a presents the frequency of “in favor” votes for all non-unanimous
meetings over the years observed. Figures 1.1b and 1.1c present the same results for drug
and device meetings respectively.
63Figure 2.1: Non-Unanmous Meetings
Figure 1b
Figure 1c
64Table 2.3: Summary of Unanimous Meetings
All Drug Device P-value
Meetings Meetings Meetings (Drug 6= Device)
Unanimous In Favor 23.5% 22.8% 24.7% 0.29
Unanimous Against 8.9% 11.2% 5.2% 0.00
2.5.1 Is There Evidence of Bias?
On average, are individuals with a ﬁnancial conﬂict of interest more likely to vote favorably
for a given new product than non-conﬂicted individuals? Table 2.4 presents marginal effects
of probit regressions for all meetings in the data (panel a) and for drug and device meetings
separately (panels b and c, respectively).
Analyzing all drug and device meetings together does not reveal any statistically signiﬁ-
cant relationships between observable characteristics about individuals’ conﬂicts of interest
or participation type and their probability of voting favorably for a new product. The same
is true when considering drug meetings separately. However, when device meetings are
considered alone, a set of interesting and statistically signiﬁcant associations emerges.
First (column 1 of panel c), individuals with any ﬁnancial conﬂict of interest are,
on average, 13.6 percent more likely to vote favorably for a new medical device. This
relationship is robust to the inclusion of year and panel (specialty) ﬁxed effects (column
2) and if anything, becomes more pronounced with controls for additional covariates:
controlling for the year of the meeting and the (medical specialty-focused) advisory panel
making the recommendation, individuals with a ﬁnancial conﬂict of interest are, on average,
18.5 percent more likely to vote favorably for a new medical device.14
I also consider the potential for differences between temporary and permanent members.
Column 3 asks if temporary voting members have different probabilities of voting favorably
for new products above and beyond the relationships observed for ﬁnancial conﬂict of
interest and controlling for year and advisory panel ﬁxed effects. Temporary members
14As a robustness check, I have also conﬁrmed that the results are highly similar in magnitude and statistical
signiﬁcance when voting data from unanimous meetings are reintegrated into the data set.
65Table 2.4: Patterns in Conﬂicted Member Voting
Outcome = Individual “In Favor” Votes
(1) (2) (3)
(a) All Meetings




Year Fixed Effects x x
Panel Fixed Effects x x
N 1495 1495 1495
(b) Drug Meetings Only




Year Fixed Effects x x
Panel Fixed Effects x x
N 903 903 903
(c) Device Meetings Only




Year Fixed Effects x x
Panel Fixed Effects x x
N 592 592 592
+<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Reported coefﬁcients are marginal effects at
sample means from probit models; standard
errors are clustered at the meeting level
66Table 2.5: Voting on Device Panels by Conﬂict Type
Outcome = Individual “In Favor” Votes
(Device Meetings Only)
(1) (2) (3)
Index conﬂict -0.002 0.010
(0.101) (0.102)
Competitor conﬂict 0.206* 0.207*
(0.083) (0.083)
Year Fixed Effects x x x
Panel Fixed Effects x x x
N 592 592 592
+<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Reported coefﬁcients are marginal effects at
sample means from probit models; standard
errors are clustered at the meeting level
do indeed have a higher probability of voting favorably, but this appears to be largely
orthogonal to the relationship between conﬂict and voting behavior. One explanation for
this pattern might be that temporary members are called into device panels because they are
experts on a speciﬁc type of medical technology. Although these members are statistically
no more likely to be conﬂicted than permanent members, they may have greater expertise.
Future versions of this paper will explore this possibility.
2.5.2 A Closer Look at the Nature of Conﬂict of Interest on Device Panels
Before moving on from the simple individual voting model, I decompose ﬁnancial conﬂicts
of interest on device panels – where they are predictive of voting behavior – into their
constituent parts. Table 2.5 considers voting behavior in the sample of device panels
analyzed in Table 2.4 but separates out two speciﬁc types of ﬁnancial conﬂict of interest:
index conﬂict (a ﬁnancial relationship with the sponsoring ﬁrm whose product is under
consideration) and competitor conﬂict (a ﬁnancial relationship with a ﬁrm that is considered
a competitor of the sponsoring ﬁrm).
In doing so, it becomes clear that the overall pattern in which conﬂicted individuals
67on device panels are more likely to vote favorably for a new product is largely driven by
individuals with a competitor conﬂict: these individuals are about 21 percent more likely
to vote favorably for a new medical device, controlling for the year of the meeting and the
advisory panel making the recommendation (columns 2 and 3).
2.5.3 Evidence of “Paving the Way” for Follow-On Innovation
Why might individuals be inclined to nudge products from a competitor of their employer
(or a ﬁrm in which they hold stock) toward regulatory approval? At ﬁrst, this ﬁnding would
seem counterintuitive: individuals have no direct gain (and indeed, if they are stock owners,
may be immediately harmed) by voting in favor of competitors’ products. However, voting
incentives in the medical device setting are dynamic: as I have shown in other work (Stern,
2014), there are signiﬁcant costs associated with being a “ﬁrst mover” in a new medical
device product market. One corollary of this ﬁrst mover regulatory disadvantage is that
individuals may be able to “pave the way” for subsequent entrants – e.g. from their own
ﬁrm – by facilitating the approval of ﬁrst or early entrants into a new product category.15
I look for evidence consistent with this type of “paving the way” behavior in Table 2.6.
Here, the coefﬁcients of interest are the interaction effects between having a competitor
conﬂict and some measure of a product’s “newness” within a category. Unfortunately only
about half of the device meetings could be directly linked to information about entry order
based on the product names provided by ERG. Future versions of this paper will aim to
capture a larger subsample of meetings.
Column 1 reproduces the results on the direct observed association between competitor
conﬂict and in favor voting for the subsample of devices for which entry order information
was available. While the result is only statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level (likely a result
15Another explanation is that some individuals simply may be more optimistic about the value of medical
technology, a trait that would lead them to be both more likely to take industry consulting jobs as well as more
likely to vote in favor of the approval of new products. Similarly, the very act of taking money from industry
might make individuals more optimistic about other medical technologies, making them more likely to vote in
favor of the approval of new products. In either of these cases, the observed conﬂicts and voting behavior would
be endogenously related to one another and/or an omitted variable. While I cannot rule such an explanation
out, I can look for evidence of an alternative scenario.
68Table 2.6: Do Conﬂicted Individuals “Pave the Way”?
Outcome = Individual “In Favor” Votes
(Device Meetings Only)
(1) (2) (3)








Order * Comp. Conﬂict -0.043+
(0.023)
Year Fixed Effects x x x
Panel Fixed Effects x x x
N 289 289 289
+<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Reported coefﬁcients are marginal effects at sample
means from probit models; standard errors are
clustered at the meeting level
69of the decreased sample size), I estimate a coefﬁcient that is similar to those estimated in
Tables 2.4 and 2.5: a competitor conﬂict is associated with a 17% greater propensity to vote
in favor of a new product, controlling for year and panel-level ﬁxed effects.
Columns 2 and 3 look for preliminary evidence of “paving the way”: column 2 includes
a binary indicator for whether or not a product was the ﬁrst to be approved in a given
category and shows that while, on average, ﬁrst products are about 4.4% less likely to get in
favor votes, those who have a competitor conﬂict are 4.7% more likely to vote in favor of
ﬁrst products, although neither of these results is statistically signiﬁcant. Column 3 uses a
direct (integer) measure of entry order into a product category and ﬁnds that later products
are, on average, 1.7% more likely to garner in favor votes (p<.10), however earlier products
are, on average, 4.3% more likely to garner in favor votes from conﬂicted individuals (p<.10).
These results are also consistent with industry insiders “paving the way” for subsequent
entrants in more novel product categories, although the collection additional data will help
to establish a deﬁnitive pattern.
2.5.4 Peer Effects and Voting Behavior
The results presented so far do not account for potential peer effects in voting behavior.
This section introduces a few types of potential peer effects and presents their associations
with observed voting behaviors in reduced form models. The potential peer effects added
here are a) the fraction of in favor votes at the meeting level, b) the fraction of in favor votes
at the meeting level for all individuals except the reference individual (i.e. a number is
calculated for each voter as the average of her panel without her vote included), and c) the
fraction of in favor votes among conﬂicted panelists (only) at the meeting level. The results
of regressions accounting for these potential sources of peer inﬂuence and interacting each
with an indicator for ﬁnancial conﬂict of interest are presented in Table 2.7.
An important note with respect to Table 2.7 is that the coefﬁcients presented were
recovered from linear probability models for ease of interpretation. So far all regression
output tables have presented marginal effects from probit regressions. For the models
70Table 2.7: Preliminary Analysis of Peer Effects in Voting Behavior
(A)
Any conﬂict 0.180** 0.104* -0.131*
(0.051) (0.045) (0.054)
Meeting Vote In Favor (Fraction) 0.983** 0.924**
(0.011) (0.018)
Conﬂict * Meeting Vote In Favor 0.378**
(0.076)
Year Fixed Effects x x x
Panel Fixed Effects x x x
N 592 592 592
(B)
Any conﬂict 0.180** 0.142** -0.187*
(0.051) (0.049) (0.081)
Meeting Vote In Favor (Fraction) for All j 6= i 0.607** 0.530**
(0.074) (0.077)
Conﬂict * Meeting Vote In Favor for All j 6= i 0.537**
(0.143)
Year Fixed Effects x x x
Panel Fixed Effects x x x
N 592 592 592
(C)
Any conﬂict 0.180** 0.133** -0.225**
(0.051) (0.047) (0.045)
Vote In Favor (Fraction) among Conﬂicted Panelists 0.609** 0.506**
(0.046) (0.053)
Conﬂict * Vote In Favor among Conﬂicted Panelists 0.518**
(0.052)
Year Fixed Effects x x x
Panel Fixed Effects x x x
N 592 592 592
+<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Reported coefﬁcients are from a linear probability model with standard errors
clustered at the meeting level
71presented in Table 2.7, results from probit regressions using the same dependent and
independent variables are of the same sign and statistical signiﬁcance in all cases, but for
this exercise, I focus on the linear probability model results, for ease of comparability across
speciﬁcations and exercises involving the summing of coefﬁcients.
The models in Table 2.7 consider the relationships between each of the additional factors
presented and an individual’s probability of voting in favor of a new product. Panel A
considers the peer effects of a higher/lower fractional vote in favor among all panelists
at a meeting. Panel B considers the fractional vote in favor among all panelists except
the reference individual at a meeting; this is likely a better measure because it is not
mechanically biased toward ﬁnding a positive result and the one I focus on in interpretation.
Panel C considers the average vote in favor among all conﬂicted panelists at a meeting.
While absolute probabilities are difﬁcult to calculate without adding in averaged year and
panel ﬁxed effects as well as a constant, the differences between conﬂicted and unconﬂicted
individuals ceteris paribus can be calculated easily algebraically. Coefﬁcients in a linear
probability model are interpreted as the percentage point change in y associated with a one
unit change in x. Thus, the difference between conﬂicted and unconﬂicted individuals is
estimated by summing the coefﬁcient on “any conﬂict” and the coefﬁcient on the interaction
between “any conﬂict” and the speciﬁc meeting measure of interest, multiplied by, e.g., the
meeting average vote, or a 1 standard deviation change in the meeting-level vote.
For example, in panel B, the difference in probabilities between conﬂicted and uncon-
ﬂicted individuals at the sample average for the fraction of in favor votes would be calculated
as -0.187 (the coefﬁcient on “any conﬂict”) + 0.537 (the coefﬁcient on “any conﬂict * meeting
average vote in favor for all j 6= i”) * 0.601 (the average meeting vote in favor for all j 6= i).
That is, at the meeting level average of in favor votes, conﬂicted individuals are 13.6 percent-
age points more likely to vote favorably for a new product than unconﬂicted individuals.
This is notable because the implied difference between conﬂicted and unconﬂicted panelists
voting propensities with peer effects is actually smaller in magnitude than the naive estimate
without peer effects in column 1 (13.6 vs. 18 percentage points).
72However, a further implication of the positive coefﬁcient on the interaction term is that
in a setting with very high rates of other panelists voting in favor, the difference between
conﬂicted and unconﬂicted individuals’ in favor voting propensities will increase. For
example using the estimated coefﬁcients from Panel B again, we can calculate that, at just
1 standard deviation above the mean fraction of co-panelists’ in favor votes, a conﬂicted
individual is 28.1 percentage points more likely to vote favorably for a new product than
an unconﬂicted individual. Thus allowing for peer effects suggests that the bias associated
with a ﬁnancial conﬂict of interest will vary positively with the fraction of other panelists
voting favorably for a new product. A corollary to this, of course, is that the difference
between conﬂicted and unconﬂicted individuals’ voting behaviors is expected to decrease as
the fraction of in favor votes among other panelists shrinks; at just one standard deviation
below the mean fraction of other panelists’ in favor votes, the estimated difference between
conﬂicted and unconﬂicted individuals shrinks to roughly zero.
Another interesting fact implied by Table 2.7 is that the fraction of in favor votes among
other panelists is also positively predictive of how unconﬂicted individuals vote (panel B).
This is consistent with peer effects that lead to “herding behavior” – even for individuals
without a ﬁnancial conﬂict of interest. Moreover, panel C implies that a greater fraction of in
favor votes among conﬂicted panelists (who represent just over 16 percent of the total voters)
is associated with a higher probability of in favor voting among unconﬂicted individuals as
well.
The data suggest that ﬁnancially conﬂicted individuals are likely to have a bias toward in
favor voting and the size of that bias is statistically increasing in the fraction of in favor votes
on the panel itself and separately, among conﬂicted individuals only. Moreover, although
these are only reduced form estimates, they are generally supportive of a meaningful
relationship between panel composition and individual voting behaviors, a framework that
has not yet been introduced into research on conﬂict of interest and voting. Lastly, I note
that Table 2.7 uses data on both temporary and permanent members, but coefﬁcients of
similar magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance are estimated when using the (smaller) sample
73of permanent members only.
A policy question raised by these estimation exercises is then: how often might bias
impact meeting outcomes? Extensions of this preliminary work will focus on simulating
meeting outcomes if the same individuals were to sit on panels with differing compositions
of colleagues.
2.6 Conclusion and Next Steps
In this preliminary analysis, I have explored the relationship between declared ﬁnancial
conﬂicts of interest and individuals’ voting behaviors on expert advisory committees at
the FDA. While I do not ﬁnd any evidence that ﬁnancial conﬂicts of interest lead to more
favorable voting in the setting of drug meetings, I do ﬁnd evidence that they are associated
with more favorable voting in the setting of device meetings. The differences between
conﬂicted an unconﬂicted individuals’ probabilities of voting in favor of new devices are
large: in a simple analysis, I ﬁnd that conﬂicted individuals are about 18 percent more likely
to vote favorably for a new medical device than their unconﬂicted peers.
I decompose the conﬂicted votes on device panels into two sub-types: votes by indi-
viduals with “index conﬂict” and votes by individuals with “competitor conﬂict.” I ﬁnd
that an indicator of “competitor conﬂict” is what drives the overall pattern between conﬂict
of interest and an increased probability of voting in favor. Why might individuals display
a bias for approving devices from which they do not stand to gain. One explanation
that follows from my earlier work on device approvals could be that individuals with a
relationship with the medical device industry have an incentive to “pave the way” for
the approval of new products within a product category, so that subsequent entrants can
beneﬁt from lower regulatory barriers to entering those markets subsequently. I present
some preliminary regression evidence that is consistent with this explanation, although the
statistical signiﬁcance of the results is limited by working with a very small sample. It will
be of great interest to return to this analysis in the future with additional data.
Next I introduce a simple model of peer effects and ask whether the composition of
74an individual’s peer group on a panel in addition to her own conﬂict of interest status
is predictive of her voting behavior. My preliminary analyses suggest that ﬁnancially
conﬂicted individuals are likely to have a bias toward in favor voting and the size of that
bias is increasing in the fraction of in favor votes among a) other panelists and b) separately,
among other conﬂicted panelists only. Moreover, I ﬁnd evidence that the fraction of peers’
in favor votes or the fraction of conﬂicted co-panelists’ in favor votes is associated with a
higher probability of even an unconﬂicted individual voting favorably for a new medical
device. This result is consistent with a notion of “herding behavior” in panel voting.
Although these are only reduced form estimates, they are generally supportive of a
meaningful relationship between panel composition and individual voting behaviors, a
framework that has not yet been used to understand the relationship between ﬁnancial
conﬂict of interest and panel voting.
Still, much work remains to be done. As discussed at several points, I am interested in
other sources of inﬂuence beyond ﬁnancial conﬂict of interest. In conversations with former
and current medical device panelists, I have collected anecdotes to suggest that several other
characteristics of a panelist’s peer group may inﬂuence how she votes. These are likely to
include whether or not she shares a past or present institutional afﬁliation with any of her
panel peers, whether she shares another (e.g. co-authoring) relationship with any of her
panel peers, and whether or not any of her peers would be considered academic experts.
An important next step will be collecting data on these characteristics in order to a) explore
these other sources of inﬂuence and b) compare their magnitudes to those associated with
bias due to ﬁnancial conﬂict of interest in modeling individual voting behavior.
Additionally, I am interested in simulating how conﬂicts of interest (and other factors)
affect panel outcomes in the modiﬁed framework. For example, what if each individual I
observe in the data were to sit on a panel composed of different peers? Using an empirical
framework that accounts for panel composition effects, I will also be able to assess how
often ﬁnancial conﬂicts of interest affect majority panel votes when there are spillover effects
onto other voters.
75I also plan to collect several more years worth of data. An important limitation of the
current data set is that once I focus analyses on smaller sub-groups (e.g. only medical
device meetings and only permanent panelists), the sample sizes become too small to draw
conclusions with appropriate statistical power. Ideally I would like to gather multiple
decades worth of data for future work. I look forward to continuing this research and
receiving feedback on both the preliminary results and proposed framework and next steps.
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Physician Beliefs and Patient
Preferences: A New Look at Regional
Variation in Health Care Spending1
3.1 Introduction
Regional variations in rates of medical treatments are large in the United States and other
countries (Skinner et al., 2012). For example, in the U.S. Medicare population over age
65, price-adjusted per-patient Medicare expenditures ranged from under $7,000 to nearly
$14,000, with most of the variation unexplained by regional differences in patient illness or
poverty.
What drives such variation in treatment and spending? One possibility is patient demand.
Many studies of variations have been conducted in environments where all patients have a
similar and fairly generous insurance policy,2 so price differences are unlikely to be large
and income differences are unlikely to be very important. Still, heterogeneity in patient
1Co-authored with David Cutler, Jonathan Skinner, and David Wennberg
2This is generally true in the U.S. Medicare program. The presence of supplemental insurance coverage
differs across the country, but most studies do not ﬁnd that these differences affect utilization by more than a
small degree (McClellan and Skinner, 2006).
77preferences for care may play a role. In very acute situations, some patients may prefer to
try all possible measures, while others may prefer palliation and an out-of-hospital death.
If patients with similar preferences are grouped together geographically – for example, if
people who value and demand life-prolonging treatments live in areas with world-class
interventional physicians – patient preference heterogeneity could lead to regional variation
in equilibrium outcomes (Anthony et al., 2010; Mandelblatt et al., 2012).
Another possible source of variation arises from the supply side. “Supplier-induced
demand” describes a situation in which a health care provider shifts a patient’s demand
curve beyond what the patient would want. This would be true in a principle-agent
framework (McGuire and Pauly, 1991), if prices are high enough (and income scarce). While
physician utilization has been shown to be sensitive to prices (Jacobson et al., 2006, Clemens
and Gottlieb, 2012), it would be difﬁcult to explain observed Medicare variations using
proﬁt margins alone, since reimbursement rates are set administratively and do not vary
greatly across areas.
Variation in desired supply may also result from non-monetary incentives. Physicians
could respond to organizational pressure or peer pressure to perform more procedures,
even if their current income is no higher as a consequence. Physicians might also have
differing beliefs about appropriate treatments, particularly for conditions where there are
few professional guidelines (Wennberg et al., 1982). These differences in beliefs may arise
because of differences in where physicians received medical training (Epstein and Nicholson,
2009) or their personal experiences with different interventions (Levine-Taub et al., 2011). If
this variation is correlated spatially – for example, if more intensive physicians are more
likely to hire physicians with similar views – the resulting regional differences in beliefs
could explain regional variations in equilibrium spending.
It has proven difﬁcult to estimate separately the impact of physician beliefs, patient
preferences, and other factors as they affect equilibrium healthcare outcomes, largely because
of challenges in identifying factors that affect only supply or demand (Dranove and Wehner,
1994). We address this problem using “strategic surveys,” as in Ameriks et al. (2011), in
78which we use detailed survey vignettes to elicit motivation and clinical beliefs of physicians
(suppliers), and attitudes and preferences of patients (demanders) as well as intervention-
speciﬁc preferences from both groups. These responses are then linked to utilization
measures at the regional level, which allows us to estimate directly how supply and demand
factors affect regional healthcare utilization.
Patient preferences are measured by a survey of Medicare enrollees age 65 and older
asking about whether they would want a variety of aggressive care interventions. We
focus on the tradeoff between invasive procedures with potential longevity beneﬁts versus
palliative care and comfort at the end of life. Physician beliefs are captured using two
surveys: one of cardiologists and the second of primary care physicians. Both groups of
physicians were presented with vignettes about four elderly individuals with chronic health
conditions, and asked how they would manage each one. Based on their responses, we
characterize physicians along two non-exclusive dimensions: those who consistently and
unambiguously recommended intensive care beyond interventions consistent with current
clinical guidelines (“cowboys”), and those who consistently recommended palliative care
for the very severely ill (“comforters”).
We ﬁrst use these surveys to examine the importance of patient and physician preferences
in explaining regional variations in care and ﬁnd that physician preferences are signiﬁcantly
more important in statistical models. In some models, we can explain over half of the
variation in end-of-life spending across areas by knowing only how a relatively small sample
of physicians in an area would treat hypothetical patients. In contrast, patient preferences
explain little of the cross-area variation.
We then try to understand what factors are associated with physicians’ treatment prefer-
ences, relating physicians’ views about optimal treatment to questions about malpractice
concerns, patient ﬁnancial arrangements (fraction of Medicaid and capitated patients), and
perceived organizational pressures (providing treatment for patients who expected but
didn’t need it, or doing a procedure because the referring physician expected it). We ﬁnd
that only a small fraction of physicians claim to have made recent decisions as a result
79of purely ﬁnancial considerations. We also ﬁnd that “pressure to accommodate” either
patients’ demands (by providing treatments that are not needed) or referring physicians’
expectations (doing procedures to keep them happy and meet their expectations) have a
modest but signiﬁcant relationship with physician beliefs about appropriate care. While
many physicians report making interventions as a result of malpractice concerns, these
responses do not help to explain the residual variation in treatment recommendations.
Ultimately, the largest degree of regional variation appears to be due to differences in
physician beliefs about the efﬁcacy of particular therapies. Physicians in our data have
starkly different views about how to treat the same patients, and these views are not highly
correlated with demographics, background, and practice characteristics, and are often not
consistent with professional guidelines for appropriate care. As much as 36 percent of
end-of-life Medicare expenditures, and 17 percent of overall Medicare expenditures, are
explained by physician beliefs that cannot be justiﬁed either by patient preferences or by
evidence of clinical effectiveness.
3.2 A Model of Variation in Utilization
We develop a simple model of patient demand and physician supply. The demand side
of the model is a standard one: the patient’s indirect utility function is a function of out-
of-pocket prices (p), income (Y), and preferences for care (h); V = V(p,Y,h). Solving this
for optimal intensity of care, x, yields xD. As in McGuire (2011), we assume that xD is
the fully informed patient’s demand for the quantity of procedures prior to any demand
“inducement.”
On the supply side, we assume that physicians seek to maximize the perceived health
of their patient, s(x), by appropriate choice of inputs x, subject to patient demand (xD),
ﬁnancial considerations, and organizational factors. Note that the function s(x) captures
both patient survival and patient quality of life, for example as measured by quality-adjusted
life years (QALYs).
Individual physicians are assumed to be price-takers (after their networks have negoti-
80ated prices with insurance companies), but face a wide range of reimbursement rates from
private insurance providers, Medicare, and Medicaid. The model is therefore simpler than
models in which hospital groups and physicians jointly determine quantity, quality, and
price, (Pauly, 1980) or where physicians exercise market power over patients to provide
them with “too much” health care (McGuire, 2011). Following Chandra and Skinner (2012),
we write the physician’s overall utility as:
U = Ys(x)+W(W + px   R)   f(|x   xD|)   j(|x   xO|) (3.1)
where Y is perceived social value of improving health, W is the physician’s utility
function of own income, comprising her ﬁxed payment W (a salary, for example) net of
ﬁxed costs R, and including the incremental “proﬁts” from each additional test or procedure
performed, p.3 The sign of p depends on the type of procedure and the payment system a
physician faces.
The third term represents the loss in provider utility arising from the deviation between
the quantity of services the provider recommends (x) and what the informed patient
demands (xD). This function could reﬂect classic supplier-induced demand – from the
physician’s point of view, xD is too low relative to the physician’s optimal x – or it may
reﬂect the extent to which physicians are acting as the agent of the (possibly misinformed)
patient, for example when the patient wants a procedure that the physician does not believe
is medically appropriate. The fourth term reﬂects a parallel inﬂuence on physician decision
making exerted by organizational factors that do not directly affect ﬁnancial rewards, such
as (physician) peer pressure.
The ﬁrst-order condition for (1) is:
Ys0 =  W0p + f0 + j0 ⌘ l (3.2)
Physicians then provide care up to the point where the choice of x reﬂects a balance
between the perceived marginal value of health, Ys0(x), and factors summarized by l: (a)
3We ignore capacity constraints, such as the supply of hospital or ICU beds.
81the incremental change in net income p, weighted by the importance of ﬁnancial resources
W0, (b) the incremental disutility from moving patient demand away from where it was
originally, f0, and (c) the incremental disutility from how much the physician’s own choice
of x deviates from her organization’s perceived optimal level of intervention, j0.
In this model,4 there are two ways to deﬁne “supplier-induced demand.” The broadest
deﬁnition is simply the presence of any equilibrium quantity of care beyond the level of the
ex ante preferences of an informed patient, i.e. x > xD. This is still relatively benign; the
marginal value of this care may still be positive. More relevant is the sign of s(x)   s(xD);
does the additional care enhance or diminish health outcomes? Supplier-induced demand
could more narrowly be deﬁned as s(x)   s(xD)  0; patients gain no improvement in
health outcomes and may even experience a decline in health or a signiﬁcant ﬁnancial
loss. Importantly, both of these deﬁnitions leave the question of physician knowledge of
inducement beyond clinically appropriate levels ambiguous. That is, a physician with
strong (but incorrect) beliefs may over-treat her patients, even in the absence of ﬁnancial or
organizational incentives to do so.
To develop an empirical model, we adopt a simple closed-form solution of the utility
function for physician i:5









Note that w/Y reﬂects the relative tradeoff between the physician’s income and the value
of improving patient lives, and thus might be viewed as a measure of “professionalism.”
The ﬁrst-order condition is therefore:
Ys0
i(xi)=l ⌘  wpi + f(xi   xD
i )+j(x   xO
i ) (3.4)
Figure 3.1 shows Ys0
i(x) and l. Note that l is linear in x with an intercept equal to
4A more general model would account for the patient’s ability to leave the physician and seek care from a
different physician, as in McGuire (2011).
5We are grateful to Pascal St.-Amour for suggesting this approach.
82Figure 3.1: Variations in Equilibrium: Differences in l and Differences in Actual or Perceived Productivity
 (wp+ fxD
i + jxO
i ). Note also the key assumption that patients are sorted in order from
most appropriate to least appropriate for treatment, thus describing a downward sloping
Ys0(x) curve. The equilibrium is where Ys0(x)=l at point A. A shift in the intercept, which
depends on reimbursement rates for procedures p, taste for income w, regional demand
xD, and organizational or peer effects xO, would yield a different l⇤, and hence a different
utilization rate. But all of these factors affect the intensity of treatments via a movement
along the marginal beneﬁt curve, Ys0(x).
Alternatively, it may be that s0
i(x) differs across physicians – productivity differs, rather
than constraints. For example, if s0
i(x)=ais0(x), where s0(x) is average physician productiv-
ity and a varies across regions, this would be represented as a shift in the marginal beneﬁt
curve. Point C in Figure 3.1 corresponds to greater intensity of care than point A and arises
naturally when the physician is or just believes she is more productive. For example, heart
attack patients experience better outcomes from cardiac interventions in regions with higher
rates of revascularization, consistent with a Roy model of occupational sorting (Chandra and
Staiger, 2007). Because patients in regions with high intervention rates beneﬁt differentially
from these interventions, this scenario does not correspond to the narrow deﬁnition of
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The productivity shifter a may also vary because of “professional uncertainty” – a
situation where the physician’s perceived a differs from the true a (Wennberg et al., 1982).
For example, physicians may be overly optimistic with respect to their ability to perform
procedures, leading to expected beneﬁts that exceed actual realized beneﬁts. Baumann et al.
(1991) have documented the phenomenon of “macro uncertainty, micro certainty” in which
physicians and nurses are sure that their administered treatment beneﬁted a speciﬁc patient
(micro certainty) even in the absence of a general consensus as to which procedure is more
clinically effective (macro uncertainty). Much of the evidence from psychology6 also argues
for overconﬁdence in one’s own ability, leading to a natural bias towards doing more.
To see this in Figure 3.1, suppose the actual beneﬁt is s0(x) but the physician’s perceived
beneﬁt is g0(x). The equilibrium is point C: the marginal treatment harms the patient, even
though the physician believes the opposite. In equilibrium, this supplier behavior would
appear consistent with classic supplier-induced demand, but the cause is quite different.
Empirical Speciﬁcation. To examine these theories empirically, we consider variation in
practice at the regional level (for reasons explained below). Taking a ﬁrst-order Taylor-series
approximation of equation (3.4) for region i yields a linear equation that groups equilibrium
outcomes into two components, demand factors ZD and supply factors ZS:
xi = ¯ x + ZD
i + ZS
i + #i (3.5)






i   xD) (3.6)
where M =  Ys00(¯ x)+f + j. This ﬁrst element of equation (3.6) reﬂects the higher
average demand for health care, multiplied by the extent to which physicians accommodate
that demand, f. The supply side component is:
6If the patient gets better, the physician gets the credit, but if the patient gets worse, the physician is able to





[wDpi + pDwi + f(xO
i   xO)+Ys0(x)Dai] (3.7)
The ﬁrst term in equation (3.7) reﬂects how differences in proﬁts in region i vs. the
national average (Dp) affect utilization. The second term reﬂects the extent to which
physicians weigh income more heavily. The third term captures organizational goals in
region i relative to national averages (xO
i   xO). The ﬁnal term captures the impact of
different physician beliefs about productivity of the treatment (Dai); this term shifts the
marginal productivity curve.7
Equation (3.5) can be expanded to capture varying parameter values as well – for
example, in some regions physicians may be more responsive to patient demand (a larger
fi). These interactive effects, considered below, reﬂect the interaction of supply and demand
and would magnify the responses here.
3.3 Data and Estimation Strategy
In general, it is difﬁcult to distinguish among demand and supply explanations for treatment
variation; even detailed clinical data reveal only a subset of what the physician knows
about her patient’s health and reveal virtually nothing about non-clinical drivers of patient
demand for health care services. Further, patient preferences and physician beliefs about the
desirability or appropriateness of different procedures are unknown in ex post clinical data.
In studying motives for household saving, Ameriks et al. (2011) implemented “strategic
surveys” to identify demand and supply. We follow this approach here, using surveys
that ask potential patients about preferences for hypothetical end-of-life choices (that is, xD
before their interaction with the physician), and asking physicians how they would treat a
set of hypothetical patients with varying disease severity, as well as questions about their
ﬁnancial and organizational constraints.
7Note that these effects are scaled by 1
M, which depends on  s00. If returns to treatment do not decline
rapidly, strongly-held physician opinions can lead to highly variable treatment rates (Chandra and Skinner,
2012).
85In an ideal world, patient surveys would be matched with surveys from their respective
physicians. Because our data do not match physicians with their own patients, we instead
match supply and demand at the area level using Hospital Referral Regions (HRRs).8 In
equation (3.5), we therefore deﬁne x to be a regional average spending measure. Our
primary measure is the natural logarithm of risk- and price-adjusted Medicare expenditures
in the last two years of life. We also consider several other measures of utilization such as
one-year risk- and price-adjusted expenditures for Medicare enrollees for hip fracture, and
overall price-adjusted Medicare expenditures.
Our ﬁrst estimation, based on Equation 3.5, asks whether area-level supply or demand
factors can better explain actual regional expenditures. Our second set of estimates then seek
to understand why physicians hold the beliefs they do (Equation 3.7). For the latter, we relate
individual physician vignette responses to those physicians’ ﬁnancial and organizational
incentives. We interpret the component of vignette responses that cannot be explained by
demographic, organizational or ﬁnancial incentives as reﬂecting primary physician beliefs
(e.g., a shift in perceived marginal treatment curve from Ys0(x) to Yg0(x)). We describe each
survey in turn.
Patient Survey. The survey sampling frame was all Medicare beneﬁciaries in the 20%
denominator ﬁle who were age 65 or older on July 1, 2003 (Barnato et al., 2009). A random
sample of 4,000 individuals was drawn; the response rate was 65%. We limit the ﬁnal sample
to respondents who provided all variables of interest, leaving a total of 1,413 Medicare
beneﬁciary surveys. The ﬁnal sample of respondents reside in 64 HRRs (an average of over
22 patients per HRR), all of which have sufﬁcient physician observations to be included in
the empirical model.
We use responses to 5 survey questions asking patients about their likelihood of wanting
unnecessary tests or cardiologist referrals in the case of new chest pain as well as preferences
for comfort vs. intensive life-prolonging interventions in an end of life situation. The exact
8These HRRs are deﬁned in the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, which divides the United States into 306
HRRs. Spending measures are based on area of patient residence, not where treatment is actually received.
86wording of these vignettes is shown in Panel I of the ﬁrst Appendix to this chapter. Since
the questions patients respond to are hypothetical and typically describe scenarios that have
not yet happened, we think of them as xD, or preferences not affected by physician advice.
Importantly, since these patients have not yet faced the tradeoffs described in the survey in
the end of life scenario, their views are unlikely to be colored by their physicians’ opinions.
Two of the questions relate to unnecessary care, asking people if they would like a test
or cardiac referral even if their primary care physician did not think they needed one (Table
3.1).9 Overall, 73 percent of patients wanted such a test and 56 percent wanted a cardiac
referral. However, there is wide variation across regions in averages responses to these
question. Figure 3.2 shows density plots of of patient preferences for the main questions
in the patient survey for the 64 HRRs considered (weighted by the number of patients per
HRR). Simulated distributions based on 1000 bootstrap samples with replacement were
used to test the null hypothesis of no geographic correlation. While some of the observed
variation is likely due to small sample sizes within regions, we tested for the null of no
regional variation by bootstrapping the distribution of area-level averages of all key variables,
assuming individuals were randomly assigned to areas. P-values are reported in the last
column of Table 3.1.
Three other patient questions, grouped into two binary indicators, measure preferences
for end-of-life care. One reﬂects patients’ desire for aggressive care at the end of life: whether
they would want to be put on a respirator if it would extend their life for either a week (one
question) or a month (another question). The second question asked, if the patient reached
a point at which they were feeling bad all of the time, would they want drugs to make them
feel better, even if those drugs might shorten their life. In each case, there is statistically
signiﬁcant variation across HRRs (Table 3.1).
Patients’ preferences are generally correlated across questions. For example, the correla-
tion coefﬁcient between wanting an unneeded cardiac referral and wanting an unnecessary
9This question captures pure patient demand independent of what the physician wants. Note, however,
that patients could still answer they would not seek an additional referral if they were unwilling to disagree
with their physician.
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Variable Mean Individual SD Area Average SD p-value
Spending and Utilization
2-Year End-of-Life Spending $56,219 - $10,715 -
6-Month End-of-Life Spending $14,272 - $2,660 -
Total Per Patient Spending $7,837 - $1,032 -
Hip Fracture Patient Spending $52,574 - $4,996 -
Patient Variables
Have Unneeded Tests 73% 44% 10% <0.01
See Unneeded Cardiologist 56% 50% 10% <0.01
Aggressive Patient Preferences Ratio 8% 27% 5% <0.01
Comfort Patient Preferences Ratio 48% 50% 12% <0.01
Primary Care Physician Variables
Cowboy Ratio 19% 39% 19% <0.01
Comforter Ratio 44% 50% 20% <0.01
Follow-Up Low 9% 28% 11% <0.01
Follow-Up High 4% 19% 7% <0.01
Cardiologist variables
Cowboy Ratio 27% 45% 19% <0.01
Comforter Ratio 29% 45% 20% <0.01
Follow-Up Low 0% 4% 3% 0.09
Follow-Up High 23% 44% 21% <0.01
Organizational and Financial Variables
Fraction Capitated Patients 16% 25% - -
Fraction Medicaid Patients 10% 13% - -
Weekly Patient Days 3.1 1.5 - -
Physician Age 57.5 9.8 - -
Board Certiﬁed 89% 31% - -
Cardiologists per 100k 6.7 1.90 - -
Responds to Referrer Expectations 10% 30% - -
Responds to Colleague Expectations 41% 49% - -
Responds to Patient Expectations 59% 49% - -
Responds to Malpractice Concerns 43% 49% - -
Responds to Practice Financial Incentives 32% 46% - -
Note: The table shows means for the sample living or practicing in one of the 64 HRRs with at least 3
cardiologists and 2 primary care physicians. The area average standard deviation is weighted by the number
of observations in the HRR. The p-value in the last column is for the null hypothesis of no excess variance
across areas. The p-value is taken from a bootstrap of patient or physician responses across areas. For each
of 1,000 simulations, we draw patients or providers randomly (with replacement) and calculate the simulated
area average and the standard deviation of that area average. The empirical distribution of the standard
deviation of the area average is used to form the p-value for the actual area average.
88Figure 3.2: Distributions of Patient Preferences vs. Simulated Distributions (based on 1000 bootstrap samples
with replacement)
test is 0.43 (p < .01). But other comparisons point to very modest associations, for example a
-0.02 correlation coefﬁcient between wanting palliative care and wanting to be on a respirator
at the end of life.
Since survey responses may vary systematically by demographic covariates such as
race and ethnicity; we create demographically-adjusted HRR-level measures of patient
preferences by adjusting all responses for observed patient characteristics (race, age and
sex).10
Physician Surveys. A total of 999 cardiologists were randomly selected to receive the
survey. Of these, 614 cardiologists responded, for a response rate of 61%. Seventeen
physicians did not self-identify as (primarily) cardiologists, and 88 physicians were missing
10One early reader suggested that patient preferences for aggressive vs. palliative care and for unneeded
tests and/or specialist visits may evolve as patients age. We tested for this by comparing average preferences
among individuals for patients that were on average “older” (age > sample mean) or “very old” (age > sample
mean + 1 standard deviation) and did not ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant differences between patient preferences in
older or very old sub-groups.
89crucial information such as practice type, or practiced in HRRs with too few respondents to
include in the analysis, leaving us a ﬁnal sample of 509 cardiologists. These cardiologists
practice in 64 HRRs, all of which have 3 or more cardiologists represented in the survey.
The primary care physician (PCP) responses come from a parallel survey of PCPs (family
practice, internal medicine, or internal medicine/family practice). A total of 1,333 primary
care physicians were randomly selected to receive the survey and the response rate was
73%. A total of 840 PCPs had complete responses to the survey and practiced in HRRs with
enough local patient and physician respondents to include in the analysis.
Both sets of physicians were asked about a number of clinical vignettes, discussed in
the next section, as well as a variety of characteristics of their practices. Two measures of
ﬁnancial circumstances are reported in Table 3.1 for all physicians: the share of patients for
whom they are reimbursed on a capitated basis (on average, 16 percent), and the share of a
physician’s patients on Medicaid (10 percent), with both factors generally associated with
lower marginal reimbursement.
A second set of questions asks about characteristics of the physician and her practice.
Twenty-nine percent are in small practices (solo or 2-person), 60 percent are in single or
multi-specialty group practices, and 11 percent are in HMOs or hospital-based practices. We
also observe a number of characteristics about the physician, including age, gender, whether
she is board certiﬁed, and the number of weekly patient days practiced.
Third, the survey asks about a physician’s actual responsiveness to external incentives
over the past year, including how frequently, if ever, in the past 12 months she has intervened
for non-clinical reasons. We create a set of binary variables that indicates whether a physician
responded to each set of incentives at least “sometimes” (i.e. “sometimes” or “frequently”)
over the past year. Ten percent of cardiologists reported that they had sometimes or
frequently performed a cardiac catheterization because of the expectations of the referring
physician and 41 percent of all physicians reported doing so because of a colleague’s
expectations (Table 3.1).
Like patient surveys, we recognize that physician survey responses may vary system-
90atically by demographic covariates such as race and ethnicity. For those exercises that
require aggregation of multiple physician surveys, we create demographically-adjusted
HRR-level measures of physician beliefs by adjusting all responses for observed physician
characteristics (race, age and sex).
Medicare Utilization Data. We match the survey responses with expenditure data by HRR.
Our primary measure is Medicare expenditures in the last two years of life for enrollees
over age 65 with a number of fatal illnesses.11 All HRR-level measures are adjusted for age,
sex, race, differences in Medicare reimbursement rates and the type of disease (including
an indicator for multiple diseases). This measure implicitly adjusts for differences across
regions in health status; an individual with renal failure who subsequently dies is likely
to be in similar (poor) health regardless of whether she lives in West Virginia or Oregon.12
End-of-life measures are commonly used to instrument for health care intensity, (e.g., Fisher
et al., 2003), are highly correlated with other medical expenditure measures such as one-year
expenditures following a heart attack (Skinner et al., 2010), and do not appear sensitive to
the inclusion of additional individual-level risk-adjusters (Kelley, et al., 2012). In sensitivity
analysis, we consider price-adjusted Medicare expenditures for all fee-for-service enrollees
age 65 and above, and a “forward looking” measure of one-year expenditures following
hospital admission for a different severe condition, hip fracture. The HRR-level price-
adjusted expenditures for the hip fracture cohort are adjusted for age, sex, race, comorbid
conditions at admission, and the hierarchical condition categories (HCC) risk-adjustment
index for the 6 months prior to admission. We focus on the 64 HRRs in the combined
sample with a minimum of 3 cardiologists (average =5.4) and 2 primary care physicians
(average = 7.9) surveyed. Among patients, we observe an average of 22 respondents per
11These include congestive heart failure, cancer/leukemia, chronic pulmonary disease, coronary artery
disease, peripheral vascular disease, severe chronic liver disease, diabetes with end organ damage, chronic renal
failure, and dementia.
12If more intensive spending saves lives, then in regions with more intensive spending, fewer die, leading
to potential biases in the end-of-life measure (Bach et al., 2004). However, given conventional estimates of
cost-effectiveness in end-of-life spending, the magnitude of the bias would be small.
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Clinical Vignettes from the Physician Surveys. Since the clinical vignettes are crucial for
our analysis, we describe them in some detail. We note ﬁrst the obvious: responses to the
vignette may not exactly reﬂect what physicians actually do in practice and because we are
unable to link physician responses to those physicians’ claims, we cannot test this in the
context of this data set. Empirical evidence, however, strongly indicates that clinical vignettes
closely predict how physicians actually intervene (Peabody et al., 2004; Mandelblatt et al.,
2012; Dresselhaus et al., 2004). Additional tests done on our data conﬁrm that HRR level
rates of percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) in Medicare patients in the year of the
survey are correlated with local cardiologists’ survey responses, additional evidence that
survey vignettes predict actual physician behavior.
Moreover, and importantly for the contribution of this paper, the vignettes have far
more detail than the claims data because they yield probabilistic assessments of multiple
counterfactual interventions. In claims data, the relative probabilities of counterfactual
interventions are unknown because counterfactual interventions are necessarily unobserved.
In this respect, among others, the vignette-based survey data we consider are far richer than
claims data.
We assume that the physician’s responses to the vignettes are “all in” measures (ZS, as
in equation 3.7), reﬂecting physician beliefs as well as the variety of ﬁnancial, organizational,
and capacity-related constraints physicians face. Alternatively, one could interpret the
physician’s responses to the vignettes as a pure reﬂection of beliefs (for example, how one
might answer for qualifying boards), and not as representative of the day-to-day realities of
their practice. We tested this alternative explanation by including the organizational and
ﬁnancial variables in our estimation equations in addition to the vignette estimates. This
13Early readers of this paper wondered how to compare measurement error in the patient responses, which
are likely to only capture individual patients’ preferences, versus physician responses, which likely capture
physicians’ experiences with hundreds of their patients. While only partially addresses this concern, we also
note that our primary results are robust to focusing only on regions in the top two quartiles of per-HRR patient
observations, suggesting that ﬁndings are very similar when focusing on those regions with relatively more
patients represented.
92did not appreciably increase the explanatory power of these equations.14
The detailed clinical vignette questions are shown in the ﬁrst appendix to this chapter
(Panel II) and summary statistics are presented in Table 3.1. We begin with the vignette for
Patient A, which asks how frequently the physician would schedule routine follow-up visits
for patients with stable angina whose symptoms and cardiac risk factors are well controlled
on current medical therapy (cardiologists) or patients with hypertension (primary care
physicians). The response is unbounded, and expressed in months. Answers ranged from 1
month to 24 months in practice. Figure 3.3 presents a HRR-level histogram of averages from
the cardiology survey for all 64 HRRs studied.
Figure 3.3: Distribution of Length of Time before Next Visit for Patient with Well-Controlled Angina
(Cardiologist HRR-Level Averages)
14One might argue that physicians in regions with, e.g. most of their low-income patients in poor health may
“ﬁll in” missing characteristics of the vignettes. This could make such physicians more likely to recommend
intensive care, meaning that imperfectly risk-adjusted Medicare expenditures would be spuriously correlated
with more intensive vignette recommendations. Alternatively, such physicians may also be less likely to
recommend intensive medical or surgical treatments, since outcomes are dependent on coordinated follow-up
care that may not be available to patients living in low-income neighborhoods. While we cannot rule out either
potential source of bias, we note that in a study of medical students responding to clinical vignettes, individuals’
clinical assessments were not associated with patient race or occupation and no association was found between
implicit preferences and the assessments (Haider et. al., 2011). Lastly, we note that to the extent that physicians
answer questions according to “textbook” answers, the responses we record from doctors could be a lower
bound on true variation in physician beliefs.
93How do these responses correspond to guidelines for managing chronic stable angina?
While diagnosis and management of coronary artery disease (the cause of angina) is the
most common clinical issue faced by cardiologists on a day-to-day basis, there are no hard
data to support any recommendation. The 2005 American College of Cardiology/American
Heart Association [ACC/AHA] guidelines (Hunt et al., 2005) – what most cardiologists
would have considered the “Bible” in cardiology at the time the survey was ﬁelded – were
very imprecise: they recommended follow-up every 4-12 months. However, even with these
broad recommendations, we ﬁnd that over one ﬁfth (23%) of cardiologists in the sample
recommend follow-up visits more frequently than every 4 months. These physicians were
geographically clustered in a subset of HRRs (p < .01 in a test of the null of no geographic
correlation) and the distribution of high follow-up cardiologists across HRRs is shown in
Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: Distribution of High Follow-Up Cardiologists and Geographic Correlation (HRR-Level Averages)
The equivalent follow-up measure for primary care physicians is for a patient with
well-controlled hypertension. The Seventh Report of the Joint National Committee on
Prevention, Detection, Evaluation, and Treatment of High Blood Pressure (U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, 2004), which would have been the most current guideline
94recommendation at the time, suggests follow up every 3-6 months based on expert opinion.
We deﬁne a “high follow-up” physician as one who recommends follow-up visits more
frequently than clinical guidelines would suggest and a “low follow-up” physician as one
who recommends follow-up visits less frequently than clinical guidelines would suggest. By
this deﬁnition, less than 1 percent of cardiologists and 9 percent of PCPs in our data are
classiﬁed as “low follow-up” physicians while 23 percent of cardiologists and 9 percent of
PCPs are classiﬁed as “high follow-up” physicians.
Ofﬁce visits are not a large component of physicians’ incomes (or overall Medicare
expenditures). Thus any correlation between the frequency of follow-up visits and overall
expenditures would most likely be because frequent ofﬁce visits are also associated with
additional highly remunerated tests and interventions (such as echocardiography, stress
imaging studies, and so forth) that further set in motion the “diagnostic-therapeutic cascade,”
resulting in subsequent diagnostic tests, treatments, and follow-up visits (Lucas, et al., 2008).
Thus the next two vignettes focus on patients with heart failure, a much more expensive
setting. Heart failure is also natural to ask about because it is common, the disease is chronic,
prognosis is poor, and treatment is expensive.
Vignettes for both Patients B and C ask questions about the treatment of Class IV heart
failure, the most severe classiﬁcation and one in which patients have symptoms at rest. In
both scenarios the vignette patient is on maximal (presumably optimal) medications, and
neither patient is a candidate for revascularization: Patient B has already had a coronary
stent placed without symptom change, and Patient C is explicitly noted to not be a candidate
for this procedure. The key differences between the two scenarios are patients’ ages (75
for patient B, 85 for Patient C), the presence of asymptomatic non-sustained ventricular
tachycardia in Patient B, and severe symptoms that resolve partially with increased oxygen
in Patient C.
Cardiologists in the survey were asked about various interventions as well as palliative
care for each of these patients. For patient B, they were given ﬁve choices: three intensive
treatments (repeat angiography; implantable cardiac deﬁbrillator [ICD] placement, and
95pacemaker insertion), one involving medication (anti arrhythmic therapy), and palliative
care. Patient C also has three intensive options (admit to the ICU/CCU, placement of
a coronary artery catheter, and pacemaker insertion), two less aggressive options (admit
to the hospital (but not the ICU/CCU) for diuresis, and send home on increased oxygen
and diuretics) and palliative care. In each case, cardiologists ranked their likelihood of
recommending each intervention separately on a 5-interval range from “never” to “always
/ almost always.” Physicians could indicate strong or weak likelihood of recommending
multiple options, for example, a physician might “frequently” recommend both palliative
care and an intervention.
We start with the obvious: regardless of the religious, political or moral persuasion of
the cardiologist, these two men deserve a frank conversation about their prognosis and an
ascertainment of their preferences for end-of-life care. One-year mortality for those with
Class IV heart failure is nearly 50 percent. If compliant with the guidelines, therefore, every
one of the cardiologists should have answered “always/almost always,” or at least “most of
the time,” to initiating or continuing discussions about palliative care.15
Studies have shown that patients, physicians and family members are often not “on
the same page” when it comes to advanced directive planning (Connors, et al., 1995), and
is reﬂected in the survey data: for Patient B, only 30 percent of cardiologists responded
that they would initiate or continue discussions about palliative care “most of the time”
or “always/almost always.” For Patient C, 43 percent of cardiologists and 50 percent of
primary care physicians were likely to recommend this course of action “most of the time”
or “always/almost always.” In both cases, physicians’ recommendations fall far short of
clinical guidelines, which would suggest that these discussions are always appropriate for
such severely ill patients. We deﬁne our second index of physicians to reﬂect physicians’
likelihood of recommending palliative care. We classify the doctor as a “comforter” if the
15According to the AHA-ACC directives, “Patient and family education about options for formulating and
implementing advance directives and the role of palliative and hospice care services with reevaluation for
changing clinical status is recommended for patients with HF [heart failure] at the end of life.” (Hunt et al.,
2005, p. e206)
96physician would discuss palliative care with the patient “always / almost always” for both
Patients B and C (among cardiologists) or for patient C (among primary care physicians,
who did not have Patient B’s vignette in their survey). In our ﬁnal sample, 29 percent of
cardiologists and 44 percent of primary care physicians met this deﬁnition of a comforter.
We now turn to more controversial aspects of patient management. The language in
the vignettes was carefully constructed to relate to the contemporaneous clinical guidelines.
Several key aspects of Patient B rule out both the ICD and pacemaker insertion16 and
indeed the ACC-AHA guidelines explicitly recommend against the use of an ICD for Class
IV patients potentially near death (Hunt et al., 2005; p. e206). On the other hand, both
treatments are highly reimbursed.
Since patient C is already on maximal medications and is not a candidate for revascu-
larization, the management goal should be to keep him as comfortable as possible. This
should be accomplished in the least invasive manner possible (e.g., at home), and if that
is not possible in an uncomplicated setting, for example during admission to the hospital
for simple diuresis. According to the ACC/AHA guidelines, no additional interventions
are appropriate.17 In fact, even a “simple” but invasive test, the pulmonary artery catheter,
has been found to be of no marginal value over good clinical decision making in managing
patients with CHF, and could even cause harm (ESCAPE, 2005).
Despite these guideline recommendations, physicians in our data show a surprising
degree of enthusiasm for additional interventions. For patient B, nearly one-third of the
cardiologists surveyed would recommend a repeat angiography at least as frequently as
“some of the time.” Similarly, 65 percent of cardiologists recommend an ICD “most of the
time,” or “always/almost always,” while 47 percent recommend a pacemaker with at least
these frequencies. For patient C, 18 percent recommend an ICU/CCU admission, 2 percent
recommend a pulmonary artery catheter and 15 percent recommend a pacemaker at least
16This includes his advanced stage; his severe (Class IV) medication refractory heart failure; and the
asymptomatic non-sustained nature of the ventricular tachycardia.
17Clinical improvement with a simple intervention (increasing his oxygen) also argues against more intensive
interventions.
97“most of the time.”
Our next measure of ZS is based on a summary of these intensity recommendations. We
start with the three most intensive interventions for both patients. Cardiologists’ responses
on aggressiveness are highly correlated across patients B and C. Of the 28 percent (N=143) of
cardiologists in the sample who would “frequently” or “always/almost always” recommend
at least one of the above-listed high-intensity procedures for patient C, 93 percent (N=133)
would also frequently or always/almost always recommend at least one high-intensity
intervention for patient B. We use this overlap – the highest treatment recommendation
overlap in our data – to deﬁne a “cowboy” cardiologist as a cardiologist who recommends
at least one of the three possible intensive treatments for both patients B and C “most of the
time” or “always/almost always.” Because Vignette B was not presented to the primary
care physicians, we use only their response to Vignette C to categorize them using the same
criteria. In total, 27 percent of the cardiologists in our sample are classiﬁed as cowboys, as
are 19 percent of primary care physicians.
All told, we test four measures of ZS: high or low frequency of follow-up visits, a dummy
variable for being a cowboy, and a dummy variable for being a comforter. How are these
measures related? Table 3.2 shows that among both PCPs and cardiologists, chi-squared
tests strongly reject the null of no association between follow-up frequencies recommended
for vignette patients and a physician’s status as a “cowboy” or “comforter.” Physicians with
a low follow-up frequency are more likely to be comforters and less likely to be cowboys
than physicians with a high follow-up frequency. Similarly, cowboy physicians are far less
likely to be comforter physicians (even though doctors could be classiﬁed as both). Most
differences are statistically signiﬁcant.18
18Patient and physician responses are only very weakly correlated across regions. The correlations across
physician types shown in Table 3.2 are also quite low, with the largest magnitudes on the order of 0.1 and the
majority being < 0.1.
98Table 3.2: Distribution of Physicians by Vignette Responses
Panel A: PCPs
Cowboy Comforter
Follow-Up Frequency Yes No Yes No
Low 16 61 8.4% 39 38 8.4%
Medium 98 452 60% 300 250 60%
High 87 200 31% 115 172 31%
22% 78% 50% 50%
p(c2): <0.01 p(c2): 0.02
Comforter
Cowboy Yes No
Yes 87 114 22%





Follow-Up Frequency Yes No Yes No
Low 17 76 18% 27 66 18%
Medium 85 238 63% 94 229 63%
High 31 69 19% 22 78 19%
26% 74% 27% 72%
p(c2): <0.01 p(c2): <0.01
Comforter
Cowboy Yes No
Yes 39 94 26%
No 104 279 74%
28% 72%
p(c2): <0.01
This table shows the bivariate relationships between the guideline-deﬁned
indicatorsfor recommended Follow-Up Frequency, as well as“Cowboy” and
“Comforter” status among both PCPs and Cardiologists in our data. Chi-
squared tests evaluate the null that there is no association between pairs
of indicators in the table.
3.4 Model Estimates
We now proceed with our estimates of the models presented above. We ﬁrst consider
Equation (3.5), the relationship between area-level spending and local patient and physician
preferences. We then turn to Equation (3.7), modeling the factors leading physicians to be
more and less aggressive.
Do Survey Responses Predict Regional Medicare Expenditures?
99We start with the basic relationship between area spending, patient preferences and
physician preferences for the 64 HRRs with at least 3 cardiologists and 2 primary care
physician responses. Figure 3.5 shows scatter plots of area-level end of life spending
vs. our measures of supply and demand for care. The measures we include are the
fraction of all physicians in the area who are cowboys (panel a), the fraction of physicians
who are comforters (panel b), the fraction of physicians who recommend follow-up more
frequently than recommended guidelines (panel c), and the share of patients who desire
more aggressive care at the end of life (panel d). Each circle represents one HRR, and its
size is proportional to the survey sample size in the respective HRR.
Figure 3.5: Log of Inpatient 2-year End-of-Life Regional Spending vs. Various Independent Variables
In the case of the three supply-side variables, the results are consistent with the theory:
despite the relatively small sample sizes of physicians in each HRR, end of life spending
is positively related to the cowboy ratio, negatively related to the comforter ratio, and
positively related to high frequency recommendations for follow-up visits. The demand
variable, in contrast, is not strongly related to spending: the data points form more of a
100Table 3.3: Regression Estimates of Ln Medicare Expenditures in the Last Two Years
Combined Sample of PCPs and Cardiologists
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cowboy Ratio, All Doctors 0.7535*** 0.6056*** 0.6096*** 0.5928*** 0.5972***
(0.1626) (0.1385) (0.1173) (0.1446) (0.1221)
Comforter Ratio, All Doctors -0.4068** -0.3206*** -0.2878** -0.3089*** -0.2745**
(0.1681) (0.1109) (0.1103) (0.1065) (0.1044)
Follow-Up Low, All Doctors -0.4174 -0.3626 -0.4884 -0.4422
(0.2755) (0.2849) (0.3299) (0.3215)
Follow-Up High, All Doctors 0.9712*** 0.9721*** 0.9680*** 0.9670***
(0.2053) (0.1963) (0.2026) (0.1910)
Have Unneeded Tests 0.1177 0.1424 -0.0543
(0.2062) (0.2251) (0.3400)
See Unneeded Cardiologist 0.2728* 0.3035* 0.5397*
(0.1549) (0.1679) (0.2855)
Aggressive Preferences Patient Ratio -0.2355 -0.2762 -0.5395
(0.4607) (0.4409) (0.7526)
Comfortable Preferences Patient Ratio -0.1154 -0.2033 -0.1917
(0.1584) (0.2015) (0.2499)
N 64 64 64 64 64 64
R2 0.3627 0.6092 0.6299 0.6127 0.6377 0.0750
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2-year End-of-Life Spending is in natural log form and is price, age, sex and race adjusted. Results shown are
for the 64 Hospital Referral Regions (HRRs) in which we have at least 3 patients and 3 cardiologists surveyed.
All regressions include a constant and control for the fraction of primary care physicians in the sample.
Respondent data is adjusted for race, sex and age. Survey sampling weights take into account differences
in the number of physician observations per HRR.
cloud than a line.
Table 3.3 explores this result more formally with regression estimates of logged end-of-
life expenditures, weighted by the number of physician observations per HRR and including
controls for the fraction of PCPs among our survey responders. As the ﬁrst column shows,
the local proportion of cowboys and comforters predicts 36 percent of the observed regional
variation in risk-adjusted end-of-life spending. Further, the estimated magnitudes are large:
increasing the percentage of cowboys by 10 percentage points is associated with a 7.5 percent
increase in end-of-life expenditures, while increasing the fraction of comforters by 10 percent
implies a 4.1 percent reduction in expenditures. This relationship between spending and the
local fractions of cowboys and comforters also holds when both cardiologists and primary
care physicians are analyzed separately, as shown in the Appendix.
Column 2 of Table 3.3 shows that the indicator for high frequency follow-up recommen-
dations is also a meaningful predictor of HRR-level end-of-life spending: conditional on the
101fraction of cowboys and comforters, an increase of 10 percentage points of physicians who
prefer to see patients more frequently than guidelines recommend is predicted to increase
end-of-life spending by 9.5 percent (and while the low frequency follow-up coefﬁcient is
large in magnitude (-0.417), it is not statistically signiﬁcant). Indeed the combination of just
these supplier beliefs alone can explain over 60 percent of the observed end-of-life spending
variation in the 64 sample HRRs.19
The next two columns add measures of patient preferences to the regressions: the share of
patients wishing to have unneeded tests, the share wanting to see an unneeded cardiologist,
the share preferring aggressive end-of-life care, and the share preferring comfortable end-of-
life care. None of these variables are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Even excluding
the physician belief variables entirely, as in column 6, the R2 from the patient preference
variables is just 0.075. Separate regressions for cardiologists and primary care physicians
are presented in Appendices C and D and show similar results.20
It is also possible that there could be an interaction effect between patient preferences and
physician beliefs, for example if aggressive physicians interact with patients with preferences
for aggressive care to generate even more utilization (or conversely for comforter physicians
and patients who demand palliative care). These hypotheses are considered in Table 3.4.
Column 1 of the table repeats Column 5 of Table 3.3 for reference. The subsequent columns
add interaction terms. As shown in Column 2, however, there is little consistent evidence
for the interactive aggressiveness hypothesis; the interaction between cowboy physicians
and patients with aggressive preferences is negative (not positive as theory would suggest),
and while the coefﬁcient between comforter physicians and patients is negative (column 3),
it is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Column 4 of Table 3.4 repeats the analyses in column 1, but uses total average per
19As Black et al. (2000) note, the OLS estimate is a lower bound and under weak assumptions, the expected
value of the OLS parameter estimate is of smaller magnitude than the true parameter. (The R2 is also a lower
bound owing to measurement error.)
20Our results do not appear to be driven by geography. The coefﬁcient estimates are similar when the east
and west coasts of the US are estimated separately.
102Table 3.4: Regression Estimates of Ln Medicare Expenditures Considering Interaction Terms and Additional
Measures of HRR-Level Spending
Combined Sample of PCPs and Cardiologists (dependent variables listed in column headings; all are in natural logs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2-yr EOL Spend 2-yr EOL Spend 2-yr EOL Spend Total Spend (Av. Total Spend (Hip
(As in Table 3.4) per Beneﬁciary) Fract. Cohort)
Cowboy Ratio, All Doctors 0.5972*** 0.5938*** 0.5835*** 0.3306*** 0.2793***
(0.1221) (0.1119) (0.1260) (0.1028) (0.0806)
Comforter Ratio, All Doctors -0.2745** -0.2600** -0.3175** -0.0889 -0.0682
(0.1044) (0.1002) (0.1224) (0.1064) (0.0749)
Follow-Up Low, All Doctors -0.4422 -0.4074 -0.4824 -0.5208 -0.1663
(0.3215) (0.2749) (0.3180) (0.3751) (0.2322)
Follow-Up High, All Doctors 0.9670*** 1.0267*** 0.9436*** 0.2480 0.2933**
(0.1910) (0.1837) (0.1870) (0.1777) (0.1291)
Have Unneeded Tests 0.1424 0.1015 0.1766 -0.0792 -0.0417
(0.2251) (0.2274) (0.2242) (0.2005) (0.1814)
See Unneeded Cardiologist 0.3035* 0.2159 0.2746* 0.3353 0.1996
(0.1679) (0.1666) (0.1617) (0.2434) (0.1478)
Aggressive Preferences Patient Ratio -0.2762 0.1880 0.6315 -0.3026 -0.1027
(0.4409) (0.5051) (0.9285) (0.4703) (0.3086)
Comfortable Preferences Patient Ratio -0.2033 -0.6297*** 0.1663 -0.2500 -0.0660
(0.2015) (0.1975) (0.3022) (0.1830) (0.1524)
Cowboy Ratio* -2.1268
Aggressive Preferences Patient Ratio (2.1367)
Cowboy Ratio* 1.5977**
Comfortable Preferences Patient Ratio (0.7557)
Comforter Ratio* -2.2461
Aggressive Preferences Patient Ratio (1.8854)
Comforter Ratio* -0.9179
Comfortable Preferences Patient Ratio (0.6437)
N 64 64 64 64 64
R2 0.6377 0.6603 0.6459 0.3482 0.3705
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; 2-year End-of-Life Spending and total spending are are price, age, sex and race adjusted. Hip fracture cohort
spending is adjusted for age, sex, race, comorbid conditions at admission, and the hierarchical condition categories risk-adjustment index
for the six months prior to admission. Results shown are for the 64 Hospital Referral Regions (HRRs) in which we have at least 3 patients
and 3 cardiologists surveyed. All regressions include a constant and control for the fraction of primary care physicians in the sample.
Respondent data is adjusted for race, sex and age. Survey sampling weights take into account differences in the number of physician
observations per HRR.
beneﬁciary Medicare expenditures (adjusted for prices, age, sex, and race/ethnicity) as the
dependent variable. This expenditure measure likely reﬂects a greater share of primary
care spending relative to specialty care. In the combined sample, the fraction of cowboys in
an HRR is a consistently strong predictor of spending across models. Moreover, although
R2 values are smaller in these models, supply-side factors continue to explain more of the
variation in spending than demand-side factors. Finally, we consider fully risk-adjusted
one-year expenditures for a “forward looking” cohort of hip fracture patients in Column 5
of Table 3.4. The estimated coefﬁcients suggest relationships similar to those in Column 1,
but, like the model explaining overall Medicare expenditures, the coefﬁcients are smaller in
magnitude and the R2 is smaller in magnitude as well (0.37 versus 0.64).
Our data imply a strong relationship between physician type and spending, as a simple
back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests. We calculate how much Medicare expenditures
would change in a counterfactual setting in which there were no cowboys, all physicians
were comforters, and all physicians met guidelines for follow-up care. In this counterfactual,
103end-of-life expenditures would be predicted to decline by 36 percent, and total Medicare
expenditures would be expected to decline by 17 percent. These comparisons point to the
importance of physician beliefs in explaining regional (and national) utilization patterns.
What factors predict physician responses to the vignettes?
To this point, we have shown that physician beliefs matter for spending, and that
physician beliefs vary across areas more than would be expected given random variation.
The obvious question is then: what explains this variation in physician beliefs? In this
section, we estimate the model in Equation (3.7) to test for the relative importance of ﬁnancial
and organizational factors in explaining physician recommendations.
Table 3.5 presents coefﬁcients from a linear probability model with HRR-level random
effects for three regressions at the physician level. Our dependent variables are binary
indictors for whether the physician is a cowboy (Column 1), a comforter (Column 2), or
recommends in high frequency follow-up (Column 3). In each model, we include basic
physician demographics: age, gender, board certiﬁcation status, whether the physician is
a cardiologist, days per week spent seeing patients, as well as cardiologists per 100,000
Medicare beneﬁciaries. Notably, some of these characteristics matter for predicting physician
types: male physicians in the sample are both somewhat more likely to be cowboys and
less likely to be comforters than female doctors and older physicians are more likely to be
high follow-up doctors and cowboys: at the mean age of 57.5 years, a 1 standard deviation
increase in physician age (9.8 years) is associated with a 4.6% increase in probability of
being a cowboy and a 5.5% increase in probability of being a high follow-up doctor.
The demographic factors included reveal that older physicians are more likely to rec-
ommend high rates of follow-up and are also more likely to be cowboys, but age is not a
signiﬁcant predictor of comforter status. Male physicians are less likely to be comforters,
while board certiﬁcation – a rough marker for physician quality – is negatively associated
with cowboy status and high follow-up frequency. This result is consistent with Doyle et al.
(2010), who found that lower quality physicians spent 10-25% more on treating otherwise
identical patients.
104Table 3.5: Predictors of Cowboy, Comforter & High Follow-Up Types
(1) (2) (3)
Cowboy Comforter High Follow-Up
General Controls
Age 0.0047*** 0.0005 0.0056***
(0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0012)
Male 0.0532* -0.0625* -0.0165
(0.0315) (0.0370) (0.0314)
Weekly Patient Days -0.0112 0.0145 0.0008
(0.0076) (0.0090) (0.0076)
Board Certiﬁed -0.0727* 0.0184 -0.1400***
(0.0379) (0.0445) (0.0378)
Cardiologists per 100k 0.0203*** -0.0223*** 0.0410***
(0.0076) (0.0079) (0.0061)
Cardiologist Dummy -0.0187 -0.1752*** -0.0695*
(0.0363) (0.0426) (0.0361)
Financial Factors
Fraction Capitated Patients 0.0980** -0.0428 0.1073**
(0.0462) (0.0540) (0.0457)
Fraction Medicaid Patients 0.2894*** 0.0325 0.3978***
(0.0931) (0.1090) (0.0924)
Organizational Factors
(Baseline = Solo or 2-person Practice) - - -
Single/Multi Speciality Group Practice -0.0584** -0.0169 -0.2019***
(0.0265) (0.0310) (0.0262)
Group/Staff HMO or Hospital-Based Practice -0.1539*** 0.0357 -0.2221***
(0.0429) (0.0502) (0.0426)
Responsiveness Factors
Responds to Patient Expectations -0.0272 0.0307 -0.0145
(0.0313) (0.0368) (0.0313)
Responds to Colleague Expectations 0.0147 -0.0007 0.0360
(0.0247) (0.0291) (0.0247)
Responds to Referrer Expectations 0.1084*** 0.0248 -0.0516
(0.0419) (0.0493) (0.0420)
Responds to Malpractice Concerns -0.0051 0.0222 -0.0105
(0.0247) (0.0290) (0.0247)
N 1349 1349 1349
R2 (within) 0.0502 0.0509 0.1075
R2 (between) 0.0379 0.1049 0.2110
R2 (overall) 0.0613 0.0596 0.1609
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
All logit regressions include a constant, and HRR-level random effects as well as general
physician-level controls. Additional explanatory variables include ﬁnancial, organizational
and responsiveness factors. The question about responding to referring doctor expectations
appeared in the Cardiologist survey only, and so reﬂects the preferences of cardiologists only.
The cardiology dummy variable therefore reﬂects both the pure effect of being a practicing
cardiologist, and a secondary adjustment arising from the referral question being set to zero
for all primary care physicians.
A greater number of cardiologists per 100,000 Medicare beneﬁciaries is associated with
a higher likelihood of a physician being a cowboy or high follow-up doctor and with a
lower likelihood of the physician being a comforter. One might be tempted to interpret this
as classic “supplier-induced demand” effect, with more cardiologists per capita leading to
less income per cardiologist, and hence a greater incentive to treat a given patient more
105intensively. Yet the equilibrium supply of cardiologists is likely to depend on a wide variety
of factors, suggesting caution in the interpretation.
The substitution effect implies that lower incremental reimbursements associated with
Medicaid and capitated patients would lead to fewer interventions and more palliative care.
Table 3.5 shows that physicians with a larger fraction of Medicaid and (to a lesser extent)
capitated patients are more likely to be cowboys and high-follow-up physicians, rejecting
the dominance of the substitution effect. One may appeal again to a dominant income effect
to explain these patterns.
Some organizational factors are strongly associated with physician beliefs about appro-
priate practice. Physicians in solo or 2-person practices are far more likely to be aggressive
than physicians in single or multi-specialty group practices or physicians who are part of
an HMO or a hospital-based practice. Yet physicians who work in a group or staff model
HMOs or hospital-based practice are no more likely to be comforters. Physicians who
respond to patient expectations are more likely to be comforters, and those responding to
referring physician expectations are more likely to be high follow-up physicians, but neither
effect is statistically signiﬁcant. Whether cardiologists accommodate referring physicians –
also a ﬁnancial factor (since cardiologists will beneﬁt ﬁnancially from future referrals) as
well as an organizational one – is a large and statistically signiﬁcant predictor of being a
cowboy.21 Finally, malpractice concerns are neither predictive of cowboy nor comforter
status, perhaps because procedures performed on high-risk patients (such as Patients B and
C) can increase the risk of a malpractice suit.
The explanatory power of these regressions is quite modest – between 6 and 15 percent –
suggesting that a considerable degree of the remaining variation is the consequence of physi-
cian beliefs regarding the productivity of treatments, rather than behaviors systematically
related to ﬁnancial, organizational, or other factors.
As a ﬁnal exercise, we include these ﬁnancial, organizational, and responsiveness
variables, aggregated up to the HRR level, in a regression that seeks to explain the variation
21Note that this question is asked only of cardiologists.
106in log end-of-life spending – an expanded counterpart to Table 3.4. These results are
presented in the Appendix. Aside from the per-capita supply of cardiologists – a potentially
suspect measure of capacity – none of the additional variables are statistically signiﬁcant,
nor do they add appreciably to the explanatory power of the regression. Physician beliefs,
independent of ﬁnancial or organizational factors, appear to explain a great deal of why
physicians are cowboys or comforters and how the frequencies of these typologies, in turn,
are related to overall spending.
3.5 Conclusion and Implications
While there is a good deal of regional variation in medical spending and care utilization
in the U.S. and elsewhere, there is little agreement about the causes of such variations.
Do they arise from variation in patient demand, from variation in physician behavior, or
both? In this paper, we found that regional measures of patient demand as measured by
responses to a nationwide survey had only modest predictive association with regional
end-of-life expenditures. By contrast, regionally aggregated measures of physician beliefs
regarding treatment options can explain a substantial degree of observed regional variation
in utilization in the U.S. Medicare population. While other results have suggested such a
ﬁnding (Sirovich et al. (2008), Lucas et al. (2008), Bederman et. al. (2011), and Wennberg et
al. (1997)), our paper is the ﬁrst to directly relate Medicare spending to physician beliefs.
Unfortunately, we are not able to match physicians directly to their own patients, which
we acknowledge is a shortcoming of the survey methodology. However, we are able to link
the patient and physician surveys at the HRR level and the regional evidence is consistent
with the dominant importance of physician beliefs in explaining HRR-level utilization
patterns. A back-of-the-envelope calculation using our regression results implies that, were
all physicians in the 64 HRRs studied to follow professional guidelines, end-of-life Medicare
expenditures in these areas would be expected to be 36 percent lower, and overall Medicare
107expenditures 17 percent lower.22
We then turned to the factors that lead physicians to have different preferences. We
found that the traditional factors in supplier-induced demand models, such as the fraction of
patients paid through capitation (or on Medicaid), or physicians’ responsiveness to ﬁnancial
factors, play a relatively small role in explaining equilibrium variations in utilization patterns.
Organizational factors, such as accommodating colleagues, help to explain only a small
amount of observed variation in individual intervention decisions. Instead, differences
in physician beliefs about the effectiveness of treatments explain the lion’s share of of
inter-regional variation in Medicare expenditures.23
Our results differ from the existing literature in that they are based on vignettes and thus
represent a lower bound to practice variations. Generally, prior studies inferred practice
variations as the residual from an area model, leading to estimates being biased either
upward (because of unobserved regional factors) or biased downward (because of ﬂawed
risk-adjustment, as in Song et al., 2010).
One concern about the interpretation of the vignette responses as “overuse” is that
they may reﬂect the true productivity of physicians. While we cannot rule this out, we
note that physicians with greater objective qualiﬁcations such as board certiﬁcation are no
more likely to be cowboys. Nor do the updated 2009 heart failure guidelines recommend
more aggressive care (Hunt et al., 2009), as a model of inappropriately cautious and slowly
evolving recommendations would suggest.
Another hypothesis is that while cowboys may over-treat patients along some dimensions,
22As one seminar participant noted, Medicare doesn’t reimburse for talks, but talks take a lot of time. Absent
ﬁnancial incentives and given implicit time costs of conversations about end-of-life and palliative care, perhaps
we should not be surprised that doctors under-provide this type of service relative to those that are (sometimes
quite generously) reimbursed. Another seminar participant noted that medical ethics call for the consultant
to speak only to referring doctor and not to the patient; this is another reason we might expect to see fewer
palliative care conversations by cardiologists.
23This result is consistent with Epstein and Nicholson (2009), who ﬁnd large variations in Cesarean section
surgical rates among obstetricians within the same practice, even after adjusting for where the physicians
trained. It is also consistent with Chassin’s (1993) “Enthusiasm Hypothesis” – that regional differences in the
use of health care services are caused by differences in the prevalence of physicians who are enthusiasts for
those services.
108they may also avoid the underuse of effective care along other dimensions (e.g., Landrum
et al., 2008). Our survey did not ask about whether the physician would recommend
appropriate levels of effective care or not. But other evidence does not support this
hypothesis: an HRR-level composite AMI quality measure from 2007 Hospital Compare
Data, (Dartmouth Atlas, 2013) is negatively associated with the HRR-level fraction of
physicians who are cowboys in our data.
Unfortunately, the data we consider in this study cannot shed light on how these
differences in physician beliefs arise. Simple heterogeneity in physician beliefs cannot
explain regional variation in expenditures, since the observed regional patterns in physician
beliefs exhibit far greater inter-region variation than would be expected due to chance alone.
Rather, spatial correlation in beliefs is required in order to explain the regional patterns we
see. We do ﬁnd that physicians’ propensity to intervene for non-clinical reasons is related to
the expectations of physicians with whom they regularly interact, a result consistent with
network models. Similarly, Molitor (2011) ﬁnds that cardiologists who move to more or less
aggressive regions change their practice style to better conform to local norms. However we
are still left with questions as to how and why some regions become more aggressive than
others.
Our results do not imply that economic incentives are unimportant. Clearly, changes
in payment margins have a large impact on behavior, as has been shown in a variety of
settings. But the prevalence of geographic variations in European countries, where economic
incentives are often nearly entirely blunted, is consistent with the view that physician
beliefs play a large role in explaining such variations. A better understanding of both how
physician beliefs form, and how they can be shaped, is a key challenge for future research.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Firm Experiences in the PMA Process
Case 1: A Protracted Review Process for a New Device
The company CardioMEMS is the developer of the Champion Heart Failure Monitoring
System device. This device is a permanently implantable pressure measurement system that
sits in the pulmonary artery of heart failure patients and monitors pressure and heart rate,
transmitting data wirelessly. It is intend to assist in the ambulatory management of heart
failure and reduce associated hospital stays (Loh et. al., 2013).
The device was evaluated in the CHAMPION Trial in which 550 patients were random-
ized into treatment or control groups. In the treatment group, physicians were provided
access to patients’ pulmonary artery pressure and all physicians were instructed in the
adjustment of heart failure medications. According to CardioMEMS,
“The CHAMPION trial achieved all pre-speciﬁed primary efﬁcacy and safety endpoints.
Speciﬁcally, the rate of adjudicated hospitalizations for heart failure was signiﬁcantly
lower in the Treatment Arm (0.32) compared to the Control Arm (0.44) (28% reduction,
p=0.0002), and the device exhibited an excellent safety and performance proﬁle. All
pre-speciﬁed secondary endpoints were also achieved.”
The results of this trial were submitted in the company’s Premarket Application to
the FDA on December 14th, 2010. The reviewing panel raised concerns about potential
118bias in the efﬁcacy analysis as well as concerns about the efﬁcacy of the device in some
subpopulations and the device was not approved following the ﬁrst Cardiovascular Devices
Panel meeting at which it was considered in December, 2011 (Husten, 2013).
In 2013, CardioMEMS continues to pursue FDA approval, having completed an addi-
tional follow-up study. However, the 2013 reviewers have reported that they still ﬁnd it
“difﬁcult to draw conclusions based on unrandomized and unblinded followup data of a
segment of the original trial population” (Husten, 2013). The fate of the Champion device
remains undecided nearly three years after its original PMA ﬁling.
119Case 2: Requests for Additional Information Following PMA Submission and Comple-
tion of Pivotal Trials
EnteroMedics is a medical device company that develops neuroscience based technolo-
gies to treat obesity and metabolic disease. Its VBLOC therapy device is intended to help
obese patients lose weight more comfortably by intermittently blocking the vagus nerve,
which resides just above the intersection of the stomach and esophagus. This is accom-
plished by two small laparoscopically implanted electrodes that are put in contact with the
vagus nerve.
EnteroMedics completed a randomized, double-blind, sham-controlled, multicenter
pivotal clinical trial of the effectiveness of the VBLOC device in 239 patients at 10 sites (The
control group received a non-functional device during the trial period). In February of 2013,
EnteroMedics announced a statistically signiﬁcant and clinically meaningful effect of the
device on weight loss and “an excellent safety proﬁle” of the device in trials. The results
suggested excess weight loss of approximately 25 percent among treated patients, with over
half of patients achieving at least 20 percent excess weight loss. Based on the results of the
pivotal trial, a Premarket Application was submitted to the FDA.
In late September of 2013, EnteroMedics reported that it had “received a formal re-
sponse...from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) with regard to its Premarket Ap-
proval Application (PMA) for approval of the Maestro Rechargeable System as a treatment
for obesity.” According to a press release by EnteroMedics, “the response contains follow-up
questions related to the application, pertaining primarily to device testing and clinical data,
including training programs for users and a post approval study.” (EnteroMedics, September
24, 2013) EnteroMedics said that it would respond to the FDA’s follow-up questions within
the weeks immediately following the communication. The Premarket Application for the
VBLOC device is still under review at the FDA and EnteroMedics hopes for an approval in
2014.
120Case 3: Emerging Classes of Medical Technology and Procedural Uncertainty
There are several classes of emerging medical technologies that do not yet have formal
regulatory approval pathways in place for entering U.S. Markets. Two examples (biosimilars
and cellular and gene therapies) are presented below. These can be thought of as extreme
cases of procedural uncertainty – that is, the complete absence of rules for regulating these
new technologies has meant that they are not yet available to patients in the United States.
I. Biosimilars
Biologics are a group of large, complex and heterogeneous proteins derived from
living organisms, which are often the primary component of vaccines and cancer therapies.
Because they are more complex and derived from living cells, biologic drugs are regulated
separately from chemical drugs. Biosimilars or follow-on biopharmaceuticals differ from
chemical drug generics in terms of their physical characteristics as well as in how they are
regulated. Generic versions of chemically manufactured small molecule drugs are based on
bioequivalence – that is, containing the same quantity of active substance(s) as the reference
product. These generic drugs can be used in the same dose to treat the same disease with
equal expected efﬁcacy. Biosimilars, on the other hand, are much larger molecules and
follow-on products are based on similarity to the reference product, such as biologically
manufactured recombinant proteins (Manheim et. al. 2006; Rovira et. al., 2011).
At present, the FDA’s Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER) is considering
how to regulate follow-on biological products and the United States has no established
industry for biosimilars. Europe, in contrast, has had biosimilars since 2006 following the
establishment of a formal regulatory pathway for their approval. On February 9, 2012,
the FDA issued three draft guidance documents on biosimilar product development and
the FDA is currently accepting public comments these documents. There remains a fair
amount of debate as to what FDA will require of biosimilars – in particular with respect
to requirements to prove interchangeability (GaBI, 2012). In a February 2012 editorial,
The Lancet urged the FDA “to integrate the data, experience, and lessons learned by the
European Medicines Agency, which has approved a dozen biosimilars since 2006.” At
121present, the absence of regulatory processes for approving biosimilars has meant that
patients in the United States have no access to these products.
II. Cellular and Gene Therapies
Several new cellular and gene therapies also provide examples of extreme procedural
uncertainty. As is the case for biologics, the applications of cellular and gene therapies
are regulated by the FDA’s Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER). Speciﬁc
products and applications, in turn, are typically regulated following the publication of,
and in accordance with, CBER guidance1 documents. As a corollary, the absence of CBER
guidance on a speciﬁc therapeutic application typically means that it is unavailable to U.S.
patients.
An example is that of retinal ganglion cell gene therapy for visual system repair. In
this application, the cells in the retina are genetically modiﬁed using viral vectors in order
to beneﬁt patients with certain inherited degenerative conditions that compromise visual
function (Hellström and Harvey, 2011). Several recent clinical trials have demonstrated that
genetic modiﬁcation can be of meaningful therapeutic beneﬁt to patients and there is now
evidence for the long-term expression of genes delivered through the vector, suggesting
extended therapeutic effects of the therapy, following a single treatment/dose. However,
clinical trials to-date have been heterogeneous in their use of viral vs. non-viral gene therapy
vectors and even within viral vector therapies, multiple vectors have been studied in clinical
trials (Hellström and Harvey, 2011). In the absence of FDA guidance on the regulation of
such therapies and despite evidence of their effectiveness, no rental repair gene therapies
are currently approved by the FDA for use outside of clinical trials.
1All cellular and gene therapy guidance documents are available at http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBlood
Vaccines/guidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/CellularandGeneTherapy/default.htm
122A.2 Approval Regulation Given a Farsighted Regulator
The ﬁrst model tested in Section 5 is an extension of Carpenter et. al.’s (2010), model of the
FDA drug approval process. In this model, drugs are indexed by i, diseases by j, and ﬁrms
by k. I generalize this model to apply to multiple categories of medical technology products
(e.g. drugs, devices, and others) and a common regulator, the FDA. New products can then
be characterized by two parameters:
1. gij (where 0 <gij  1) is the curing probability of the product. Assume gij is ﬁxed and
known with certainty throughout agency’s decision problem.
2. µi is the danger of the drug or the expected number of people who will be harmed or
killed by it over an interval of time, which can be normalized to 1 such that µi can be
thought of as the rate of harming consumers. The greater is µi, the more its approval
will harm the regulator’s reputation.
Note: for simplicity, it is helpful to assume that cov(µi, gij) = 0 – that is, danger and
curing power are independently distributed.
The agency observes information (e.g. clinical trials) in which a product either harms or
does not harm the consumer. Harm evolves according to a Wiener process Xit = X(t) a
linear function of underlying danger (µ) plus a random component:
X(t)=µt + sz(t)
where µ and s > 0 are constants and where z(t) is a standard normal variable with mean 0
and variance t. Then the agency applies Bayes’ Rule to the stochastic history of X(t) to learn
about µ. In this model, assume that s is the same across products, but that µ (normally
distributed) differs across them and has a mean, m and variance s. Then, Carpenter et. al.
(2010) note that for any product review of time t and accumulated harm X(t)=x, [x,t]
constitutes a sufﬁcient statistic for the agency’s problem.
Bayseian estimates of µ are then:







Where the posterior variance can be thought of as the FDA’s uncertainty about µ, the harm
the product may induce (Carpenter et. al., 2010).
Approval Payoff
Scholars of the political economy of FDA drug approvals have found that the FDA
may be more responsive to the demands of lobby groups representing (potential) drug
consumers, such as cancer or AIDS organizations (Olson, 1995; Carpenter 2002; Carpenter
et. al., 2010) and that individual ﬁrms may also exert pressure on the FDA. Once can think
of a general model of payoff for the regulator as follows:
Aijk = g(gN, NJ,rK,qJ,c)
where:
• gN is the curing probability, as noted above
• NJ   1 is the number of products in the same product category that have already
applied for FDA approval
• rK is the “political clout” of the submitting ﬁrm, K
• qJ is a disease-speciﬁc factor that may represent the disease’s prevalence and/or the
strength of its political lobby2
• c is a set of relevant specialty area and time-varying effects that may affect the payoff
associated with product approval
Agency Decision-Making
2Note that in contrast to Carpenter et. al. (2009), I am not interested in identifying the disease-speciﬁc effects
per se. Rather, knowing that they may exist for some subset of illnesses, I control for them when estimating
other model coefﬁcients.
124As in Carpenter et. al. (2010), I can write an agency objective function, in which the
Agency wants to maximize its approval payoff given information about ˆ µ:




where d is the discount factor, T is approval time, µ⇤ is the agency’s estimate of danger
at the optimal stopping time for clinical trials and other data collection, w represents an
elementary event in probability space W and y is a variable of integration.
Early Entrant Advantages
In a model like the one used above, early entrant protection should be observed within a
product category. All else equal, this is a result of a regulator making approval decisions in
the present while expecting a discounted pipeline of future innovations. For example, given
two products i = N and i = N + 1 with the same expected levels of danger (µN = µN+1)
and curing probability, then the Nth product should have a shorter expected approval time.
This result is, of course, in the absence of regulatory uncertainty, which is introduced and
discussed in Section 3.
125A.3 Product Code Examples
Examples of unique cardiovascular products:
Example product code deﬁnition for an implantable pacemaker pulse generator:
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B.1 Determining Conﬂict of Interest and Eligibility for Advisory
Committee Participation1
1: Is the subject matter of the meeting a “particular matter?”
2: Will the particular matter have a direct and predictable effect on the ﬁnancial interest(s)
of any organization?
3: Identify potentially affected products/organizations and request that the employee
complete the ﬁnancial disclosure form
4: Does the employee, or persons/organizations whose interests are imputed to him, have a
ﬁnancial interest in one or more of the potentially affected products and/or organizations?
5: Will the particular matter have a direct and predictable effect on the ﬁnancial interest of
the employee and/or persons/organizations whose interests are imputed to him?
6: After applying applicable regulatory exemptions, does the employee or persons/organizations
whose interests are imputed to him have a disqualifying ﬁnancial interest?
7: Are There disqualifying ﬁnancial interests for which a waiver would not be considered?
8: Is the combined value of the employee’s personal disqualifying ﬁnancial interests and
1Source: FDA (2008)
127those of his spouse and minor children $50,000 or Less2?
9: Is the individual’s participation necessary to afford the advisory committee essential
expertise?
10a: If the individual is a special government employee, does the need for the individual’s
services outweigh the potential for a conﬂict of interest created by the interest involved?
10b: If the individual is a regular government employee, is the ﬁnancial interest not so
substantial as to be deemed likely to affect the integrity of the services provided by that
individual?
11: Waiver may be recommended if consistent with waiver cap3.
2If the combined value of these disqualifying ﬁnancial interests is greater than $50,000, the member would
not ordinarily be considered for a waiver and would not participate in the advisory committee meeting.
3Provided that the applicable waiver cap would not be exceeded, staff may recommend that a waiver
for the individual be granted. FDA has discretion to issue limited waivers under 18 U.S.C. 208 and under
section 712(c)(2)(C) of the Act; e.g., by limiting participation to non-voting. If staff decides to recommend that a
waiver be granted, they should determine which type of waiver(s) (including any recommended limitations) is
appropriate to recommend to FDA ofﬁcials who will review and decide whether to approve the waiver.
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Panel Roster 
Circulatory System Devices Panel Meeting 
Edwards SAPIEN Transcatheter Heart Valve P110021 
June 13, 2012 
 
   
Name  Affiliation  Role 
Warren Laskey, MD  Univ New Mexico School of Medicine 
Albuquerque, NM  Temporary Panel Chair 
David J. Slotwiner, MD  Long Island Jewish Medical Center 
New Hyde Park, NY   Voting Member 
David C. Naftel, PhD  University of Alabama at Birmingham 
Birmingham, AL  Voting Member 
E. Magnus. Ohman MB, F.R.C.P.I., 
F.A.C.C. 
Duke University Medical Center 
Durham, NC  Voting Member 
Valluvan Jeevanandam MD  University of Chicago  
Chicago, IL  Voting Member 
John C. Somberg, MD  Rush University Medical Center 
Lake Bluff, IL  Voting Member 
Richard A. Lange M.D.  University of Texas  
San Antonio, TX  Temporary Voting Member 
Jeffrey S. Borer, M.D.  State Univ. of New York, Downstate Medical Ctr. 
New York, NY   Temporary Voting Member 
Gregory J. Dehmer, M.D.  Scott & White Healthcare, Texas A&M University 
Temple, TX  Temporary Voting Member 
George W. Vetrovec, M.D.  Medical College of Virginia, 
Richmond, VA  Temporary Voting Member 
David C. Good, M.D  Penn State Milton S. Hershey  
Medical Center, Hershey, PA  Temporary Voting Member 
David E. Kandzari, M.D.  Piedmont Heart Institute 
Atlanta, GA  Temporary Voting Member 
Brett C. Sheridan, M.D.  University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill  
Chapel Hill, NC  Temporary Voting Member 
Marc R. Katz, M.D., M.P.  St Mary's Hospital 
Richmond, VA  Temporary Voting Member 
Elizabeth B. Patrick-Lake, M.F.S.  PFO Research Foundation  Patient Representative 
Burke T. Barrett, B.A., B.S., M.B.A.  Vice President of Regulatory &  
Clinical Affairs, CardioFocus, Inc.  Industry Representative 
Kristine R. Mattivi, Ms, Pt  Colorado Foundation for Medical Care 
Englewood, CO  Consumer Representative 
Jamie Waterhouse  Food and Drug Administration 
Silver Spring, MD  Designated Federal Officer 
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                 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES    Public Health Service 
                                       
AGENDA 
 
* Open Public Hearing   Interested persons may present data, information, or views, orally or in writing, 
on the issue pending before the panel.  Scheduled speakers who have requested time to address the panel 
will speak at this time.  After they have spoken, the Chair may ask them to remain if the panel wishes to 
question them. Then the Chair will recognize unscheduled speakers as time allows.  Only the panel may 
question speakers during the open public hearing. 
 
Last updated 6/18/2012    1 
 
     
GENERAL AND PLASTIC SURGERY DEVICES PANEL 
of the 
MEDICAL DEVICES ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
Hilton Washington DC North/Gaithersburg 
620 Perry Parkway, Gaithersburg, MD  
June 21, 2012 
Panel Chairperson               Designated Federal Officer 
Joseph LoCicero III, M.D.             Natasha G. Facey 
08:00  a.m.  Call to Order 
Panel Introductions  
Conflict of Interest  
    PMA# P110014 Dune Medical Margin Probe System, by Dune Medical Devices, Inc. 
08:10   a.m.  Sponsor Presentation 
09:40   a.m.  Q&A Sponsor 
10:00  a.m.  Break   
10:15   a.m.  FDA Presentation 
11:45   p.m.  Q&A FDA Presentation 
12:05   p.m.  Lunch 
01:05  p.m.  Open Public Hearing*    
02:05  p.m.  Panel Deliberations   
03:05  p.m.  Break 
03:20  p.m.  FDA Questions 
05:30  p.m.  FDA and Sponsor Summations   
 
05:40  p.m.  Panel Vote  
06:00  p.m.  Adjournment   
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C.1 Clinical Vignettes and Response Options for Patients, Cardi-
ologists and Primary Care Physicians
131132C.2 Regression Estimates of Ln Medicare Expenditures in the Last
Two Years (Cardiologists Only)
Cardiologists
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cowboy Ratio, Cardiologists 0.1825* 0.1831** 0.2460*** 0.1726** 0.2391***
(0.1027) (0.0864) (0.0883) (0.0857) (0.0868)
Comforter Ratio, Cardiologists -0.1261 -0.0400 -0.0016 -0.0449 -0.0111
(0.1100) (0.0848) (0.0903) (0.0852) (0.0862)
Followup Low, Cardiologists -0.6662*** -0.5460*** -0.7836*** -0.6951***
(0.1062) (0.1373) (0.1648) (0.1691)
Followup High, Cardiologists 0.5323*** 0.5265*** 0.5333*** 0.5292***
(0.1077) (0.1027) (0.1062) (0.1017)
Have Unneeded Tests 0.2587 0.2705 0.2343
(0.1925) (0.2066) (0.2302)
See Unneeded Cardiologist 0.2674 0.2894 0.2411
(0.1834) (0.1791) (0.2083)
Aggressive Preferences Patient Ratio -0.2385 -0.2539 -0.2870
(0.3013) (0.3044) (0.4397)
Comfortable Preferences Patient Ratio -0.0628 -0.1267 0.0120
(0.1488) (0.1482) (0.1559)
N 64 64 64 64 64 64
R2 0.0535 0.4073 0.4446 0.4119 0.4530 0.0406
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2-year End-of-Life Spending is in natural log form and is price, age, sex and race adjusted. Results shown are
for the 64 Hospital Referral Regions (HRRs) in which we have at least 3 patients and 3 cardiologists surveyed.
All regressions include a constant and control for the fraction of primary care physicians in the sample.
Respondent data is adjusted for race, sex and age. Survey sampling weights take into account differences
in the number of physician observations per HRR.
133C.3 Regression Estimates of Ln Medicare Expenditures in the Last
Two Years (PCPs Only)
PCPs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cowboy Ratio, PCPs 0.6689*** 0.5476*** 0.4773*** 0.5383*** 0.4728***
(0.1687) (0.1416) (0.1333) (0.1251) (0.1223)
Comforter Ratio, PCPs -0.2489* -0.2436** -0.2104* -0.1987** -0.1724*
(0.1380) (0.1137) (0.1157) (0.0944) (0.0972)
Followup Low, PCPs -0.4729* -0.4639* -0.5905** -0.5682*
(0.2754) (0.2706) (0.2938) (0.2930)
Followup High, PCPs 0.9091* 0.9918* 0.8640* 0.9333*
(0.5359) (0.5386) (0.5135) (0.5064)
Have Unneeded Tests -0.2231 -0.1341 -0.2371
(0.3258) (0.3037) (0.3941)
See Unneeded Cardiologist 0.4045* 0.4135** 0.7422**
(0.2154) (0.2046) (0.3350)
Aggressive Preferences Patient Ratio -0.8012 -0.7712 -0.6638
(0.6915) (0.6460) (0.9768)
Comfortable Preferences Patient Ratio -0.2719 -0.3058 -0.3864
(0.2521) (0.2739) (0.3348)
N 64 64 64 64 64 64
R2 0.3430 0.4613 0.4888 0.4852 0.5126 0.1290
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2-year End-of-Life Spending is in natural log form and is price, age, sex and race adjusted. Results shown are
for the 64 Hospital Referral Regions (HRRs) in which we have at least 3 patients and 3 cardiologists surveyed.
All regressions include a constant and control for the fraction of primary care physicians in the sample.
Respondent data is adjusted for race, sex and age. Survey sampling weights take into account differences
in the number of physician observations per HRR.C.4 Expanded Regression Estimates of Ln Medicare Expenditures
in the Last Two Years
Combined Sample: Cardiologists and PCPs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cardiologists per 100k 0.0390** 0.0499***
(0.0165) (0.0156)
Cowboy Ratio, All Doctors 0.6080*** 0.5212*** 0.5930*** 0.5115*** 0.3942***
(0.1345) (0.1232) (0.1385) (0.1252) (0.1340)
Comforter Ratio, All Doctors -0.3098*** -0.2876** -0.3018*** -0.2289* -0.1998*
(0.1093) (0.1144) (0.1134) (0.1277) (0.1022)
Follow-Up Low, All Doctors -0.3481 -0.1154 -0.3931 -0.1235 0.0410
(0.2246) (0.2165) (0.2642) (0.2010) (0.2364)
Follow-Up High, All Doctors 0.9409*** 0.7724*** 1.0192*** 0.7609*** 0.5836*
(0.1945) (0.2239) (0.2312) (0.2169) (0.2951)
(mean) Fraction Capitated 0.1622 0.2325*
(0.1313) (0.1245)
(mean) Fraction Medicaid -0.5005* -0.3495
(0.2976) (0.2288)
Base = (mean) Solo or 2-person Practice - -
(mean) Single/Multi Speciality Group Practice -0.2432 -0.2381
(0.1739) (0.1580)
(mean) Group/Staff HMO or Hospital-Based Practice -0.1735 -0.4342*
(0.2104) (0.2221)
(mean) Responds to Patient Expectations 0.0785 -0.0723
(0.1415) (0.1074)
(mean) Responds to Colleague Expectations -0.1456 -0.0044
(0.1208) (0.0967)
(mean) Responds to Referrer Expectations -0.0772 -0.1260
(0.1690) (0.1311)
(mean) Responds to Malpractice Concerns 0.1298 0.2344*
(0.1830) (0.1295)
N 64 64 64 64 64
R2 0.6008 0.6442 0.6112 0.6641 0.7310
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2-year End-of-Life Spending is in natural log form and is price, age, sex and race adjusted. Results shown are for the
64 Hospital Referral Regions (HRRs) in which we have at least 3 patients and 3 cardiologists surveyed. All regressions
include a constant and control for the fraction of primary care physicians in the sample. Respondent data is adjusted for
race, sex and age. Survey sampling weights take into account differences in the number of physician observations per HRR.
This ﬁgure provides additional visual evidence of the relationship between cowboy status and recommended follow-up
frequency for the HRRs with the greatest number of respondents; a point that is further out on the scale corresponds to a
larger fraction of physicians.
135Figure C.1: Radar Plots of Select High Follow-up Frequency and Cowboy Prevalence by HRR
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